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This dissertation posits, theoretically and empirically, that Agency Theory personal and 
organizational assumptions explain more fully and realistically than any other management 
theory the relationship in a business triad: Client-Headhunter-Candidate. Moreover, the 
dissertation develops research on the Executive Search Processes using third parties. This study 
identifies some situations in this triad relationship that may compromise the whole executive 
search process. The triad relationship is analyzed in dyads using the headhunter as a hinge 
between the two other parties. The central hypothesis is that Agency Theory presents more 
solid arguments and assumptions aligned with real-world situations than other management 
theories. This argument allows researchers to understand failures in the executive search 
process, creating the possibility of streamlining processes. 
The central hypothesis is reviewed and tested in few stages: first, by theoretical and context 
reviews on the triad relationship, and then in the dyad, headhunter-client. Furthermore, it tests 
in part the hypothesis in the dyad headhunter-candidate with data analyses derived from a 
survey among 202 candidates who have been contacted by headhunters.  
This dissertation provides contributions to management theory development with regard to the 
usage for Agency Theory on triads’ scenarios. This research presents the best explanation for 
a particular business triad like the client-headhunter-candidate triad. This thesis also provides 
contributions in the field of Human Resources Management. Another important contribution 
this study provides relates to the practitioners in the executive search profession and the 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION  
This dissertation analyzes the relationship between clients, headhunters and candidates, mainly 
under the personal and organizational assumptions denoted in the Agency Theory (Eisenhardt 
1989). It presents two large theoretical context reviews, and then the results of a survey 
conducted among a group of professionals (N=1775) located in sixteen countries (mainly in 
the US and Venezuela). These individuals were selected from a headhunter’s database on a 
professional network. This survey serves to test a set of hypotheses entirely related to the 
headhunter-candidate relationship, part of the triad relationship which has been less explored 
in previous research.   
In the first section (Chapter 2), I present a literature review, on which I connect the 
circumstances that surround an executive search process, reaching a convergence in regard to 
the use of Agency Theory as a framework for understanding this triad relationship. Following, 
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I denote in more detail some documented interactions related to the headhunter-client dyad, 
explained from my main theoretical framework. Then I develop content with the survey's 
results. I present the hypotheses linked to constructs like employment status, type of 
psychological contract between headhunters and the candidate, job search behavior, 
information sharing between them, and outcomes. 
This dissertation challenges the previous research done on this business triad using 
Coordination Theory. The research presents a group of contributions, which have applications 
in the research development of the business intermediaries and triads, agency theory  literature, 
the recruitment & selection field, career management,  and finally, but no less important, an 
academic explanation about a group of heretofore unaddressed issues and situations confronted 
by the practitioner community. 
In this introductory chapter section 1.2, I explain the importance of the triad relationship 
mentioned, providing motives related to the other aspects of the dissertation. In section 1.3, I 
establish a general linkage between the triad and Agency Theory, setting the importance of 
using this theory to understand this relationship. Then, in section 1.4, I develop some arguments 
in which I clarify the research and its significance for recruitment & selection and career 
development. Section 1.5 develops the connotation of this research with the practitioner’s 
perspective. Section 1.6 plots the purpose of the dissertation. Then, section 1.7 develops the 
research questions and main contributions. To end the chapter, I provide an outline for the 
additional chapters and content in this dissertation. 
1.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH RELATED TO THE 
CLIENT-HEADHUNTER-CANDIDATE TRIAD 
One of the biggest challenges for organizations is managing talent in the modern labor market 
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(Cappelli, Keller 2014a). The current labor market includes mobility among qualified 
individuals (Hamori 2010). Therefore, knowing how that mobility happened is important to 
companies. This mobility in many cases is related to headhunter’s intervention (Clerkin, Lee 
2010). The headhunters are part of a three-party relationship or triad between clients looking 
for particular talent and potential candidates with that talent who without the headhunter is 
highly probable that they will not engage with each other.  
The definition of triads as relations of three parties set by Simmel (1950) has been an important 
framework to understanding many business relations. These relationships implied individuals 
commonly known on the business arena as brokers. Simmel’s work is recognized as a starting 
point in the development of the typology for individuals who participate on triads. His research 
and concepts label the headhunter’s role as a “Tertius Gaudens,” in other words, a third party 
who can capitalize from the difference between the others. However, further developing on the 
topic implied strategies how to overcome these intermediaries using coalitions (Caplow 1968) 
between the two other parties. 
Unfortunately, the relationship between the three parties is a consequence of ignorance or 
unawareness of the other’s existence and (in most of the cases) with only full disclosure to the 
headhunters, a possible coalition will be almost impossible due to non-collective goal 
orientation (Porter 1970). I want to emphasize that this unawareness of the others is not the 
single cause of this relationship, as I will develop on the chapters Two, Three and Four. 
In a contemporary research done by Britton, Wright and Ball (2000), on which the relationship 
studied is similar to mine, the authors have used Coordination Theory as theoretical framework. 
Consequently, their research considers that all parties involved will need to have aligned 
objectives in order to achieve a common goal, falling on identical issues considered by Porter 
(1970). In the same line of analyzing this triadic relation, Khurana (2002) adds to Simmel’s 
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typology a more in-depth knowledge about the “intermediaries.” In his research, Khurana 
clearly set how the intermediaries (in this case, the headhunters) play an important role 
reducing information imbalances between the two other parties.   
Considering all these previous arguments and researchers, I see gaps in understanding how this 
triad works and what the real headhunter’s role in the triad is, which is what Simmel’s 
description of a Tertius Gaudens or an Intermediary that Khurana describes. Knowing how the 
triad works will clarify the all-intervening parties where they can intervene leveraging from a 
better position.  
1.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH ON THE CLIENT-
HEADHUNTER-CANDIDATE RELATIONSHIP USING 
AGENCY THEORY  
Professionals as agents have been researched using agency as a framework (Sharma 1997). 
Nevertheless, the importance considered by Sharma (1997) is connected to the precondition of 
knowledge as an element in the exchange of relations, making these types of agency situations 
different from other traditional typologies. Thus, I consider vital to give at this point a general 
explanation about agency theory, regardless that on each further chapter, the theory is well 
developed, adapted to the context and intervening parties.  
Agency theory is defined as the situation in which a Principal hires an Agent to act or decide 
on behalf of the first one performing a duty (Ross 1973a). However, an important issue 
considered by the theory is information asymmetries. This is defined with the imbalances of 
information between the principal and the agent (or intervening parties in exchange) (Arrow 
1963).  Based on this limitation of information the Principal and Agent can act at its own 
discretion assuming some risk for the other counter party (Jensen, Meckling 1976). This 
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aforementioned situation is called Moral Hazard (Arrow 1965). In some other cases, due to the 
limitation of information, the Agent makes the wrong decision on the Principal’s behalf, which, 
in this case, is called Adverse Selection (Akerlof 1970). To avoid these previous situations, the 
theory proposes the usage of contracts to limit actions and rewards or recompense adherence 
to the exchange following these bonds. 
In order to reduce information asymmetries, there are defined choices “signaling” or 
“screening.” Signaling is a way of information shared in the form of signals (Spence 1973). 
This is sent by one of the parties to the other, which may modify the behavior of the receiver. 
Screening is the technique used by economic agents to get information from their counterpart 
to minimize the information asymmetries (Stiglitz, Weiss 1992). 
A seminal paper that I have considered the main pillar for this dissertation is the research done 
by Eisenhardt (1989). In this article, she sets what is known as the agency theory assumptions, 
which can be divided into individual and organizational assumptions. The individual 
assumptions are self-interest, bounded rationality, and risk aversion. Self-interest is known as 
an explanation of why individuals tend to make decisions based on their benefit. Bounded 
rationality is the description given to how individuals never make perfect decisions because 
there is information unknown to them. Risk aversion is human behavior executed when 
individuals are exposed to uncertainty in the outcomes. Therefore, we tend to choose the less 






Table 1 Agency Theory Outline 
Key idea Principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient organization of 
Information and risk-bearing costs. 
Unit of analysis  Contract between principal and agent 
Human assumptions  Self-interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion 
Organizational 
assumptions 
Partial goal conflict among participants. 
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion. 
Information asymmetry between principal and agent 
Information assumption  Information as a purchasable commodity 
Contracting problems  Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection) 
Risk sharing 
Problem domain  Relationships in which the principal and agent have partly differing 
goals and risk preferences (e.g. compensation, regulation, leadership, 
impression management, whistle-blowing, vertical integration, transfer 
pricing) 
Source: Eisenhardt, 1989. 
The organizational assumptions are partial goal conflict, efficiency as the effectiveness 
criterion, and Information asymmetries among the parties. The partial goal conflict is the 
situations in which the same goals may be shared by the intervening parties. However, some 
other goals which are expected in the relationship correspond to their individual agendas. 
Therefore, principal and agent may be willing to achieve their personal agendas in some cases 
compromising the original agreement. In regards to the efficiency as effectiveness criteria, 
nothing other than how parties come up with the best and most efficient ways to create a 
contractual form may be beneficial for both. 
These assumptions are explained in detail along the Chapters 2, 3, and 4. Thus, the theoretical 
concepts presented above are just an introduction to the theory developed later. The simple 
propose at this point is to allow the comprehension for the triad relationship.  
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Considering the agency concepts exposed above, it is a clear agency relationship between 
clients and recruiters. Their relationship has a contractual element as the theory defines. Even 
so, in the case of the third party (the candidate) there is not a “de jure” contract with the 
headhunter. I posed towards a contract which may have similarities to psychological contracts 
set by Rousseau (1989). In other words, it’s a form of unwritten contract, which values more 
the temporality of the relationship and the definition of responsibilities to achieve goals. 
Moreover, another key element on this matter is the level of dependency developed by the 
principal and agent in comparison with the candidates. The latter may modify the process 
outcome at any moment. Candidates at some point can become principals in the triad, 
subjecting the agent to a second set of controls, which is a concept known as double agency 
(Child, Rodrigues 2003). Similar situations have been reviewed using agency theory and triads. 
For instance, these have documented for the marketing service sector (Tate, Ellram et al. 2010), 
and in the construction industry (van der Valk, van Iwaarden 2011). 
I support the main argument that the uniqueness of this work is Candidates as human beings 
are the “sellers” and the “assets” in this relationship. Given the particular characteristics of 
these individuals, their decision has a strong effect on their future professional lives and their 
importance in the triad is immeasurable. 
Therefore, maintaining a research of business triads using agency theory, provides far more 
realistic contributions than other theories which have considered commonalities or mutual 





1.4 THE IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH ON EXECUTIVE 
SEARCH PROCESS USING THIRD PARTIES FOR 
RECRUITMENT & SELECTION AND CAREER 
DEVELOPMENT 
Towards the end of the 80’s, recruitment and other hiring practices changed (Bonet, Cappelli 
et al. 2013). A shift from traditional ways of recruitment to the use of labor intermediaries is 
an example of this change. Among those intermediaries are Executive Search Firms, also 
known as headhunters; these are firms or “agents whom get paid fee by clients, companies or 
organizations to help them attract, hire, develop leaders” (Piccolo 2012). 
A 2014 report presented by the company Bullhorn (IT and software solutions for the staffing 
industry), expressed that from 2010 until 2014 70% or more of the respondents (n=1337, 
Staffing companies) met or exceeded their revenue goals (US and Canada). Another report 
(American Staffing Association (ASA) 2014) related to the industry, showed that besides the 
past few years of economic recession, there has been a “vigorous [growth]” in the staffing 
industry.  Along with these important references, companies like Korn Ferry, Boyden, Egon 
Zehnder, Heidrick & Struggles with large experience in this service industry, among others, 
have become global firms (Garrison 2005). This suggests that the executive search process is 
a business practice that impacts companies around the world. This is proven by these firms 
engagement on non-traditional markets, like higher education and non-profit organizations, in 
their searches for leadership positions. 
The executive search firms growth mentioned above and the high level of globalization (Hall, 




 The HR’s functions automatization or E-HRM is a major trend among organizations in the 
global context (Panayotopoulou, Vakola et al. 2007, Davila, Elvira et al. 2007). However, in 
the case of recruitment and selection people still play an important role, as they are active 
candidates (people looking for employment). As I explain and provide evidence in this 
dissertation, in many cases headhunters consider candidates who are not looking for 
employment. Therefore, it is important to maintain research on a sector as it can motivate the 
mobility among candidates. 
Another way to understand the headhunters’ work is seeing them as intermediaries between 
organizations looking for individuals with hard to find characteristics and the individuals 
themselves (Hamori 2010). Using these third parties to do the matchmaking can be expensive, 
however, due to the level of specialization that some positions require, an executive search firm 
may be cost efficient (Adler 2003).  
Finally, in regards of career development, previous research (Hamori, Kakarika 2009, Hamori 
2010, Hamori, Cao et al. 2012, Dreher, Lee et al. 2011) had shown it can be beneficial for 
candidates who choose to engage with headhunters. These individuals may have better 
opportunities for career growth and undergo higher career mobility than those without ties with 
headhunters. Thus, understanding through research how candidates interact during the 
executive search process is important.  
1.5 THE IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH ON EXECUTIVE 
SEARCH PROCESS USING THIRD PARTIES FOR 
PRACTITIONERS 
The executive search firms or headhunters are service firms that have been included on those 
that participate on “contestable markets” (Britton, Clark et al. 1992). These are markets where 
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there are short barriers to get in or out, non-sunk costs and equal conditions in regards 
technology accessibility for actual or new entrants (Baumol 1982). It seems like due to some 
of these characteristics plus the “confidentiality” (Jones 1989, Byrne 1986) that historically 
have surrounded this group, it can be seen as an occupation with a low level of professionalism.  
However, we can see how the Association of Executive Search Firms and Leadership 
Consultant (International Organization for Executive Recruiters) partnered with the most 
renowned business schools incorporating their alumni in possibilities of career management 
strategy (Association of Executive Search and Leadership Consultants (AESC) NAb). 
Furthermore, they have developed an advanced certificate program for these professionals with 
Cornell University ILR School (Association of Executive Search and Leadership Consultants 
(AESC) NAa).  
These previous signals from the practitioners in this field, like developing competencies on 
executive recruitment and creating synergies with business schools is proof there is an 
increment of the levels of professionalism in this activity, becoming more respectful service 
providers.  
These elements above discussed allow me to considered, how important is it that academia 
engages in developing more research that explains a more detailed process and the 
characteristics of this industry. Through keeping an ongoing investigation in this sector, it will 
eventually translate on the creations of formal academic courses. Consequently, training future 
professionals, creating streamline operations and process simplifying tasks for practitioners.  
1.6 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISSERTATION 
Gerald Roche, whom for many years was the Chairman for Hedrick and Struggles (one of the 
most recognized headhunting firms in the world) mentioned in an interview back in 1994 that 
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not all executive search processes end up rightly (Ettorre 1994). On the same line and more 
recently, Sengupta (2004) raises concerns in regards to “outside hiring agencies” capable of 
assessing potential candidates well, but may not be able to create a good matchmaking with the 
job and the immediate supervisor. When an executive search process fails, there are many 
parties affected: individuals, organizations and society.  
In regards to individuals, the headhunters are pointed as creators of a new race of upper-echelon 
executives who moves from top organizations to others (Luci 2012a). In reality, after reviewing 
many documents, I have realized for each successful search process, there are between two or 
three candidates who reach the final stage or shortlisted (Dingman 1993) , but are dismissed. 
In some other cases, there are positions, which stay non cover. Thus, I may argue that some 
individuals may develop their career better than others because headhunters (Nazmi 2005), in 
contraposition to others that have engaged in a process somehow unsuccessful.  Failed search 
processes include those on which candidates make the wrong decision in joining a company 
that in the short term, may not be what they were expecting.  
Therefore, the individuals who interact in this relationship play an important role not only while 
they are engaged as a potentially selected candidate, but also after the process has ended. 
Consequently, I consider it important to review what fails for them during the process. It is 
interesting that there are few papers that consider the candidates’ perspectives for this process 
(Britton, Wright et al. 2000, Dreher, Lee et al. 2011).  
Previously, I have addressed that organizations hire headhunters to execute tasks on which the 
last may provide solutions with constrain resources (information).  An important concern to 
business is that whenever they decide to outsource a service, will the vendor be able to deliver 
lasting results.  What happened after an executive search process did not end properly? As I 
explain in the Chapter 3, headhunters base their business on repeating job orders from their 
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clients. Therefore, each time a search process fails it is possible there would not be another one 
with the same client. More dramatic is for contingent headhunters (section 2.3) who basically 
work at their own risk, with no consolation prize.  
Another issue triggered when the process fails, is that the client is left with an open position. 
In many cases, reducing the capability of decision-making for lacking of the right individual 
or relaying those decisions to others. There are some costs involving the use of headhunters 
like many other outsourced services. However, there is evidence of a higher cost relating to 
unfilled positions (Tracey, Hinkin 2008, Jones 1990), more so when these positions require 
particular characteristics. Therefore, knowing how to reduce the failure rate on executive search 
processes using headhunters will have positive impacts to organizations. 
Confidentiality is a particular characteristic in the executive search industry (Garrison 2005, 
Jones 1989, Finlay, Coverdill 2002). This common practice has surrounded headhunting for 
many years, and limited the possibility of formal academic research.  However, under the veil 
of confidentiality (Jamal, Bowie 1995) there are many wrong practices in the professional 
arena, erroneous actions that may compromise the whole process. It seems like there are still 
parts of the executive recruitment process that look like a “Black Box”, not allowing outsiders 
to know how things work. The society requires more transparency every day. Moreover, on 
issues related to business and individuals, considering these previous arguments, there are 
foundations to see how important it is for the society learn and discover how these 
intermediaries operate.  
The core purposes of this dissertation is to review and understand how the client-headhunter-
candidate relationship is aligned under a theoretical framework of Agency theory with a high 
level of asymmetries in the process.  
As I have mentioned, there are three main slopes that haven been used to develop research in 
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regards the practice of headhunters. The first group, started in the nineties with topics related 
to consultant firms, which argued the importance of this service industry and the characteristics. 
This research was led by Timothy Clark (Durham Business School) along with some retired 
professors from the Leicester Business School. Secondly, another group (Prof. William Finlay 
and James Coverdill from University of Georgia) on the late 90s and early 2000, which 
developed an ethnographic research, actually the most documented and detailed research done 
in the headhunting industry. Finally, there was a third group that included Monika Hamori 
(Instituto de Empresas), and Peter Cappelli (Wharton School of Business) which focused on 
career development and the industry impact for some individuals and organizations. In most 
cases, they were all contacted during the development of this dissertation, unfortunately due to 
agenda issues I was only able to meet in person with Prof. Hamori. With the exemption of Prof. 
Clark that at some point research the headhunting sector using agency theory (Clark 1993), all 
others have considered different theories. However, this research antecedent didn’t 
contemplate the candidate and a third party. As a secondary purpose of this dissertation is 
maintaining the conversation and research field that used Agency Theory for triads on the 
service industry.  
1.7 RESEARCH QUESTION AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
The main investigation question addressed in this research is as follows:  
What Agency Theory arguments and assumptions provide understanding for the client-
headhunter-candidate relationship as a triad? 
In order to answer this question I did two theoretical-contextual reviews and an empirical 
research. On the first review, I examined the headhunters as a hinge in the relationship, partially 
adapting the methodology used by Armenakis & Bedejan (1999). Building over some 
headhunting industry characteristics and documented and identifiable process (Finlay, 
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Coverdill 2002, Garrison 2005, Byrne 1986, Dingman 1993) I’m able to use agency theory 
arguments and assumptions to explain some of the issues like timeframes in the search process, 
confidentially, information asymmetries created by the client, and the candidates’ perspectives 
about the relationship.  
For the second theoretical contextual analysis, I review the relationship client-headhunter. 
Considering that this is a natural principal-agent scenario (Stiglitz 1987), I took a similar 
approach to that on the previous review. On this second group of content, I consider situations 
where the client produce (consciously or unconsciously) information asymmetries. I also 
explore the ways clients evaluate the services provided by the headhunter and the double 
principal issue. To that end, I explain and argue the Hidden profile concept proposed. 
Systematically, and considering that I had already factored the client-headhunter relationship, 
it made sense to contemplate another part of the triad. On the empirical research, I chose to 
review the relationship headhunter-candidate from the perception of the latter, using as a 
dependent variable the outcomes obtained from the relationship set with the headhunter. These 
outcomes as I explain are aligned to those recently considered in the HR literature (Saks, Zikic 
et al. 2015) adapting those to the outcomes pointed in this context. I contemplate this the logical 
way to complete a research on this triad.  
The empirical part mentioned here includes as a starting point the employment status for 
candidates (Hamori 2010, Sonnenfeld, Ward 2008) that have engaged with headhunters. The 
employment status is used as an antecedent for the information shared between candidates and 
headhunters, the efforts done by a candidate during the relationship and the perception of a 
proposed form of contract that I suggest. These three variables are tested towards the outcomes 
achieved by the candidate.  This chapter’s results provide evidence that there are some elements 
of the psychological contract present in the candidate-headhunter relationship, but also 
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supports the idea that efforts in looking for a job executed by the candidate during the 
interactions with the headhunter are related to outcomes.  
This dissertation provides contributions to the Management theory development in regards to 
the usage for agency theory on triads’ scenarios. First, because the research presented can 
identify some situations existing in the context of executive search using headhunters, and 
explain those under the agency theory, an approach never executed before in this context for a 
triad. Second, because it maintains the stem related to “double agency” in the service industry, 
with the particularity that in this triad as I mention in the dissertation the asset of exchange is 
a human being, which has relevance and decision in the process. I consider this dissertation 
aligned with the other previous research which combine Agency Theory and Behavioral 
outcomes (Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia 1998). However, in my case the context is a process on 
which there are three parties and relates to the service industry.  
Ultimately, the biggest theoretical contribution for this research is the possibility to explain a 
business triad so particular like the client-headhunter-candidate under a theory (Agency) more 
realistic in the context described.  
This thesis also provides contributions in the field of Human Resources Management. First, 
because it offers an academic review from the executive search process using third party. 
Second, it explores more in deep the usage of service providers in processes like recruitment 
and selection. Third, because suggested concepts like the “Hiring Authority” and the “Hidden 
Profile” which related to issues on HR. Fourth, it explains the role HR units which may play 
positively or not in an executive search process. Finally, it also identifies a group of situations 
that negatively affect the interaction with executive recruiters. 
Another important contribution this study provides relates to the practitioners in the executive 
search profession and the individuals who use them as an outlet to develop their careers. Most 
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of the research available to practitioners in this field tends to be from Executive Search Firms, 
Association groups or research done by vendors that serve this industry. Therefore, in many 
cases I argue that it could be some level of bias. This is one of the few researches that have 
considered the candidates as the main source of information.  
Understanding some of the candidate’s perceptions of the overall process, and their position in 
regards to the relationship developed with the headhunters, we are able to provide solutions to 
the issues in this relationship and keep reducing the informational gaps between the 
participants.  
Finally, but not less important, this dissertation has served to set up a personal research agenda 
in this topic, and build a strong network of researchers and collaborators with whom I’m 
actually developing some other investigations.  
 
1.8 DISSERTATION OUTLINE 
This dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I present the first contextual-theoretical 
review titled Executive recruitment triads and Agency Theory. In that chapter, I lay the 
theoretical foundations of this whole dissertation. This section allows me to build upon 
theoretical assumptions and establishes some links and parallelisms that allow the reader 
understand how an organizational theory can be applied to a triad. This approach is similar to 
“Building Theory” suggested by Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007), with the only following 
difference: instead of utilizing cases, I used a process and a context to develop my arguments.  
Then considering the approach took by Caplow (1968), I decided to split this triad in dyads 
using the headhunter as a hinge between the client and the candidates.  
In Chapter 3, I present the second contextual-theoretical review entitled “Information 
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Asymmetries between Clients and Headhunters.” As I have explained previously, the client-
headhunter relationship is most definitely a natural principal-agent dilemma. Therefore, I 
consider it more important to develop more theoretical concepts regarding this dyad. Through 
this, I have been able to develop a set of testable propositions and turn the conversation into an 
empirical study of the headhunter-candidate relationship. 
For Chapter 4, I present an experimental study entitled “The Headhunter-Candidate 
Relationship: A Different Form of Agency.” In this chapter, I develop some constructs based 
on latent and observable variables, which create a model that reflects the candidate’s 
perceptions about some agency theory issues and assumptions. Here, I develop the research 
hypotheses, describe the research method, and the results, where I will conclude my findings 
and discuss those results. Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes all of my findings throughout my 
dissertation and gives some suggestions for future research. 
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In recent years, talent has become a strategic priority for organizations (Guthridge, Komm et 
al. 2008). The “war of talent” (Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al. 2009) is at the top of the 
business agenda as organizations look to attract the most talented executives to lead their 
businesses. The complexity of this process among the core activities for strategic HR has led 
to the outsourcing of talent recruitment and selection1 (Greer, Youngblood et al. 1999). For 
                                                          
1 I want to clarify to readers that throughout the chapter we use Recruitment and Selection (R&S) indistinctly. 
Some academics and practitioners may argue that this is a different process, and I totally agree, but I generate 
sufficient information in the chapter showing that headhunters may be involved in both R&S activities, 
therefore, the term should be understood within the scope described. 
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high-level executives and many other highly skilled employees, the responsibility is shared 
with third parties that provide recruitment, selection and on-board services. Within the 
professionals’ or practitioners’ field, these firms are also known as Executive Recruitment 
Firms or Headhunters.  
Executive recruitment refers to the process of attracting and selecting candidates through direct 
and personal contact by a specialist consultant who acts as an intermediary between the 
employer (often referred to as client or customer) and the candidates for the available position 
(Britton, Wright et al. 2000). An industry report by the Association of Executive Search 
Consultants (Association of Executive Search and Leadership Consultants (AESC) 2014) 
forecasted that these service providers would generate around US$11 billion in 2014, showing 
a steady growth of revenue since 1978. The same report also detailed high expectations in 
maintaining growth for this industry, mainly due to demographic shifts in developed countries. 
Considering these socio-economic facts and their role in providing highly qualified, hard to 
find talent for organizations, the importance of research on this topic cannot be overstated.  
Clerkin and Lee (2010) highlight the scarcity of research on the executive search process. 
Theories like transaction cost theory (Williamson 1981), resource base view (Barney 1991) 
and coordination theory (Malone, Crowston 1990) have been applied in the few studies done 
on this topic. Transaction cost theory frames headhunting as outsourcing (Finlay, Coverdill 
1999), while resource base view explains why young companies poach executive talent from 
competitors (Rao, Drazin 2002) and coordination theory helps to understand the expectation 
gaps between the intervening parties (Britton, Wright et al. 2000).   
Another perspective that sheds light on the executive search process with different angle is 
agency theory (Jensen, Meckling 1976), which explains cooperative efforts between 
organizations and agents (Eisenhardt 1989), like executive search firms (ESF). This 
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cooperation in part is the information exchange. Information is considered a commodity that 
may be exchanged for money; thus in the recruitment process there is a knowledge imbalance 
between the three parties: client, headhunter and candidate. This imbalance is known in agency 
theory as information asymmetry (Stiglitz, Weiss 1992), which may be defined as the 
dissimilarity in knowledge between two parties in an economic or social interaction with 
respect to outcomes (Shapiro 2005). 
 While other theories explain why companies use headhunters, coordination and agency 
theories are more concerned with what happens during the process. Unfortunately, coordination 
theory assumes common goals between the intervening parties; an assumption that, as I show 
below, does not always hold true. Agency theory reflects this and offers robust explanations of 
behaviors exhibited by the parties in this triad: clients, headhunters and candidates. A triad can 
be defined as an exchange that involves three parties buyer - intermediaries – seller (Simmel, 
1950). Typically, agency theory has been used most often to explain dyadic relationships, but 
I submit that using it in the context of this triad is a contribution to the field is of value to the 
study. 
 There are two main purposes for this chapter. First, I discuss the applicability of agency 
theory in the context of this triad. Second, to study this triad, I use examples documented in the 
context in which information asymmetries play an important role. In addition, I present testable 
propositions to demystify this process. A key contribution is a theoretical discussion about what 
happens during the executive search process using headhunters, giving partial explanations to 
the argument posed by Sengupta (2004) there are so many companies (headhunters) that are 
able to assess potential candidates reasonably well, but not reach the matchmaking with their 
customers.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows: In the first section, I review agency theory in the 
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realm of recruitment and selection of executives using headhunters. I examine a triadic instead 
of the traditional dyadic process. Next, I review the headhunter’s role and the payment schemes 
used with possible effects on the process. The third part elaborates on information imbalance 
from the candidate’s angle. To conclude, I present implications, conclusions and potential areas 
for future research. 
2.2 AGENCY THEORY AND EXECUTIVE SEARCH FIRMS 
Agency theory can be defined as a mode of interaction between two (or more) parties, where 
the agent is hired or appointed to make decisions on behalf the principal (Ross 1973b). This 
concept has been used to describe the interaction between the headhunter and the client or 
employer (Britton, Ball 1999). The theory focuses in part on how information differences or 
asymmetries (Akerlof 1970) may affect goal alignment between principal and agent 
(Eisenhardt 1989). This situation is commonly present in many employer-employee or client-
vendor relationships.   
These asymmetries between principal and agent can lead to two main situations: moral hazard 
(Arrow 1963) and adverse selection (Akerlof 1970). Moral hazard can be conceptualized as the 
benefit extracted from taking advantage of another, using information from related interactions 
(Holmstrom 1982). In some cases, either party’s partial or total ignorance may augment 
asymmetry. Moreover, the eventual discovery of the advantage may terminate the relationship 
(Baker 1996). Adverse selection describes situations when, due to the information imbalance, 
the principal is not fully aware of the quality of the service or product offered or chosen by the 
agent. Therefore, the decision may produce undesirable results (Akerlof 1970).  
Britton and Ball (1999)  used agency theory to describe the client-headhunter relationship. 
Clark (1993) used information asymmetries and the potential outcomes (moral hazard and 
adverse selection) to explain quality in service industries.  Due to the intangibility and 
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perishability of the services, information asymmetries exist because service providers 
(including headhunters) may be able to offer high or low quality products, but the buyer is 
unable to fully assess the value of such characteristics. However, while Britton and Ball’s 
(1999) and Clark’s (1993) papers were pioneering in using agency theory to study ESFs and 
their clients, the candidate’s role, arguably the most important actor in the process, was not 
included.  
Research in agency theory has considered situations in which the agent has responsibilities 
with two principals who may have interactions between them (Hallock 1999). Dual agency is 
defined as the condition in which an agent has two sets of controls or principals (Child, 
Rodrigues 2003). The agent, thus, may compromise the level of trustworthiness between each 
party, thus creating potential conflicts of interest. In other words, the dual agent has 
responsibilities to both parties.  Dual agency has been used in service sectors like real estate 
(Miceli, Pancak et al. 2000, Evans, Kolbe 2005, Heisler, Kallberg et al. 2007) where the 
relationship between sellers, realtors and buyers – another triad - is scrutinized. Other 
researchers also mention dual agency in relation to corporate board compositions and 
governance (Child, Rodrigues 2003, Hallock 1999) and psychiatrists in the military (Hines, 
Ader et al. 1998). Furthermore, triads and dual agency have been documented in the literature 
using supply chain as context. For instance Gunawardane (2012) and van der Valk and van 
Iwaarden (2011)  have studied service triads in the context of supply chains and construction. 
Using agency theory in the headhunter’s context is, therefore, a logical extension with highly 
valuable implications. 
Agency theory presents human and organizational assumptions that permeate the theory 
(Eisenhardt 1989); the human assumptions are: 
 Self-Interest: individuals tend to give priority to their own benefits, even when they are 
40 
 
performing on behalf of someone else (Smith 2010). Also, in the case of executive 
recruitment, the individualistic culture (Miller 1999) related to: career advancement for 
the candidates, possibility to fulfil job order (search) by the headhunter, and locating 
the right candidate in the adequate timeframe and salary by the client makes this self-
interest play a preponderant role during the relationship engagement.  
 Bounded Rationality: decisions made by individuals are based on incomplete 
information; in many cases, the decision is not optimal (Simon 1957). This is core issue 
in this relationship. First, this bond is based on initial information asymmetries among 
the parties. Second, because the information is partially disclosed during the process. 
And finally, as all information is disclosed not necessarily imply that the client chose 
the optimal candidate, or the candidate accept an equal or better than expected position. 
 Risk Aversion (Arrow 1965): individuals tend to take less risk in decision making if a 
potential outcome has a negative level payoff. 
Eisenhardt (1998, p.59) mentions the following as organizational assumptions: 
 Partial goal conflicts among parties: both principal and agent interests are based on the 
human assumptions described above. Thus, whether they engage in a contract or not, 
their ultimate interest may be different. 
 Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion: in other words, the selection of the governing 
contract for the relation may be based on behavior (process) or outcome (result). Actors 
will choose whatever contract is the most efficient for their interaction. 
 Information asymmetry between the parties: from the beginning, the principal engages 
with the agent assuming the latter has better knowledge about the particular task; thus, 
asymmetry is embedded. 
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Source: own elaboration, based on Eisenhardt, 1989 and Britton, Wright & Ball, 2000. 
 
Each of these assumptions is present in the headhunting process. Figure 1 shows the 
interactions in the triad. For instance, research by Coverdill and Finlay (2000) describes the 
low level of risk taken by headhunters to secure job orders from customers. They describe how 
final goals for intervening parties are different: for the client, obtaining a suitable candidate 
and for the headhunter, providing service with the possibility of repeating business. In relation 
to human assumptions between headhunters and candidates, Luci (2012) discusses how 
interactions may benefit headhunters and clients, for instance, knowing the salaries in the labor 
market. Therefore, I consider that a distinguishable contribution to this study is to be able to 
connect these two dyads -client- headhunter and candidate- headhunter- and see them as a “triad 
case” client-headhunter-candidate not only based in the transactional, short term, but also in 














2.3 HEADHUNTERS, INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES AND 
PAYMENT SCHEMES 
Executive search firms can also be characterized by specialization, in particular areas such as 
information technology, marketing and human resources (Garrison 2005). Other headhunter 
characteristics are that they provide efficiency and expertise-based advantages (Hamori 2004). 
In relation to efficiency, headhunters tend to have databases with sizable pools of potential 
candidates for executive positions or experienced individuals with rare competencies. They are 
then able to expend less time and resources than most human resources units. Their duties 
include all the tasks needed to have a positive outcome. For instance: 
…prescreening candidates according to the criteria define by the client, provide access to a 
larger pool of potential candidates who otherwise may not be interested, promote the client 
firm to candidates or groups, diffuse incorrect or potential damaging information, and serve 
as channel of communication during the recruitment and selection process between client and 
candidates. (Africa, Major 1988)  
Also, in some cases, they are chosen by clients to execute “lateral” hiring (Gardner, Stansbury 
et al. 2010), also known as “poaching” candidates from competitors.  
Another justification for using an external source is based on Transaction Cost Theory. 
Considering the low frequency of an executive search process and how the newly hired 
employee’s competencies are so rare, organizations prefer “buying” talent instead of “making” 
it (Williamson 1981). In some cases, it is more costly to develop within the company a 
replacement for a leadership position than bring a good candidate from the outside (Finlay, 
Coverdill 1999). Besides economic reasons, there are other reasons why companies may use 
headhunter, for instance, to legitimize the selection of a candidate for an upper echelon position 
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when stakeholders require an external search (Khurana 2002b).  
To understand the triangular relation, I describe how this process happens. Some authors (Jones 
1989, Finlay, Coverdill 2002, Garrison 2005) agree on general features of the recruitment 
process using headhunters. First, the client requests candidates with a particular profile from 
the consultant. These candidates must have a set of skills and competencies that satisfy the 
client’s expectations. 
Next, the consultant will prioritize the search for those candidates in their database and network 
of contacts. Those candidates who match the desired profile may be interviewed and screened 
about the position; then those open to the possibility of working for the client will be included 
in a “short list” of potential candidates. Following contractual conditions, the consultant will 
then present a short list with candidate dossiers. With this information, the client evaluates 
potential fit and proceeds to interview those candidates they deem best. Once the client 
recognizes their most desirable candidates, they proceed to make an offer. If accepted, the 
candidate initiates the client’s internal recruitment process or onboarding. At this point, the 
consultant may monitor only the culmination of the process; but, in some cases, they may help 
with the onboarding (a process by which organizations help new employees adapt to their new 
positions in an organization).  
Finlay and Coverdill (2002) say that headhunters have to make a “Double Sale”: candidates to 
their customers and vice versa. These roles are similar to those of brokers, with the major 
difference that their “products” - candidates and clients - can share information or keep it to 
themselves. Headhunters act as “Tertius Gaudens” or “happy third parties” (Simmel 1950) 
capitalizing on the interaction between client and candidate and ideally placing them in a better 
position by putting buyers and sellers in the same context. This headhunter brokerage allows 
them to act as an agent for the candidate (as well as the client), therefore, triggering what I 
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defined in the previous section as “Double Agency.” This moment is the trigger for an increase 
in information asymmetries between the three parties.  
Towards the end of the process, the headhunter is described as the “Visible Hand” (Finlay, 
Coverdill 2002) and often acts as a mediator between the other two parties. At each step of the 
information, sharing process-getting information from clients and candidates, selecting likely 
candidates, interviewing and ensuring offers are made, asymmetric information and moral 
hazard may become an issue. These issues may be reduced, increased or modified based on 
each executive search firm’s contractual and other preferences. 
Agency theory research (Eisenhardt 1989) emphasizes how important it is to review the 
payment scheme used in the process. Dingman (1993) divides headhunters into two big groups: 
“Retainers” and “Contingents.” Retainer search firms are those that charge a periodic fee and 
often have exclusivity during each of the sub-processes of the search. The exclusivity and the 
intention of keeping customers in the long run constitute great incentives for seeking optimal 
results, i.e., finding the best available candidate to suit customer requirements. 
 “Contingency recruiters” are those firms that only get paid if the position is filled successfully 
(Garrison 2005); their fees are totally dependent on their outcome. These headhunters do not 
receive exclusivity in their search and they may be competing with other firms also performing 
a search for the same client (Finlay, Coverdill 2002). These types of recruiters tend to perform 
searches for mid-to low-level positions, compared to “retainer headhunters” who aim for higher 
level positions.  
Considering agency theory’s organizational assumption of efficiency in the selection contract 
type, contingent headhunters are almost solely based on outcomes, while retainer headhunters 
are rewarded by a mix of the outcomes and behavior (processes) that they deliver and exhibit.  
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This situation is consistent with a report published by Bullhorn Inc. (2014) (Software company 
focused on CRM2 solutions for headhunters) that suggests that “retainers” do searches faster 
than “contingents.” Also, retainers complete more assignments than contingents. This is also 
in line with a report by the Association of Executive Search Consultants (Association of 
Executive Search Consultants (AESC), 2011), in which they compared benefits between 
retainer and contingent headhunters. The capacity demonstrated by retainer headhunters 
regarding the process, the speed, the quantity of searches provided and, most importantly, long 
term relations with their customers, leads us to believe that they tend to manage information 
asymmetries better. Another evidence that may be considered to support the idea of reduced 
information asymmetries by retainer headhunters can be how best firms are rated in some 
rankings. The most influential headhunters (Bloomberg Business 2008a, Bloomberg Business 
2008b)  and more important firms (Garrison 2005) tend to be retainers. I argued that retainer 
firms lay on their quality recognition in using this payment scheme, and their results tend to 
satisfy their clients, consequently reducing information asymmetries with them. Therefore, I 
present my first set of testable propositions: 
P.1a Executive recruitment searches using retainer firms exhibit reduced information 
asymmetries. 
P.1b Executive recruitment searches using contingent firms exhibit increased information 
asymmetries. 
                                                          
2 Customer relation management can be defined as a data  
base management tool that allows for increase in customer retention or customer partnering (Sin, Alan 






These propositions leave open the possibility that retainer firms may also manage unbalanced 
information and can generate moral hazard situations. For example, time to deliver results is 
an important indicator in this industry (Bullhorn 2014). Based on the urgency to fulfill the 
position, client and headhunter should define an initial time frame. Previous research has 
reported the importance of time to produce results as a quality element expected by clients 
(Fish, Macklin 2004). I also suggest that knowing how urgently services are required is 
consistent with the human assumptions of the theory; this time frame can be used by 
headhunters or candidates to extract rents from the client.  
For instance, the headhunter’s self-interest may afford higher priorities to a particular search. 
Also, adding rationality, the urgency of the position to be filled may impose larger constraints 
on the decision making process. Ultimately, the headhunter may exhibit different behaviors to 
manage the situation. For instance, if the time frame is short, the headhunter could produce 
candidates with a lesser likelihood of person-position or person-organization fit than if they 
took more time to identify candidates. This argument diverges from Kristof-Brown et al. 
(2005), on which they argued that recruiters’ perceptions of candidates person-organization fit 
are low in validity. However, my position is aligned with evidences presented by Carless (2005) 
on which she advocates for the need of more information early in the recruitment process to 
develop better fit perception, therefore with more time the headhunter may develop a better 
person-position fit. As quality in the person-position fit is likely a function of information 
shared, I offer my second proposition: 






Fish and Mack (2006) considered the high importance of confidentiality in the headhunting 
process. In fact, confidentiality is of high importance in managing information from client firms 
to candidates and vice versa, when acting as messengers, buffers and mediators between them. 
By itself, the term “confidentiality” implies unbalanced information. Indeed, this has been a 
major limitation to carrying out research in this industry. Moreover, under the veil of 
confidentiality, not all interactions are honest (Jamal, Bowie 1995). I may argue that, in some 
cases, the actors in the process use this confidentiality as a shield to limit access to information. 
Therefore, this confidentiality may have positive or negative consequences during the 
executive recruitment process.  
There are many cases in which confidentiality towards the candidates harms the process. Volpe 
and Tucker (2004) state how limiting information given the potential candidate may hamper 
the evaluation of whether a position is desirable to them or not. A second scenario could be 
that the consultant gives excessive information that allows the candidate to negotiate from a 
stronger position, opening the door to opportunistic behavior or moral hazard. A third scenario 
would be when the consultant creates false expectations in the candidate, and the latter makes 
decisions (e.g. resigning from present job) without a firm commitment from the hiring client. 
On the other hand, in some instances, those levels of confidentially may not even exist in search 
processes in which full transparency may be required. For example, some searches in 
education, nonprofit organizations or a few government agencies cannot guarantee 
confidentiality due to regulations or organizational preferences. 
Headhunters may produce better process the candidates if they provide precise and clear 
information about their clients, similar to what has been called  realistic job previews (Breaugh 
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1983),3 but they should always strive to maintain the client’s confidentiality if requested 
(National Association of Executive Recruiters 2014). I introduce my third proposition:  
P.3 Executive recruitment searches with high levels of confidentiality increase information 
asymmetries. 
I have presented some situations that show how information asymmetries can be originated by 
headhunters. However, this situation still have two other members in this triad; I now turn to a 
discussion of how clients’ actions also affect the process. 
2.4 INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES CREATED BY CLIENT 
FIRMS 
Clients play a very active role in the triad. Based on the report published by the Association of 
Executive Search Consultants in 2011 (Association of Executive Search Consultants [AESC], 
2011a), 68% of their customers have an in-house unit that may perform recruitment and 
selection processes, usually the HR or personnel department. Their client firms are in multiple 
industries or sectors, as well as in multiple countries (Faulconbridge and Hall et al., 2008). 
A common denominator for many organizations that hire executive recruiters is the partial or 
complete failure of succession planning (Khurana 2001, Khurana 2002b, Byrne 1986). 
Succession planning has been defined as the leadership developing internally within an 
organization to guarantee that there will be people for the upper-echelon positions in the future 
(Charan, Drotter et al. 2010). Many times headhunters are contacted by customers when there 
is an urgent need for a replacement. 
                                                          
3 Realistic job preview (Premack, Wanous 1985) can be defined as all positive and negative 
information in regards to a position that employers provide to potential candidates.  
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In some cases, headhunters are called to perform searches because of conflicts of interest 
between clients and their current employees. Third parties may be the best choice for protecting 
the clients’ interests (Sengupta 2004). To illustrate, a position may be actually covered, but the 
company may try to find a more suitable replacement, in cases like new marketing officers or 
positions related to changes in the business model. A company that is changing its strategy may 
realize that current employees lack the necessary knowledge, skills and attributes for its new 
chosen direction; however, companies may decide to maintain or retain someone even if a 
replacement is hired. Another example is when a technical or leadership position that requires 
high levels of confidentiality towards any stakeholder opens. Many companies attempt to 
manage the process outside the organization. In all cases, the main information providers are 
the clients. 
What is clear is that client firms are generally responsible for initiating the process by giving 
the “job order” (Finlay, Coverdill 2002). Qualitative research by Hamori (2002) addressed 
three roles of “clients” during an executive search process using third parties. She argues there 
are three important roles played by client firms: ultimate decision maker, executor of the search 
steps and input (information) provider. In the first role, ultimate decision maker, clients are the 
ones responsible for choosing among the candidates short listed by the headhunter; the client’s 
decision will override any of the headhunters’ suggestions.  
In the role of executor of the search, Hamori (2002) describes how clients manage the interview 
process. They have control of this situation. In some cases, the headhunter may try to influence 
candidates, but clients will be the ones that will ultimately make the candidate confident about 
this potential outcome (staying in the process and eventually accepting the position. Finally, as 
an input provider, the client provides continuous feedback regarding the candidates and 
services rendered. For instance, in providing feedback about candidates after the first 
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interviews, the client lets the headhunters know how suitable the candidates were. Furthermore, 
at the end of the service, an input is given. This may correct any potential mistakes for further 
searches. 
2.4.1 Ideal candidate profile 
 
Input from the client (once the process is closed) may help the candidate’s onboarding process, 
avoid early termination or reduce turnaround in the position. I submit that the information 
provider is a decisive role for the client, because if the information given to the headhunter and 
the candidate is limited or unclear, information asymmetries will be increased. Therefore, the 
headhunters’ duties are beyond the short-term, transactional relationship. In other cases, the 
headhunter may have to exert extra effort due to limited information from the client. For 
instance, the principal might not provide enough information about the skill set the ideal 
candidate should have (Williamson, Wachter et al. 1975).  
The ideal candidate profile includes three characteristics. Two have already been developed by 
Finlay and Coverdill (2002): Knowledge, Skill and Attributes (KSA) and Fit. KSA or specifics 
are the technical characteristics that give evidence to the employer that the candidate will be 
able to perform the task; they are usually defined in the job profile. The fit (Rynes, Gerhart 
1990) is a form of adaptability that the ideal candidate will have in order to adjust to the 
organizational culture of the client’s firm and to the particular job. In both cases, these factors 
are measurable.  However, I also consider that there is a portion of this ideal candidate’s profile 
often not provided by the client; what has been defined as the “Hidden Profile”, concept that I 
develop in the section 3.6. This includes all the client’s biased perceptions about a group of 
candidates who may have a specific race, gender, education, etc. These are not usually 
disclosed by the client, but by “screening” the headhunter may be able to identify them before 
presenting candidates.  
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This information is vital to creating a narrower and more precise shortlist of candidates. 
Williamson et al. (1975) argue that not being clear about an ideal candidate’s characteristics 
may trigger moral hazard from the agent, because the headhunter will know how complicated 
the task will be and, consequently, he or she will find justification to increase the price of the 
service. The partial disclosure of information may happen consciously or unconsciously. 
However, it may also open the door for opportunistic behavior by the client firm, because its 
managers may use the lack of information to blame the headhunters if the process fails. More 
formally, my fourth proposition states: 
P4: Executive recruitment searches that have an extensive ideal candidate’s profile reduce 
information asymmetries. 
2.4.2 Employment Status for Recruiters 
 
For many companies, the employment status (employed or not) is an important factor during 
the recruitment process. For instance, employers tend to consider candidates to be more suitable 
if they are employed (Eriksson, Lagerström 2006) at the moment that they are contacted by the 
headhunters. Clients can also use information created by other parties to generate an 
opportunistic situation. Previous research (Behrenz 2001) has shown that many candidates are 
employed at the moment they engage in an executive recruitment process using third parties. 
However, in some cases, this employment status may generate information asymmetries 
between the client firm and potential candidates. Specifically, when a candidate is employed 
he or she may be more adverse to the risks associated with considering other jobs. On the other 
hand, unemployed candidates may be more collaborative during the executive search process, 
because they do not have the safety net or the reputational risk that employed candidates have.  
Based on this mobility, I argue that, at times, the best candidate may not be found in other 
organizations but in the labor market. Mergers, acquisitions or other similar events may cause 
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perfectly effective and productive individuals to experience a spell of unemployment. Other 
candidates may leave their employers because of reasons not related to the executive's 
reputation, or their organization’s performance. Regardless of the reasons, it is conceivable that 
very suitable candidates may be temporally unemployed. As such, unemployed candidates may 
be more collaborative during the process, for instance, engaging with the headhunter and the 
client. This is aligned to agency theory because the risk aversion for an unemployed candidate 
is lower due to the self-interest in obtaining employment. However, from the client’s 
perspective, unemployed candidates are under appreciated because they may send the wrong 
signal to potential employers. 
Employment status can create opportunistic behavior from the client firm as well. For example, 
clients may offer compensation below the original salary expected. When clients do not mind 
the candidate’s employment status (employed or not), the process tends to be less asymmetric 
for all the parties involved. Clients are able to expand the potential pool of candidates. Agency 
theory suggest that a salary offer below the one originally disclosed by the headhunter can 
generate moral hazard on the client’s part and a bad beginning for the relationship between 
employer and the employee. This may be minimized if a preliminary salary is included in the 
realistic job preview disclosed by the executive search firm to the potential candidate.  
This gives rise to my proposition: 
P.5 Executive recruitment searches that include unemployed candidates reduce information 
asymmetries with the headhunter but increase the asymmetries with the client’s firm. 
I present now a candidate’s perspective of the ongoing problem. 
2.5 THE CANDIDATE’S PERSPECTIVE 
The candidate can be considered the product or service that the headhunter offers, while his or 
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her placement is the outcome. However, there are important characteristics that a candidate 
needs that can influence the outcome. Finlay and Coverdill (2002) call these “Hot Buttons.” 
They use this term to refer to specific skills and experiences that create positive signals for 
future employers.  These include a high level of managerial knowledge and knowledge of the 
nature of the organizations. Mobility from one organization to another, whenever required 
(Murphy, Poist 1991), is also an important characteristic. Candidates should have portability 
of their knowledge, skills and abilities (KSA) and not be specific to their current organization 
(Groysberg, Sant et al. 2008). Another characteristic is adaptability (also called adjustment by 
Coverdill and Finlay (1998). Even if the skills are of vital importance, this flexibility is a must; 
it has a high weight among the characteristics of potential executive candidates. Customers will 
choose candidates who can bring from their previous assignments qualities that have enabled 
them to be high performers. Such characteristics are expected to allow them to replicate past 
successes in a new organization with a different set of circumstances.  
Independently of the candidate’s characteristics emphasized by Hamori (2010) or the 
particularities of some candidates described by Garrison (2005), what makes candidates 
homogeneous is that they are human beings. Therefore, they are more likely to exhibit the 
human assumptions described by Eisenhardt (1989): self-interest, bounded rationality and risk 
aversion. These can be more transcendent and decisive in a triad context, because the candidate 
may use the safety net (easy to be marketable in the executive market) provided by his or her 
characteristics (high level of education, network, tenure, previous experience with well-
recognized organizations and international exposure (Hamori 2010)) to obtain additional 
benefits in the search process. 
Candidates may also try to assess their market value as a potential candidate by participating 
in a search process just to receive an offer and eventually use this as leverage to renegotiate 
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with their current employer (Finlay, Coverdill 1999). Or candidates may refuse to continue the 
search process regardless of the economic impact (usually a significant, positive increment in 
income). Moreover, candidates can use their knowledge of intention to quit (self-interest) to 
engage in an executive search process that may be time consuming (bounded rationality). The 
potential candidate pursues the relationship with the others (headhunter and client), even with 
the possibility of losing their current employment due to lack of commitment with the existing 
employer (risk aversion). Intention to quit can be defined as the perception of probability felt 
by an individual, to leave the present employer in the short future (Vandenberg, Nelson 1999). 
Unfortunately, due the nature of the process, the creation of a false potential candidate is 
possible, which may jeopardize future services with the client firm. Therefore, it is almost 
imperative that the headhunters reduce or eliminate this type of candidate from the pool and 
shortlist because they do not have goals aligned with the headhunter.  
I may also argue that in some cases, due to excess information sharing between candidate and 
client, the first one may take advantage of the situation.  Networks in the world of executives 
have become an important aspect to consider when choosing candidates: “As a manager moves 
into a leadership role, his or her network must reorient itself externally and toward the future” 
(Ibarra, Hunter 2007). These networks or connections may play an important role in the 
candidate’s outcome during the recruitment process using headhunters. This access to 
information through networks can be highly valued for career success (Seibert, Kraimer et al. 
2001b). I contemplate that this career success in the context (client-headhunter-candidate 
relation) is related to obtaining a higher salary in a new job venture. This argument is anchored 
in previous research done on this topic, For instance, proactive people tend to have career 
initiative which is positively related to salary progression (Seibert, Kraimer et al. 2001a). 
Individuals who use sponsor mobility (using others to change jobs) tend to obtain higher 
salaries (Ng, Eby et al. 2005).  
55 
 
Therefore, it can be in the self-interest of a candidate to bargain for a greater salary offer, even 
if that compromises staying in the search process with the headhunter (bounded rationality) 
risking a salary offered which is higher than his actual, but lower than the expected through the 
information managed. For example, if the candidate knows through his or her network any 
privileged information about the client, the candidate may use this as a bargaining tool to 
negotiate the initial offer. In a situation like the one previously described, there is a clear 
possibility that moral hazard will appear. 
I now present my sixth proposition: 
P.6 Executive recruitment searches using only employed candidates increase information 
asymmetries with the headhunter. 
2.6 IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Considering agency theory, and the human assumptions mentioned by Eisenhardt (1989) 
discussed in this chapter, I propose a different perspective on how to understand the process or 
interactions between these parties. Perhaps this chapter can answer the question posed in the 
introduction by Sengupta (2004) about why many executive search processes are not 
successful. The answer may rely on the analysis of these interactions in which all parties 
initially may have similar goals, but in reality have different agendas. I posed that headhunters 
in many cases think that just because a candidate may be a good fit for their client not 
necessarily mean is the best candidate for them. Other possible answer to Sengupta’s question 
may rely on the client’s better knowledge by the headhunter. A good way to in depth this 
knowledge is by reviewing past searches, to highlight best practices and common 
characteristics for further candidates. Finally in the same line, clients must understand that a 
long term relationship with headhunter may boost the possibility to produce better results. 
56 
 
I consider it important to note that this triad relationship (exchange that involves to three 
participants) tends to be long term (relational), therefore, double agency allows theoretical 
research along this line. For instance, for the headhunter, maintaining a long term relationship 
with a customer is the key factor. Also, headhunters may see any potential candidate as a 
potential customer. Moreover, clients may try to engage in a long term relationship with 
headhunters that produces positive results. For instance, it is more likely that when a headhunter 
provides a service as expected, the headhunter develops a better sense of the kinds of 
individuals that their clients may be looking for. Another important aspect is to open a 
discussion about whether retainer or contingent payments provide better solutions, and if so, in 
what ways. This definitely has important implications for the practitioner community.  
The chapter addressed time frames in the search process. I understand that my position may 
contradict some traditions in the executive search firms industry. However, the timing issue is 
one that warrants further discussion in this sector.  
In considering the ‘ideal candidate’ profile in an executive search process, anecdotal evidence 
from practitioners argues that there are no tried and true methods for determining this. 
Conversely, I posit that this issue plays a part in simplifying information asymmetries during 
the process, thus increasing the information sharing between client and headhunter.   Perhaps 
in narrowing down what could be considered an ideal candidate’s profile, information 
imbalances between all parties could be reduced substantially, however, this could jeopardize 
the headhunters’ role. For instance, if clients found new methodologies by which to reach ideal 
candidates, in theory the numbers of searches using headhunter could be reduced. 
It seems that the big distinction between a candidate’s employment status during the process 
could be a topic for further analysis by practitioners and researchers, especially when 
considering the role of ethics.  For instance, I argue that clients could use headhunters to 
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discriminate against some individuals, due to their employment status or the “hidden profile” 
mentioned before.  
Another important implication that this chapter arises is related to the “Double Agency” issue. 
As I addressed in the chapter, this is not a new concept. However, in my case has dramatic 
implications. Headhunters find candidates to clients, but they have to sell clients to candidates. 
In what point is the right equilibrium of information about each other disclosed to both parties? 
Clearly the agency fiduciary role for the headhunter is with the client, but in some point, they 
may have to push somehow the client or candidate to make a final decision, in some cases 
exacerbating potential doubts. This is definitely a field for further research, the ethics in this 
profession.  
I would like to point out that my research has two main limitations. First, in regards to adverse 
selection in the executive recruitment process, I think this may be minimal. I base my 
arguments on two main situations: When a client decides to engage in an executive search 
process, the selection of the agent (headhunter) is based on previous experience and/or 
referrals, and therefore the information asymmetry tends to be partially offset. Also, if the 
outcome (candidate selection) is poor, there are some guarantees (for instance, replacing 
candidates, re-doing the whole process or waiving part of the professional fees). On the other 
hand, the adverse selection from the candidate’s perspective is minimized by the information 
disclosed by the client and the headhunter during the process and, ultimately, by opting out of 
the selection or company (even after being hired, if needed). Therefore, I mainly focused my 
attention on the moral hazards instead of adverse selection.  This may be an issue that could be 
addressed in the future. 
The second limitation is the high level of confidentially in this sector, i.e., executive search 
firms. This has an important effect on the research of this topic. Notwithstanding this, more 
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academic research about this service that plays such an important role in many modern 
organizations is warranted. 
References 
AFRICA, M.F. and MAJOR, R.A., Jr., 1988. How Employers Can Use Headhunters 
Effectively. Legal Economics, 14(1), pp. 28. 
AKERLOF, G.A., 1970. The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), pp. 488-500. 
ARROW, K.J., 1963. Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. The American 
Economic Review, 53(5), pp. 941-973. 
ARROW, K.J., 1965. Aspects of the theory of risk-bearing. Helsinki: Yrjö Jahnssonin Säätiö. 
ASSOCIATION OF EXECUTIVE SEARCH AND LEADERSHIP CONSULTANTS 
(AESC), 2014. 2014 State of the Global Retained Executive Search Industry - Part One. New 
York,NY: Association of Executive Search and Leadership Consultants (AESC). 
ASSOCIATION OF EXECUTIVE SEARCH AND LEADERSHIP CONSULTANTS 
(AESC), 2011a. 2011 HR Survey. New York,NY: Association of Executive Search and 
Leadership Consultants. 
ASSOCIATION OF EXECUTIVE SEARCH AND LEADERSHIP CONSULTANTS 
(AESC), 2011b. AESC’s 2011 Senior Executive Recruitment Survey The Client Speak. New 
York, NY: Association of Executive Search and Leadership Consultants. 
BAKER, T., 1996. On the genealogy of moral hazard. Texas Law Review, 75(2), pp. 237-292. 
BARNEY, J., 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of 
management, 17(1), pp. 99-120. 
BEHRENZ, L., 2001. Who gets the job and why? An explorative study of employers’ 
recruitment behavior. Journal of Applied Economics, 4(2), pp. 255-278. 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, 01/31/2008, 2008a-last update, List: Most Influential 
Headhunters, Part One [Homepage of Bloomberg L.P.], [Online]. Available: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2008-01-31/list-most-influential-headhunters-part-
onebusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice [07/07, 2015]. 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, 10/28/2008, 2008b-last update, List: Most Influential 
Headhunters, Part Two [Homepage of Bloomberg L.P.], [Online]. Available: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2008-10-28/list-most-influential-headhunters-part-
twobusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice [07/07, 2015]. 
59 
 
BREAUGH, J., 1983. Realistic Job Previews: A Critical Appraisal and Future Research 
Directions. The Academy of Management Review, 8(4), pp. 612-619. 
BRITTON, L.C. and BALL, D., 1999. Trust Versus Opportunism: Striking the Balance in 
Executive Search. Service Industries Journal, 19(2), pp. 132-149. 
BRITTON, L.C., WRIGHT, M. and BALL, D., 2000. The use of co-ordination theory to 
improve service quality in executive search. The Service Industries Journal, 20(4), pp. 85. 
BULLHORN, 2014. North American Staffing and Recruiting Trends Report 2014. Boston: 
Bullhorn Inc. 
BYRNE, J., 1986. The Headhunters. 1 edn. New York: MacMillan Publishing Company. 
CARLESS, S.A., 2005. Person-job fit versus person-organization fit as predictors of 
organizational attraction and job acceptance intentions: A longitudinal study. Journal of 
Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 78(3), pp. 411-429. 
CHARAN, R., DROTTER, S. and NOEL, J., 2010. The leadership pipeline: How to build the 
leadership powered company. John Wiley & Sons. 
CHILD, J. and RODRIGUES, S., 2003. Corporate Governance and New Organizational 
Forms: Issues of Double and Multiple Agency. Journal of Management & Governance, 7(4), 
pp. 337-360. 
CLARK, T., 1993. The market provision of management services, information asymmetries 
and service quality - Some market solutions: An empirical example. British Journal of 
Management, 4(4), pp. 235. 
CLERKIN, T.A. and LEE, J.-., 2010. Executive search relationships-contacts between 
executives and search firm professionals: Scale development and validation. Organisation 
Management Journal, 7(3), pp. 208-228. 
COVERDILL, J. and FINLAY, W., 1998. Fit and skill in employee selection: Insights from a 
study of headhunters. Qualitative Sociology, 21(2), pp. 105-127. 
DINGMAN, H.B., 1993. The right fit: Executive search by retained recruiters. Cornell Hotel 
and Restaurant Administration Quarterly, 34(6), pp. 26. 
EISENHARDT, K.M., 1989. Agency Theory: An Assessment And Review. Academy of 
Management.The Academy of Management Review, 14(1), pp. 57. 
ERIKSSON, S. and LAGERSTRÖM, J., 2006. Competition between Employed and 
Unemployed Job Applicants: Swedish Evidence. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 108(3), 
pp. 373-396. 
EVANS, R.D. and KOLBE, P.T., 2005. Homeowners' Repeat-Sale Gains, Dual Agency and 
Repeated Use of the Same Agent. Journal of Real Estate Research, 27(3), pp. 267-292. 
60 
 
FAULCONBRIDGE, J.R., BEAVERSTOCK, J.V., HALL, S. and HEWITSON, A., 2009. The 
'war for talent': The gatekeeper role of executive search firms in elite labour markets. 
Geoforum, 40(5), pp. 800-808. 
FINLAY, W. and COVERDILL, J., 2002. Headhunters Matchmaking in the Labor Market. 1st 
edn. 2002: Cornell University Press. 
FINLAY, W. and COVERDILL, J., 1999. The search game: Organizational conflicts and the 
use of headhunters. Sociological Quarterly, 40(1), pp. 11-30. 
FISH, A. and MACKLIN, R., 2004. Perceptions of executive search and advertised recruitment 
attributes and service quality. Personnel Review, 33(1), pp. 30-54. 
GARDNER, T.M., STANSBURY, J. and HART, D., 2010. The Ethics of Lateral Hiring. 
Business Ethics Quarterly, 20(3), pp. 341-369. 
GARRISON, N., 2005. Headhunters and how to Use Them. 1st edn. London: Profile Books 
Ltd. 
GREER, C.R., YOUNGBLOOD, S.A. and GRAY, D.A., 1999. Human Resource Management 
Outsourcing: The Make or Buy Decision. The Academy of Management Executive (1993), 
13(3, Themes: Teams and New Product Development), pp. 85-96. 
GROYSBERG, B., SANT, L. and ABRAHAMS, R., 2008. When 'Stars' Migrate, Do They 
Still Perform Like Stars? MIT Sloan Management Review, 50(1), pp. 41. 
GUNAWARDANE, G., 2012. Managing Supplier to Customer Direct Service Triads in 
Service Supply Chains – A Case Study. Journal of Supply Chain and Operations Management, 
10(1), pp. 50. 
GUTHRIDGE, M., KOMM, A.B. and LAWSON, E., 2008. Making talent a strategic priority. 
McKinsey Quarterly, (1), pp. 48-59+2. 
HALLOCK, K.F., 1999. Dual agency: corporate boards with reciprocally interlocking 
relationships. Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value. Springer, pp. 55-75. 
HAMORI, M., 2010. Who gets headhunted - And who gets ahead? The impact of search firms 
on executive careers. Academy of Management Perspectives, 24(4), pp. 46-59. 
HAMORI, M., 2004. Executive search and selection with mediation: The role of executive 
search firms in executive succession, University of Pennsylvania. 
HAMORI, M., 2002. The role of clients in the executive search process, ACADEMY OF 
STRATEGIC AND ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP, ed. In: Academy of Strategic and 
Organizational Leadership PROCEEDINGS, 04/10/2002 2002, Allied Academies 
International Conference, pp. 29. 
HEISLER, J., KALLBERG, J.G. and LIU, C.H., 2007. The impact of dual agency. The Journal 
of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 35(1), pp. 39-55. 
61 
 
HINES, A.H., ADER, D.N., CHANG, A.S. and RUNDELL, J.R., 1998. Dual agency, dual 
relationships, boundary crossings and associated boundary violations: A survey of military and 
civilian psychiatrists. Military medicine, 163(12), pp. 826-833. 
HOLMSTROM, B., 1982. Moral hazard in teams. The Bell Journal of Economics, 13(1), pp. 
324-340. 
IBARRA, H. and HUNTER, M., 2007. How Leaders Create and Use Networks. Harvard 
business review, 85(1), pp. 40. 
JAMAL, K. and BOWIE, N.E., 1995. Theoretical considerations for a meaningful code of 
professional ethics. Journal of Business Ethics, 14(9), pp. 703-714. 
JENSEN, M.C. and MECKLING, W.H., 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Finance Economics, 3(4), pp. 303-431. 
JONES, S., 1989. The Headhunting Business. 1st edn. London: The Macmillan Press LTD. 
KHURANA, R., 2002. Searching for a Corporate Savior: The Irrational Quest for 
Charismatic CEO. 1st edn. Princeton University Press. 
KHURANA, R., 2001. Finding the Right CEO: Why Boards Often Make Poor Choices. MIT 
Sloan Management Review, 43(1), pp. 91-95. 
KRISTOF‐BROWN, A.L., ZIMMERMAN, R.D. and JOHNSON, E.C., 2005. 
CONSEQUENCES OF INDIVIDUALS'FIT AT WORK: A META‐ANALYSIS OF 
PERSON–JOB, PERSON–ORGANIZATION, PERSON–GROUP, AND PERSON–
SUPERVISOR FIT. Personnel Psychology, 58(2), pp. 281-342. 
MALONE, T.W. and CROWSTON, K., 1990. What is coordination theory and how can it help 
design cooperative work systems? Proceedings of the 1990 ACM conference on Computer-
supported cooperative work 1990, ACM, pp. 357-370. 
MICELI, T.J., PANCAK, K.A. and SIRMANS, C.F., 2000. Restructuring Agency 
Relationships in the Real Estate Brokerage Industry: An Economic Analysis. Journal of Real 
Estate Research, 20(1), pp. 31. 
MILLER, D.T., 1999. The norm of self-interest. American Psychologist, 54(12), pp. 1053-
1060. 
MURPHY, P.R. and POIST, R.F., 1991. A comparison of headhunter and practitioner views 
regarding skill requirements of senior-level logistics professionals. Logistics and 
Transportation Review, 27(3), pp. 277. 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF EXECUTIVE RECRUITERS, 2014-last update, Code of 
Ethics [Homepage of National Association of Executive Recruiters], [Online]. Available: 
http://www.naer.org/code-of-ethics/ [04/07, 2014]. 
NG, T.W., EBY, L.T., SORENSEN, K.L. and FELDMAN, D.C., 2005. Predictors of objective 
and subjective career success: A meta‐analysis. Personnel Psychology, 58(2), pp. 367-408. 
62 
 
PREMACK, S.L. and WANOUS, J.P., 1985. A meta-analysis of realistic job preview 
experiments. Journal of Applied Psychology, 70(4), pp. 706-719. 
RAO, H. and DRAZIN, R., 2002. Overcoming Resource Constraints on Product Innovation by 
Recruiting Talent from Rivals: a Study of the Mutual Fund Industry, 1986-94. Academy of 
Management Journal, 45(3), pp. 491-507. 
ROSS, S.A., 1973. The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. The American 
Economic Review, 63(2, Papers and Proceedings of the Eighty-fifth Annual Meeting of the 
American Economic Association), pp. 134-139. 
RYNES, S. and GERHART, B., 1990. Interviewer Assessments of Applicant 'Fit': An 
Exploratory. Personnel Psychology, 43(1), pp. 13-13. 
SEIBERT, S.E., KRAIMER, M.L. and CRANT, J.M., 2001a. What do proactive people do? A 
longitudinal model linking proactive personality and career success. Personnel Psychology, 
54(4), pp. 845-874. 
SEIBERT, S.E., KRAIMER, M.L. and LIDEN, R.C., 2001b. A Social Capital Theory of Career 
Success. Academy of Management Journal, 44(2), pp. 219-237. 
SENGUPTA, S., 2004. Delegating recruitment under asymmetric information. International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, 22(8-9), pp. 1327-1347. 
SHAPIRO, S.P., 2005. Agency Theory. Annual Review of Sociology, 31, pp. 263-284. 
SIMMEL, G., 1950. The sociology of Georg Simmel. Simon and Schuster. 
SIMON, H.A., 1957. Models of man: Social and Rational. 1st edn. New York: Wiley. 
SIN, L.Y., ALAN, C. and YIM, F.H., 2005. CRM: conceptualization and scale development. 
European Journal of Marketing, 39(11/12), pp. 1264-1290. 
SMITH, A., 2010. The theory of moral sentiments. Penguin. 
STIGLITZ, J.E. and WEISS, A., 1992. Asymmetric information in credit markets and its 
implications for macro-economics. Oxford Economic Papers, , pp. 694-724. 
VAN DE VALK, W. and VAN WEELE, A., 2011. Business service triads: a new area for 
service research, IPSERA 2011 Conference Proceedings 2011, pp. 978-994. 
VANDENBERG, R.J. and NELSON, J.B., 1999. Disaggregating the Motives Underlying 
Turnover Intentions: When Do Intentions Predict Turnover Behavior? Human Relations, 
52(10), pp. 1313-1336. 
VOLPE, L. and TUCKER, J., 2004. Third-party recruiting. Employment relations today, 31(1), 
pp. 1. 
WILLIAMSON, O.E., 1981. The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach. 
American Journal of Sociology, 87(3), pp. pp. 548-577. 
63 
 
WILLIAMSON, O.E., WACHTER, M. and HARRIS, J., 1975. Understanding the 
Employment Relation - the Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange. Bell Journal of Economics, 


















CHAPTER 3: INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES 
BETWEEN CLIENTS AND HEADHUNTERS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
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asymmetries? 
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Despite the corporate world's financial crisis in last the two decades, executive search 
companies have stayed active and in some cases show increased growth, such as the market in 
the United States (U.S. Census Bureau ).  
Companies looking for an executive successor outside the organization tend to experience 
significant changes in strategy (Wiersema 1992). Therefore, deciding how to reach outsiders is 
an important issue for organizations. Companies can benefit by investigating this process of 
how these executives come to these organizations. Little academic research has been done to 
keep the topic of company executive searches as a trend, but there is still practical evidence that 
demonstrates how companies manage their interactions with headhunters or executive search 
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companies (Finlay, Coverdill 2002, Freeman 2010, Garrison 2005, Jones 1989). Although 
these are important theoretical foundations, few of these investigations touch on the reasons 
why these interactions are unsuccessful.  
A concern that this chapter seeks to solve (at least partially) is why many executive search 
companies evaluate and generate suitable candidates and, nevertheless, are not able to achieve 
the perfect match with the client's needs (Sengupta 2004), going so far as to lose future 
assignments. My investigation focuses on these causes and their consequences, but it begs to 
question the following: is it possible that the failures of this process are due to limited information 
about the client (consciously or unconsciously); eventually limiting the performance of the 
headhunting firms? If this is the case, then the objectives may provide an answer to this dilemma, 
which are illustrated in the following paragraph. 
The objectives of this chapter, as aforementioned, focus on the importance of understanding the 
knowledge, skills, and attributes (also known as KSA) of the necessary candidates for the 
position the organization wishes to fill, the identification of the appropriate candidate, and the 
impact that a good business relationship between the client and headhunter has on the result. 
In this chapter, I also developed the concept of the HIDDEN PROFILE as a variable that 
explains the results of the headhunter’s selection process.  
Apparently, the solutions to this problem in the hiring of executives using headhunters have 
been directed toward the candidate, but have not sufficiently considered other participants. 
Therefore, it is possible that these problems may be resolved by studying the relationship between 
the executive search company and the client.  
My work proposes a research model that involves several variables, investigated in different 
theoretical perspectives, with the addition of what I have termed the Hidden Profile. The main 
theory used to anchor the research is the Agency Theory, and its assumption of asymmetric 
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information. I also propose the use of methods such as “Screening” (a term that will be explained 
and developed in the appropriate section) in an attempt to explain to professionals the importance 
of knowing the client, especially the Hiring Authority.  
The contributions of this chapter can be divided into several theoretical arguments regarding how 
the external elements can help to construct a “block” that the asymmetrical information must 
overcome. Furthermore, it will produce tests in addition to “Screening” (Stiglitz 1975) that, 
together with its importance in economic theory, also has value as a method for overcoming the 
informational gaps. In regards to professionals or practitioners, this chapter tries to help define 
“the hidden profile” in Recruitment and Selection, presenting possible explanations to the 
community of executive search companies on how to connect the information not defined in the 
selection of adequate candidates and, finally, to help produce better results in this process.  
This chapter is organized in the following way. First, I present the body of theoretical 
knowledge, which exposes the perspectives of agency theory that are used in the research. Next, 
I explain a set of implications as far as preparing to participate in the executive search company 
process. Subsequently, I develop a theoretical framework to define a suitable relationship between 
headhunters and clients. Then I describe the interaction between the hiring authority and 
headhunters. I also consider how human resource departments can act negatively as a type of 
speed bump during the process. Then, I define the concept of the hidden profile and its potential 
effects on the result of the process. I finish by presenting a discussion of my arguments and the 
conclusions of this research.  
3.2 AGENCY THEORY ASSUMPTIONS THAT CAN BE 
CONSIDERED TO SHAPE HIDDEN PROFILES 
Jensen and Meckilin (1976)  define the agency relationship as a contractual agreement in 
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which one or more person (the principle(s)) delegate another person (the agent) to accomplish 
a task or service in their name, partially entrusting the decision and administration authority to 
the agent.  
The primary problem, which this theory presents, occurred when the interests of the principal 
and the agent are not aligned, generating situations of asymmetric information between the 
parties, allowing some to take advantage of the situation, eventually causing moral damage2 
to one of them and/or an adverse selection in the decision to be made.  
As Eisenhardt (1989) indicates, the information management is one of the initial contributions 
of Agency Theory. In fact, this theory presents many factors related to my research, among which 
I can mention:  
- The existence of a principal and an agent (Britton, Ball 1999), in this case the principal (either 
the Human Resources Department or the Hiring Authority), and the agent is the headhunter.  
- The asymmetric information is presented in the relationship between the Principal and the 
Agent. The exchange asset is the information or the access to it. Basically the headhunters, 
based on certain information given by the client, will have to generate possible candidates to 
fill a vacancy. Depending on the quality of the information provided by both sides and the 
exchange of information, there may be different results (Stiglitz 2001).  
- The moral hazard can be seen in several ways, with respect to the headhunters and their moral 
practices, Lim and Chan (2001) in their research present evidence that the headhunters “are 
willing to strictly adhere to a select set of ethical values, both in absolute terms as well as in 
comparison with the other non-headhunters and executive providers."  
On the other hand, Sengupta (2004) presents evidence that the headhunters are free of moral 
hazard with respect to the conflict of interest with the client for fear of losing the contract, and 
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that, with it being a paid service. The primary moral hazard is evident in regards to the efforts 
performed by the executive search company to identify a candidate.  
These are, as far as agency theory goes, the influential factors in this chapter. Questions that 
may arise related to this framework are: What happens with the adverse selection? The case is 
that the adverse selection in the headhunter industry is minimal.  
Therefore, I can argue that during the process, there is some possible adverse selection, although 
based upon the typology of the executive search companies known as “retainers” (explained later 
in the article), the typology to which I refer in this research, must be resolved at some point. 
Lastly, the type of contract does not affect the central element, the information.  
 










Source: own elaboration.  
In order to keep my research within the same theoretical framework, I may be able to 
recommend the testing of proposals developed in the chapter using Screening (Stiglitz 1975) 
as a possible partial explanation for my research model when the information is asymmetrical 
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(See Figure 2).  
As it can be seen in Figure 3, each one of the parties involved in the process employs some type 
of filter in the group of potential candidates. Even so, I believe that this process is repetitive 
and generates a valid result each time. I could argue then that this repetition tends to establish 
a pattern of good candidates for each hiring authority or decision maker.  
 









Source: own elaboration.  
Screening is a tool for the extraction of information not shared among the selection processes 
of executive search firms.  
Taking into account previous approaches, information is the basis of this chapter and its asymmetry 
the modifier of the results. Therefore, I’m inclined to use agency theory and its related assumptions 
as the framework for this chapter.  
3.3 KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS AND ATTRIBUTES CORE 
ELEMENT ON INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES  
Job Orders are the starting point in the client - executive search company relationship. This 
X – X1 > 0 
X – X1 – X2 > 0 
X – X1 – X2 = 0 
X – X1 – X2 – X3 ≥ 1 
X – X1 – X2 – X3 = 0 
X= Candidates shortlisted. 
X1= Candidates shortlisted who do not meet the client’s basic specs. 
X2= Candidates shortlisted who do not meet the Human Resource Unit requirement KSA. 
X3= Candidates shortlisted who do not meet the Hiring Authority Hidden Profile. 
Headhunter Human Resource Unit Hiring Authority 





subject has been previously documented in research performed by Finlay and Coverdill 
(2000) and bibliographically by Garrison (2005). The Job Order, in most cases, comes to the 
executive search firm with an attached file, the position profile, which emphasizes the general 
characteristics minimally required of each candidate for the position.  
Nevertheless, beyond all the elements included in the Job Order, this chapter aims to establish this, 
as the human resources department and hiring authorities (Finlay, Coverdill 1999) much of the 
time cannot provide the information that the headhunters need, which they call “soft 
skills”(Sharma 2009).  
These soft elements contrast with the concept of “fit” (Dingman 1993), which are all the 
personality elements that may make a person a more attractive part of the organization, 
especially in relation to a potential candidate. I can argue that this compatibility is part of the 
description of the position or position profile. I may, likewise, include the technical skills 
necessary for the desired functions, also known as the knowledge, skills and ability (KSA).  
These previous arguments raise the question that, if the Human Resources Department only 
provides a description and position profile, so the headhunters can prepare ahead of time this 
condition of “empathy” or fit, could this situation pose a threat to a successful hiring? This 
empathy can be accurately demonstrated in the interviews; final interviews are considered a 
good practice in human resources management (Huo, Huang et al. 2002).  
The tendencies show that headhunters are inclined to perform selective recruitment (Breaugh 
2008), so their efforts are more efficient. As agents, they will have to apply a first filter based on 
the Knowledge, Skills and Attributes (KSA), which is why the headhunters will look for some 




The headhunters have to produce candidates, who at a minimum meet the professional profile 
requested by the Human Resources Department and then have to make sure that the potential 
candidates also fulfill the "hidden profile."  
These expositions have two different implications: initially the headhunters must develop to a set 
of tools and techniques that allow them to obtain the missing information or “hidden profile” 
from the Hiring Authority. Second, the Client (Human Resources Department or the authority 
they employ), who must maintain registries of those soft skills, which in the long run can help 
future searches and the obtaining of more precise results.  
Considering the importance of Knowledge, Skills and Attributes (KSA) as the preliminary piece 
of information shared between the parties, I present my first proposition:  
P.1 The understanding of the Knowledge, Skills and Attributes (KSA) by the headhunters is 
negatively related to informational asymmetries in the selection of the ideal candidate. 
Therefore, considering previous research, there are arguments to test that a well-defined position 
profile will improve the results of the executive search process using headhunters. Now, I 
present the elements to understand what can be defined as a good headhunter-client 
relationship, and the resulting implications.  
3.4 QUALITY IN THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT 
RELATIONSHIP: HOW TO REDUCE INFORMATIONAL 
ASYMMETRIES?  
What causes a client to call a headhunter? Many professionals would affirm that it is a simple 
necessity to fill a position, which, for some reason, could not be complete by the Human 
Resources Department. At the end of the day, professionals in this area must “realize that they 
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face serious limitations in the labor market” (Showkeir, Showkeir 2006). Therefore, using agency 
theory as a framework, the Principal (Client) will ask for the services of an agent (Headhunters) 
when the Principal (as a whole) is incapable of finding a particular talent (due to information 
deficiency).  
There is evidence that shown how headhunting is as many other services industries a business 
based upon reputation, recommendations and repeat business (Britton, Ball 1994). On the other 
hand, it can be seen headhunters or executive search companies as Producer Service Firms 
(PSF) conceptually basing their advantage on the reputation and knowledge of their workforce 
(Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al. 2009).  
In this perspective, another research (Nazmi 2005) shows that the basis of the probable 
relationship is founded upon: the creation of contact networks, the pursuit of industry’s evolution, 
and that the headhunters have a strong database with excellent latent candidates. Thus, the first 
element to measure a good relationship between executive search companies and clients is the 
amount of repeat business.  
In this regard, it is important to clarify that this chapter primarily considers executive search 
companies under the "retainer" payment scheme, meaning that a payment is received, most of the 
time beforehand, independent of the result of the process, or whether or not they find an adequate 
candidate (Dingman 1993).  
The fact that I focused on “retainers,” is based upon the high level of client loyalty, the high 
degree of repeat activity, and personal recommendation as an important source of the 
assignments. These payment systems should not be considered in the research as an additional 
variable, merely as a distinction between two well-defined executive search company groups.  
Both the academic (Khurana 2002a) and professional (Berger 1987) scope agree that the flows 
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of information and bidirectional communication are essential to produce high-quality results. 
These are only possible thanks to the interaction between parties. Therefore, both groups 
(retainers and contingents) assumed that the informational asymmetries have negative results 
for the process.  
Keeping in mind the previous arguments, I pose that the client can measure the relationship 
with the search process, as well as with the executive search firms, with the following elements:  
- Experience: this is the capability to constantly have a better yield than other competitors, being 
able to produce concrete results and, finally, to replicate the results in different surroundings and 
clients (Ericsson, Prietula et al. 2007). The characteristics previously mentioned are also included 
in the approaches demonstrated by Shanteau et al (2002). This is frequently used as the argument 
for the advanced mitigation of risks by the principal or client.  
- Service: this refers to the variety of products and services that executive search companies can 
offer, seen another way, what is the value proposition from a headhunter compered to others. For 
example, background verification services and psychometric candidate exams, among others. This 
differentiation can assist the Principal in choosing among a large number of agents.  
- Quality: Britton et al (2000) explains the quality of the executive search processes that are 
handled incorrectly and can lead to the selection of the wrong individuals (adverse selection). 
Therefore, the quality is measured in two aspects, the result (what the client receives) and 
processes (how the candidate is found).  
- Mitigation of Risks: Considering the delicate nature of some positions and that the organizations 
(clients) are vulnerable to the risks of public knowledge or scrutiny, the headhunters will 
have to reduce or diminish the possibility of risk by perfectly controlling information and to 
a high level of confidentiality.  
74 
 
All these previously described elements have been considered by Hall et al (2009). They can be 
considered as an outline for the client's expectations. I primarily emphasize the elements of 
quality and mitigation of risk because the exchange of information has a more profound impact 
in comparison with the other two.  
Therefore, I see theoretical arguments that the client-headhunter relationship will always have 
asymmetrical information, which is without a doubt a “market failure.” When this happens, the 
greater asset in the exchange between parties is information. To avoid or minimize this market 
failure, clients tend to use agents who have already worked for them. 
All these arguments allow me to reveal my second proposition:  
P. 2 The previous performance of the Agent (Headhunter) is positively related to future 
searches with the same principal (Client). 
Now, after clarifying  how to measure the relationship between the Client and Headhunter, I 
can establish that when a measurement of the quality of this relationship is superior, the possibility 
to contact the hiring authority and establish the hidden profile are greater, resulting in a more 
efficient executive search process.  
3.5 “DOUBLE PRINCIPAL:” MORAL HAZARD AND THE 
INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES BY THE HIRING 
AUTHORITY AND THE HUMAN RESOURCES 
DEPARTMENT  
It seems then, that previous successful results by the headhunters, having a suitable KSA 
profile and offering quality service is sufficient to guarantee results. Nevertheless, many times 
these elements are not enough, engaging properly with the clients firm may also be mandatory.  
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First, if a headhunter performs a search for a C-level position (i.e. CEO, CFO. CIO) then the 
hiring authority will be any of the members of the Board of Directors (Khurana, 2002b) or the 
executive who will be leaving the organization. For that reason, the headhunter will have several 
people with special characteristics to cover.  
Secondly, if the position being searched for by the consultant is a mid or high level position, two 
parties could intervene as a client: the Human Resources Department and the Hiring Authority. 
Consequently, there could be a Double Principal-Agent situation (See Figure 4).  
 
















Source: own elaboration.  
 
After reviewing the relevant research in the topic, I have discovered that there is no clear definition 




















conditions being equal, and following the requirements and human resources policies, chooses 
between a group of possible candidates, which one is the best candidate to fill a vacant position. 
They will be most likely a direct reporting figure for the position. The hiring authority will be 
the primary decision maker in the hiring process.  
The question that arises at this point is, why it is important to the headhunter made a differentiation 
between the hiring authority and the HR unit? The answer is information, the information 
speed, flow and the coordination efforts may compromise the process. Therefore, the objective 
is considering the human resources unit as an “intermediary of information” (Kauffman, 
Subramani et al. 2000).  
The argument here is how the headhunter executes the search process gaining access to the 
hiring authority and subsequently to more information, without compromise the potential 
relation with the HR unit as future vendor. I pose to see two principals with only one fiduciary 
responsibility from the headhunter. This situation is not new to economics is similar to the 
arguments presented by Aghion & Tirole (1997) when the set a “Formal” and “Real” authority 
in the organizations.  The formal management in a recruitment process using headhunters will 
fall on the HR Unit, but the real authority will be in the hiring authority.  
Either the HR Unit or the hiring authority may exert control over the process. It is not a 
collaboration effort, but a strategic decision (which can increase, depending on the level of the 
position to fill). Both the headhunters and the human resources department share responsibilities in 
the result with the hiring authority (in one hand, the headhunters may not receive a new work order 
or the client may demand a guarantee clause. On the other, the HR unit may be perceived as not 
attending their internal client needs).  
Having said all of this, I present my third proposal:  
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P. 3 Access to the hiring authority is related to positive search process. 
This potential access to more information can be seen by the headhunters as another opportunity 
to fill any gap left in the position profile or the KSA, and previous working relationships with the 
same client. In fact, I can affirm that if access to the hiring authority is not permitted, but the Client 
indirectly reveals the hidden profile, and the headhunter will use the information.  
 
3.6 THE HIDDEN PROFILE, AN IMPORTANT PART OF 
THE INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES  
Although executive selection can be seen as a chain of individual decisions (with individual 
criteria or filters), the fact is that it can also be easily seen as a group decision.  
The concept of a hidden profile has already been used in the field of social psychology in the 
concept of a situation in which a part of the information is shared between group members before 
meeting each other, but no member can decide with only handled by one of the group members. 
The members of the group must make a consensual decision, but no member can make a 
decision with only the individual information. Therefore, the possibility of making an optimal 
decision is mediated by sharing the non-shared information in the discussion (Stasser, Titus 
1985).  
Now, I am going to extrapolate this concept to the three elements (Headhunter-Client-
Candidate) in the triad. It is very probable that all of them will have the KSA and organization 
attributes at hand, but only the hiring authority will have the decision to choose one of the 
candidates filtered by the executive search company and the human resources department.  
The position's hidden profile is all the personal characteristics of the candidate and the 
78 
 
attributes that can trigger the hiring decision by the hiring authority, in regard to a group of 
candidates with similar KSA elements such as ethnicity or race, marital status, affiliations, 
University alumni status, industries, political position, sexual orientation, social club 
memberships, and affinity groups, among others.  
In some other cases these social similarity attributes (Coverdill, Finlay 1998), often called 
"chemistry," with the difference of that the chemistry is developed during the interview 
process. The hidden profile is present even before initiating the process. These elements 
can sometimes be considered as “selection bias” or “discriminatory questions,” which is why I 
argue that the hiring authority is not willing to share this information in advance to the other 
members of the group (headhunters and the human resources department, whatever is the case).  
It is important to mention the research developed by Dreher et al (2011), in which they found 
evidence that subjects like race, gender and minority status, are non-recognized sources of bias. 
Moreover, in the same article, there is evidence that ties these subjects to mobility (in reference to 
changes from one employment opportunity to another) and compensation.  
Using a “modification” (Davies, Dick et al. 1999) of Luft's (1969) “The Johari Window," the 
consciousness of this selection bias or discriminatory questions can be located in quadrant II 
(the Blind Spot, where others can see the things that we don't realize), III (Hidden Quadrant, things 
that we know, but do not reveal to others) and IV (Unknown Activity, neither we nor the others are 
conscious of certain behaviors or motives).  
Consequently, it is not irrational to think that the hiring authority is not conscious of the probable 
bias. In the end, this individual is the one who is going to interact with the potential candidates. 
This situation may end on preferring candidates comparable with the hiring authority. 
A possible explanation for why the hiring authority tends to give priority to socially similar 
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candidates is related to the “prospect theory” (Kahneman, Tversky 1979), which explains that people 
tend to make the decision to assume the risk when giving important weight to the future value of 
their verdict.  
Thus, using social similarities as a proxy, the hiring authority may think that the person with 
whom they share these elements should yield a similar performance to the person making the hiring 
decisions.  
The hiring authority is more often adverse to risk when choosing a probable candidate, since they 
can see the positive result (Huber, Neale et al. 1987) with the candidate with social similarities 
that coincide with the hidden profile.  
Based upon the previously elaborated arguments, I present my last proposal for this chapter:  
P4: The understanding of the Hidden Profile by the headhunter is positively related to the 
selection of the optimal candidate. 
Therefore, in order to achieve the understanding of the hidden profile the headhunter may use 
Screening. This allows the executive recruiter to learn as much as possible from the hiring authority 
in order to map the characteristics non-disclosed. Some examples of characteristics to be identified 
via Screening:  
- Background characteristics related to the professionals coupled with a direct report to the hiring 
authority.  
- The personal decorative elements in the hiring authority's office or workspace (for example: 
photographs, sports memorabilia, Documents or Degrees on the walls, books, among others). 
- Evaluations in regard to the last positive experience during the hiring of another person in 
a direct-reporting position.  
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In the end, any information that may help the headhunter discover the hidden profile, positively 
affects candidate selection. Considering the lack of homogeneity between the candidates (Stigler, 
1962), more information can make the difference.  
What I have defined as the hidden profile, in my opinion, will determine in part, the quality with 
which the hiring authority will later measure the result. The headhunter being an intermediary 
in this business relationship, it's important to have the sensation that the quality is well defined 
(Akerlof, 1970).  
3.7 DISCUSSION  
The concept of a “hidden profile” is a cemented construct which considers what the client 
often wants, although the headhunter unfortunately cannot provide, a candidate who turns the 
position profile or KSA, the fit and all the characteristics not directly revealed during 
interactions. The concept is in accordance with the theory considered by me, along with other 
strong sources in management literature. In my opinion, repeated processes and interactions 
between parties (client and headhunter) may reduce or help this asymmetries. I am sure that 
there are other factors that can also affect the desired result. These factors not considered, I see 
them as the externalities of the employment market or the business atmosphere in which the client 
may be developed. 
Another aspect that this chapter did not take in to account was the interaction between the 
headhunter and the candidate and how this can affect the process before and after the hiring 
decision. I discuss this relationship in the following chapter.  
During the literature review and the development of the concept “hidden profile” I observed in 
common with the theme of “stigma,” an investigational subject that generally touches on ethical 
points of view. It will take time for the executive search industry to not be able to remove the 
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guardian ethos, in the end the quality of service is fundamentally based upon giving the client 
what it wants.  
Therefore, the deepening research on these aspects would help to continue receiving possible 
solutions to the executive search processes that leave the clients and the headhunters with a "bad 
taste" in their mouths. Besides providing corrections to irregular situations, being able to confirm 
that although the relationship that has been described is, by nature, potentially full of asymmetrical 
information, this can be overcome using concepts of economic theory such as Screening.  
I think there can be agreement in regards that the position profile is without a doubt an incredible 
piece of information; at the very least technically since without a clear profile, it appears that the 
headhunter would be like “sending paper airplanes nowhere.” On the other hand, my review tends 
to see that, in addition to all the development of recruitment and selection methods used by human 
resources and headhunters, there is still work to be done.  
In the long run, the "Double Principal" dilemma argued in this article can trigger a difficult 
decision-making process for the headhunters, if the balance is more inclined toward the human 
resources department or the hiring authority. Considering that Agency Theory has been proven 
using laboratory experiments (Eisenhardt, 1989), my proposals could possibly be verified by 
this method. Nevertheless, the control of the effect of variables would have to be very 
meticulous, but I definitely perceive compatibility with my proposed model and possible 
experimentation. The theoretical argument of this work can, in part, try to offer solutions to 
what was stated at the outset, that many headhunters can easily present a large number of 




3.8 CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS  
The ups and downs in the modern organizations have not reduced the importance that 
headhunters provide to these enterprises. Nevertheless, new tendencies in social media have 
made a complete change in their organizational role. This does not mean that what they do is 
taken for granted. Thus, their existence is not questioned, but their sustainability is 
compromised. Executive search companies must keep their proposal value at a high level to 
continue “matchmaking” or pairing.  
This chapter presents a contribution to human resources professionals in regard to a few issues. In 
the first place, explaining to professionals that, in addition to the technical aspects of the 
individual work order, they must work much more on the fit evaluation, and understand the 
real needs of the clients. Second, the headhunters and clients must understand that this is a 
relationship that generally is worth the trouble in the long term, I encourage them to evaluate 
this relationship after some interactions or searches.  
In order to mitigate the risk associated with the first and second assignment or work order, they 
should begin with positions that have the lowest level of exposure. Another possibility to 
mitigate this risk is having both the clients and executive search company take the time to get 
to know each other, sometimes rushing the search without this mutual knowledge can result 
in the selection of a candidate who technically is ideal, but he does not fulfill the “hidden 
profile.”  
Professional considerations are related to the ties created by human resources department, who 
must understand that they and the headhunters must "row" in the same direction and 
therefore, participating in a rivalry against one another will affect the result and the possible 
interaction with the hiring authority in future searches.  
83 
 
I have contributed to the literature by more deeply investigating the interactions between the 
executive search companies and clients. I also used Agency Theory to a particular situation in 
the selection of executives, which have only been considered in a few previous works.  
I have presented two concepts, the “hidden profile” and “hiring authority," that may raise some 
questions, which will allow for the presentation of new research with other variables or units of 
analysis.  
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The interaction between Executive Recruiters and Candidates during an executive search 
process is considered an important element for the construction of the management labor 
market (Beaverstock, Faulconbridge et al. 2010). In some cases, the relationship between 
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Executive recruiter and Candidate has significant implications to mobility in managerial and 
career development (Luci 2012b), mobility being the ability to move from one position to 
another.  
The bond among Executive Recruiter and Candidates has been researched considering 
“common goals” (Britton, Wright et al. 2000) a central factor to achieve positive outcomes. 
Such outcomes would involve entering the candidate into a new position for which he or he is 
well suited, and provide a well suitable candidate to the client for the recruiter. However, due 
to the nature of this relationship, it is also probable that both parties may not have similar 
agendas. Executive recruiters are known as Headhunters. Executives Search firms are 
intermediaries hired by Clients to perform search, selection and placement (Beaverstock, 
Faulconbridge et al. 2012) of upper-echelon positions (Candidates) in the organizations. In 
contrast, Finlay & Coverdill (2000) provided evidence that headhunters do searches for 
positions at different levels. Therefore, they search for candidates in all kinds of positions.  
Another part of this relationship is the Candidates (candidate). These are individuals who come 
from respectable and large firms, with similar position denominations or function than the 
client’s needs (Hamori 2010), in most cases employed. However, not all candidates that engage 
with headhunter are working. In some cases they may be unemployed or in the middle of 
“career transition.” In fact, it is a common discussion topic among the executive recruiter 
practitioners. These parties (headhunter and candidate) engage in many cases when the 
headhunter has been hired by an organization or firm to locate potential candidates. When the 
headhunter finds one candidate who stands out in the larger pool of candidates whose skills 
match with the firm’s requirements, the relationship with the candidate can begin.  
It seems like this relationship can be clear and streamlined. Headhunters are intermediaries 
between buyers (Organizations) and sellers (Candidates). However, authors like Sengupta 
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(2004) recognize that executive recruiters are able to assess candidates “reasonably well” but 
are unable to match their clients and jobs needs. As Sengupta (2004) acknowledged, because 
this is a delegation of a recruitment process (using a third party to manage a recruitment 
process), information asymmetries are usually present. Information asymmetries can be 
defined as the difference of information between two parties regarding a quality or attribute for 
a product or service. This situation may change the behavior and decision between them 
(Akerlof 1970). 
This chapter focused on give explanation to the question presented by Sengupta (2004) about 
why executive recruiters are able to narrow good candidates but clients are not satisfied. I based 
on the argument that the relationship between the involved parties has been studied using other 
theoretical frameworks that not necessarily are adapted to each party’s interest. 
As I mentioned initially, this relationship has been studied by the assumption of common goals 
using Coordination Theory (Malone, Crowston 1990). However, if information asymmetries 
are usually latent, shared goals are less likely to appear. Therefore, I aim to use a different 
theoretical framework, Agency Theory (Ross 1973b). This theory explains the relationship 
between a Principal and Agent, when the latter is hired to act on behalf of the Principal.  
Traditionally, Agency Theory has been used to explain relationships in which Principal and 
Agent are recognizable. For instance, Agency theory illustrates interactions like Owners and 
Employees, Stakeholders and Management Team, Investors and Stockbrokers. I suggest that, 
in the relations defined by us headhunter - candidate, the Principal and Agent roles may be not 
well defined. However, there is a concept known as “Double Agency” that allows us to identity 
the candidate as a Principal and the headhunter as an Agent. Double Agency (Child, Rodrigues 
2003) refers to when the Agent acting on behalf of the Principal (I) to perform a task and while 
executing this activity engages with another party (Principal Il). Thereby creating a second set 
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of control by a third party. In our case, the candidate is this third element.    
Agency theory has additionally produced other insights about elements or assumptions 
(Eisenhardt 1989) that are present in the agency relationship. These conventions are: Human 
assumptions (self-interest, bounded rationality and risk aversion) & Organizational 
assumptions (partial goal conflict among participants, efficiency as the effectiveness criterion 
& information asymmetry between a principal and agent). These assumptions are connected to 
the variables considered in my research, but most importantly appeared during the relationship 
studied in this chapter. 
In this article, I study the relationship between headhunter and candidate from the perspective 
of the candidates. To explain this, I considered as a constraining element between them the 
candidate’s employment condition (if is employed or not) and as a moderator of his or her 
efforts in looking for employment. These constrains may be related to the information 
asymmetries during the process, to how the relationship will be ruled or framed in the short a 
long-term and, lastly, to the outcomes generated between these interactions. I suggest that this 
relationship may be framed under similarities with the Psychological Contracts (Rousseau 
1989), used most likely in the organizational context. However, I argue that there is evidence 
that same concept can be used in this non-organizational context.  
I propose a model in which the Employment Status relates to the quantity of Information shared 
and the type of relationship between headhunter and candidate, and the efforts performed by 
the candidate in looking for a job, but the last three are related to the outcome. The model is 













Source: own elaboration.  
 
This chapter aims to the following contributions. First, from the theoretical stand point, I 
support the idea of using agency to understand a relationship that is not initially seen as 
Principal-Agent. Second, using constructs like employment status, information sharing and 
psychological contract, I am able to shape more details on the application of Agency theory. 
Third, I present for practitioners in the executive search firms evidence in regards to the 
distinction between candidates employed or not. Additionally, in relation to whether the 
candidates’ efforts in looking for a new position may modify what recruiters may expect from 
them (candidates), including the type of relationship expected. And finally, find out if this 
information sharing and relationship have a connection between the candidate’s outcomes.   
This chapter is structured as follows. Initially, I present a theoretical frame work and the 
variables including my hypothesis. Next, I present the Methods, including the participants, 
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Psychological Contract (two dimensions) 
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procedures, measurements variables. Third, I present the results and statistical information, 
followed by a discussion section, and, finally, a limitations and suggestions body text.  
4.2 AGENCY THEORY 
“If the hill will not come to Mahomet, Mahomet will go to the hill”. This popular quote from 
Sir Francis Bacon (1601) explains how the headhunters engage with candidates. If headhunters 
do not have candidates available, they will have to find them. They mostly will be agents 
finding executive talent, but they may eventually also be agents to those candidates. 
Clerkin et al. (2010) define the Executive Search Relationship as “the interactions between 
executives and search professionals; connections that may potentially lead to career benefits 
for the executives.” 
Agency theory has been defined as follows: “relationship has arisen between two (or more) 
parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as a representative for the 
other, designated the principal, in a particular domain of decision problems” (Ross 1973b).   
The problem arises when there are information asymmetries between the Principal and Agent, 
and self-interest appears. Basically, due to the asymmetries, the agent does not necessarily 
apply the best effort to execute the task. This may trigger a moral hazard or adverse selection 
by the parties involved. The theory anchors a contractual element to minimize these situations 
(Eisenhardt 1989). 
Information asymmetries can be defined as the difference of information between two parties 
in regards to quality or attributes for a product or service. This situation may change the 
behavior and decision between them (Akerlof 1970). To explain the commonalities that the 
Principal-Agent relationship may have to the Headhunter-Client relationship is important to 
understand the executive search firms and their business model. 
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Executive Search Firms or headhunters are defined as “A third-party agent who is paid a fee 
by client companies and organizations to help them attract, hire, and develop leaders” (Piccolo 
2012). This business relationship involves mainly three parties, Headhunters, Clients and 
Candidates. However, in some cases, other elements may intervene, but there are not part of 
the triad. 
In the case of the Executive Search industry, these arguments have been used previously to 
explain, to some extent the relationship Headhunter-Client, their contractual element and the 
rewards scheme (Britton, Ball 1999) . On the contrary, not much has been done to explain the 
relation headhunter-candidate using the same theory framework.  
Initially, it may look like the only agency situation presented is when a Company (Principal) 
hires a headhunter (Agent) to find a candidate for a position. However, this relation involves a 
third party (candidate) that will have, at some point in time, effects in the original relation 
(Client-Headhunter). In contrast to other intermediaries’ situations like stock brokers, the 
exchange is related to a tangible asset like stocks; in our situation the exchanged asset is the 
candidate. In the context that I develop this research, the candidate as a human being, an 
eventually with capability to decide during this process, can compromise the process’s 
outcome.  
At this point, our intermediary confronts a dual agency problem. This may be defined as the 
situation when an agent has two sets of control or Principals (Child, Rodrigues 2003), 
compromising the level of loyalty to each of them. 
On one side, the headhunter is an agent to the Client, but at the same time, the headhunter acts 
as the candidate’s agent. This potential shift in the agency role has been presented by Marsh 
and Zumpano (1988) in the Real Estate Industry, where they proposed that the real estate 
brokers were Agents to the Sellers, but they also may act as Agent for Buyer; they argued that 
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changes in that situation will include dramatic modifications in that business profession. 
Similar to the relationship used on this chapter, the headhunters are under contract to the 
client’s firm, but not with the candidates. 
These parallels and precedents encourage us to see evidence that agency theory may be used 
as a framework to understand the relation between headhunters and candidates during the 
executive search process.  
Agency theory presents human and organizational assumptions (Eisenhardt 1989). These 
assumptions are highly connected to the variables and hypothesis that I subsequently present 
in the chapter. The human assumptions are: risk aversion, bounded rationality and self-interest. 
In my case, these assumptions are present:  
 The risk aversion (Arrow 1965) is the situation in which individuals tend to take less 
risk on decisions when the outcome may be negative to them. In this context, this is 
represented in the level of risk that a candidate may experiment in engaging in executive 
search process with a headhunter. I argue that this level of risk may differ depending 
on the candidate’s employability or its individual objectives with respect to a new 
employment relationship (Berntson, Sverke et al. 2006) . 
 Bounded rationality refers to the decision making under different levels of information 
(Simon 1959); for instance, depending on the stage during the contacts between the 
headhunter and candidate, the information that they share may be different. This 
information is also a variable in my research, and I argue based on the theory that 
conditionally to the level of information sharing, the relation between the candidate and 
headhunter may be different or inexistent. 
 Self-interest, this position defines that individuals are inclined to prioritize their actions 
for their own benefit, even if they are acting on behalf of someone else (Smith 2010).  
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In the interactions between headhunter and candidate, I may argue two perspectives. 
First, the headhunter in one hand primarily looks for an optimal candidate to accomplish 
his or her initial assignment.  On the other hand, the candidates may have many reasons 
to engage in a working relationship with a headhunter, but ultimately, the goal is to 
receive a job offer from the headhunter’s client. Therefore, the self-interest for both 
parties is intrinsically related to the outcomes of this work relationship. 
Along with the human conventions, Eisenhardt (1989) defines three organizational 
assumptions. These are: 
 Partial Goal conflicts between participants: This is a fundamental in the Agency 
dilemma. The principal is not sure that the agent will act on his behalf properly (Jensen, 
Meckling 1976), which is why the theory suggests a contractual form to offset this. 
Considering what I mentioned in this chapter introduction, I argued that the interaction 
between headhunter and candidate may be seen initially with similar goals. However, I 
may claim that the headhunter may engage with a candidate just to complete a shortlist 
for the candidate, or the candidate is using the headhunter only to know his market 
value.  
 Efficiency as effectiveness criterion: With this assumption the theory assumes that the 
parties involved will define a contract figure that considers what is efficient primarily 
to the principal (Nilakant, Rao 1994). I argue that even though is not clear at first sight 
who may be the principal in the relationship (headhunter or candidate) still there is a 
possible type of contract that may fits both parties’ interests. This is a point on which I 
will elaborate later in the chapter, in the heading that relates to psychological contract. 
 Information Asymmetries, this may be conceptualized as the imbalances of information 
between two parties that engage in a transaction, creating imbalances between the 
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parties, giving more power to one party (Akerlof 1970) and eventually turning the 
transaction failed or sour.  This is for us, a core element in my relationship. Although 
in theory, the headhunter knows in the initial stage more about the candidate and the 
Client, later along the process because the candidate has more decision power over the 
outcome there may be a shift of the information imbalance. Therefore, I am confident 
that this is a relationship based on informational asymmetries.  
Having explained the theoretical framework that has been used in my research, I now present 
my variables and explain their connection to the Agency Theory human and organizational 
assumptions. 
4.3 EMPLOYMENT STATUS 
The executive recruiter community makes a distinction between the two main kinds of 
candidates that may engage in the recruitment process depending on their employability status. 
This typology is used frequently in Websites such as Ere.net, Fordyceletter.com, 
Hrgrapevine.com among others (focused on the Executive recruitment practitioners). Thus, for 
each group of CAs, practitioners see each of them with different perceptions, inclinations and 
tradeoffs during the process. 
The first group is named Active candidates. This group includes those individuals who are 
actively looking for a job, directly making efforts to reach a new position, regardless of whether 
they are employed or not. For instance, they periodically review job boards, look for 
newspaper’s ads, check social media and specialized recruitment sites. This type of candidates 
had been historically the main source of potential candidates for search performed “in house” 
or by Human Resources within organizations. 
Another group is known as Passive candidates. Those are the candidates that are not actually 
looking for a job or position. They may be employed or not, but regardless of their employment 
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position, the first impression is that they are not actively looking for a position. Cappelli (2001) 
has used this distinction on research related to online recruitment and selection. 
Connecting these groups (Actives and Passives) to my theoretical framework, I see different 
trade-offs regarding the interactions with the headhunter and consequently, different levels of 
exchange among them. Therefore, is clear that two variables should be considered, the 
employment status (Employed or Unemployed) and the efforts in looking for an opportunity.  
Employed candidates most likely are the larger portion of candidates considered by 
headhunters (Hamori 2010). These potential candidates are working for other companies, and 
from the perspective of recruiters these send positive signals (Spence 1973). These candidates 
are able to perform well in other, similar positions. Therefore, from the perspective of the 
headhunter, these candidates will be more appreciated by the Client. However, my theoretical 
framework may add in regards to this. Agency theory considers a group of human assumptions 
that also include as a potential candidates those unemployed. For instance, if I am considering 
the “Risk Aversion” human assumption of the Agency Theory, I may argue that candidates that 
are employed may be risk adverse to engage with the headhunter, because their trade-off may 
be higher. For instance, engaging with headhunter can generate negative signals to his or her 
actual employer; it may question his level of loyalty with this last one. This situation would be 
more uncomfortable if the current employer of the candidate realizes that this is seeking 
employment with a competitor. 
Previous research argues that headhunters mainly focus of employed candidates (Hamori 
2010). However, there are documented cases that some potential candidates may be 
unemployed or even retired before engage in a new position (Sonnenfeld, Ward 2008).  
Unemployed candidates are those who when contacted by the headhunter, are not working for 
anyone, not even doing consulting or as a self-contractor, because this condition may include 
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them in the “Employed.” Therefore, it will not be wrong to see unemployed candidates as 
potentials to be used by the headhunters. 
Considering the previous condition and using the same human assumption (Risk Aversion), I 
may argue that unemployed candidates are willing to take higher risks in engaging on 
relationships with headhunters, these candidates may be more collaborative on scenarios like 
getting a new employment. 
4.4 INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN CANDIDATE 
AND HEADHUNTER 
Information sharing has been defined as “communication with other team members related to 
coordination activities, task detail, task progress, and reasoning for task decision” (Moye & 
Langfred, 2004). 
In the context of business-to-business relations, information sharing may be defined as “making 
information available to trading partners” (Yi-Ming & Chin-Fu, 2010) (p.1387). In the case, 
headhunter- candidate this may not be seen as a Business to Business relation. However, the 
concept itself allows us to elaborate the construct.  
Information sharing has been already discussed in the recruitment and selection research field, 
mainly focused on the development of networks and labor markets (Gërxhani, Brandts, & 
Schram, 2013). However, the information sharing on this research stream is more related to 
interaction between employers to validate a candidate’s quality or previous performance. In 
other words, the authors investigated through experiments how the emergence of employer’s 
networks validates the trustworthiness of job candidates.  
It seems that the definition, regardless their many commonalities, depending on context of 
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application, may change. In this context the information sharing I analyzed, is the one that 
occurs between headhunter and candidate. 
Therefore, I can define Information sharing in my context as the process of information 
exchange and disclosure to reduce asymmetries during the executive recruitment process 
between candidate and headhunters, clarifying gradually to both parties trying to reach an 
equilibrium on information. Ultimately, with the intention to maintain interest awareness about 
the relationship process and outcomes.  
The initial signals that headhunters see on the candidates’s pool, are those that at first glance 
match the client’s specs. They look for potential candidates with similar job positions 
experience and in some cases, the same industry as their clients. They are usually in the 
headhunters’ contact database, to be “poached” (industry term) from those companies, also 
known as lateral hiring. 
In some other cases, when the candidates in the executive labor market do not produce those 
signals, headhunters have to follow other directions (Referral, Ad online, Online Professional 
Networks, Newspaper ads, among others)(Klehe, de Goede 2012) , increasing the pool of 
candidates. 
When a list of people that may match the criteria is identified, the interactions begin (there may 
be some changes the interactions depending on the candidate efforts in looking for a job, but 
this will be clarified later on the chapter). My research focused on these individuals who are 
somehow short listed by the headhunters. Therefore, I would not consider as a part of the 
information sharing any information accessed by the candidate (Werbel, Song et al. 2008) 
previously to the initial contact between them. 
First information sharing may happen with a short casual or formal interview, or a phone 
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conversation (Luci 2012b). Both the candidate and the headhunter send signals in regards to 
the position and the candidate’s characteristics. This first contact may be vague or informal, 
but it triggers for further follow up. A strong potential candidate that may be hesitant in first 
conversation may opt out right away or early in the process. Likewise, a candidate that doesn’t 
show basic “fit” or interest may also be discharged by the HH. 
In the event that the headhunter did not already have the CV, this may be required. Perhaps the 
contact with candidate was a referral (Luci 2012b) thus the headhunter may not have an update 
CV. Some organizations or recruiters may need some extra forms or documents (Internal 
Applications, References, among other things). Moreover, based on that initial contact, a 
second more formal interview may happen. 
This second wave of information sharing is more detailed. On one hand, the headhunter will 
try to sell indirectly the position and the organization to the candidate. On the other side, the 
headhunter will measure if the candidate may be a good fit for the client’s organization. The 
headhunter then might present a Realistic Job Preview, describing in a soft manner what the 
candidate will find out in the client’s organization (Wanous 1977). This will help to explain 
broadly in what extent the candidate will be challenged (Positive and Negative).   
It is important to mention confidentiality. In the executive search industry, this is a significant 
issue (Melé, Roig 1995). On one side, the headhunter has to maintain in many cases the clients’ 
privacy (Jones 1989). Also, the type of candidates that usually are engaged by headhunters, are 
interested in companies with some reputation (Cappelli, Hamori 2006), not compromising their 
future career, as well as their actual employment (if they are working). Therefore, I argue that 
the initial stage for this process is loaded with information asymmetries. Eventually, along the 
process the candidate may contacted directly with the client and more company information 
may be disclosed.  
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After this interview process, both parties (headhunter and candidate) may require further 
contacts or meetings between them, and with the client. At this point, the collaboration efforts 
play an important role. There is not a documented standard time frame for this process, and the 
agendas for all intervening parties may be completely different. Therefore, understanding and 
respecting each other’s time and activities is sensitive. Furthermore, when the client engages 
in the process, this may be decisive.  
With this said, their collaboration levels in regards to a full agenda disclosure, and commitment 
to attend to meetings is essential. This commitment is also connected to the interest in the 
processes itself. Either the headhunter or the candidate needs to know until what point someone 
is interested in the process. Thus, if a candidate loses interest in the search, is expected that 
they will notify the HH. On the other hand, for those candidates that may be rejected or 
dismissed during the process it is strongly recommended to let them know (National 
Association of Executive Recruiters 2014, Association of Executive Search and Leadership 
Consultants (AESC) 2012).  
During the process, each party may request feedback about the process and what the client’s 
firm perceptions in regards to the candidate assessment is. Furthermore, transparency should 
be present during all the process. Neither headhunter nor CC should develop false expectations 
of each other.  
Finally, when the right candidate is identified, the headhunter shifts position to some degree 
and becomes the candidate’s Agent confronting a Dual Agency situation (Child, Rodrigues 
2003). The candidate expect directly or indirectly from the headhunter to intervene in the offer 
negotiation, if is the case. At the same time, when a strong candidate have been identified, the 
headhunter will try the end the process satisfactorily for all. The candidate receives an offers, 
accept the position, fills open position, and headhunter closes the job order and goes to another 
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one.   
The process’ sequence described above, has been documented partially by Jones (1989), Finlay 
and Coverdil (2002) and Garrison (2005).  Jones’ (1989) work is a narrative about the industry 
from and UK perspective using CAs, recruiter and client’s experiences. Garrison (2005) is a 
guide about the industry and how candidates and companies can use the headhunter services, 
unveiling many more practices. Finlay and Coverdill (2002) write a more in depth book based 
on an ethnographic research about the headhunters in a Southern State, with the only difference 
that they limited their research to Contingent Executive Search Firm.  
The Information sharing items that I have presented, favorably match with the common objects 
between headhunter and candidate, from the candidates’ point of view, defined by Britton, 
Wright and Ball (2000) (Britton, Wright et al. 2000)  like: Job Specification, Interviews, 
Career advices, Remuneration package, information about the company, CV and 
candidate report, and Psychometric test. 
Therefore, considering these preceding arguments, the employment status mentioned in the 
previous heading and the differing degrees of risk-aversion between employed or unemployed 
candidates, I present my first hypothesis: 
H.1 Employment status is negatively related to information sharing between the candidate 
and the headhunter.  
4.5 JOB SEARCH BEHAVIOR AND THE PROCESS 
The levels of information sharing perceived by the candidate may also take shape from other 
variables that may boost or diminish this construct. As I explain on the Employment Status 
variable, headhunters consider candidates mainly employed. However, I also noted that some 
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candidates who may be unemployed can be considered by headhunters. In both cases, the big 
issue is how “employable” are either employed or unemployed candidates.  
The employability from the practitioners is interpreted as if candidate is actively looking for a 
new employment or not. This can be linked to the efforts that a candidate may do or not looking 
for a job. This employability is a main discussion topic among the practitioners, mainly because 
depending on this condition, a candidate is more likely to engage with headhunters in a search 
process. These arguments can be seen on practitioner’s publications like The Executive 
Grapevine and The Fordyce Letter used as sources in academic research related to the 
Executive Search Firms (Coverdill, Finlay 1998, Finlay, Coverdill 2000, Faulconbridge, 
Beaverstock et al. 2009). 
In the academia, this activity in looking for employment has been defined “job search behavior” 
(JSB) considered as the effort-intensity, content-direction and temporal-persistence with which 
people search for a job (Van Hoye 2013).  
In a recent research by Saks, Zikic and Koen (2014) they include this element JSB as part of 
the construct Job search self-efficacy (JSSE).  JSSE is the perception that someone may have 
in regards to the level of success in executing behaviors necessary to looking for and obtaining 
a job (Saks, Ashforth 1999), JSSE-B is the behavioral element, while JSSE-O is the outcome. 
I suggest using part of this concept, JSSE-B, and adapting some of its measurements to my 
construct, JSB. 
JSB is vital in my relationship, even more when considering the Agency theory human 
assumption of bounded rationality and risk averseness. I argue that everyone may have different 
motivations (with a different risk aversion level) regardless their employment status. For 
instance, there may be candidates that are unemployed and not looking for employment (i.e. 
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recently retired CEOs that have been call by organizations, or candidates that recently have left 
their jobs but are in career transition). 
The fact that a candidate employment status relates to the information sharing with the 
headhunter suggest that the candidate’s behavior in regards to the JSB may also be affected by 
the employment status. This argument is embedded on the self-interest human assumption of 
the agency theory. The rationale is that a candidate may have different levels of JSB due their 
employment status due the self-interest and the risk that someone is willing to take. Moreover, 
an individual that is unemployed may have a higher JSB compered to someone that is 
employed. In all, I hypothesize: 
H. 2 Employment status is negatively related to job search behavior develop by the candidate.   
4.6 PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACT BETWEEN THE 
CANDIDATE AND HEADHUNTER 
Besides the human assumptions mentioned in the agency theory, another consideration in this 
framework is the contractual form included in the organizational assumptions. This relationship 
between headhunter and candidate may lack an agreement method, at least a formal contract 
or de jure. However, contracts must not necessarily be written to influence a relation between 
two parties. I suggested that there is not a written or legal contract between these parties 
because the binding argument is formed during the process on Trust and Reciprocity. Thus, 
usually as more time passes or positive interactions between them occur, this implicit contract 
form becomes stronger.   
The explanation for this previous argument can be seen in research done by  Spier (1992), in 
which information asymmetries lead to contract incompleteness. This supports the notion that 
just the idea of having an informal/spoken contract between a candidate and a headhunter may 
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generate potential wrong signals in the situation, even more when the outcome is contingent.  
This isalso in accordance with the ambiguity mentioned by Bernheim and Whinston (1998): 
definitely the parties consider that a written contract may be a hassle instead of a help. They 
explained that because some performance aspects of this relationship are not measurable, it 
may be optimal to leave out of a contract those other measurable aspects.  I argue that being 
this relationship initially based on information asymmetries a non-written type of contract 
between the candidate and the headhunter is feasible.   
Towards the end of 1990s, academics (Sparrow, Cooper 1998)start to talk about other forms of 
organizations or scenarios to review the psychological contract; among those they mentioned 
companies privatized, downsized, and restructured. Regarding such scenarios, I suggests a 
change of principal occurs. Due the organizational changes in many cases the principal 
changes. For instances, when privatized going from a private enterprise to a government 
manage entity, thus in some cases the psychological contract may change. Still, there are clear 
application of the concept under an organizational context (Employer-Employee). 
Other research (Sturges, Conway et al. 2005) shows psychological contracts as a framework to 
understand career management. This research shows connections between individual career 
management behaviors and organizational career management. Perhaps, I argue that the 
organizational career management help may come from an outsider like the headhunter 
(Hamori 2010). Thus, the existence of a psychological contract between candidate and HU can 
empower the candidate individual career management behavior outcome. The figure 5 denotes 


















Source: own elaboration, based on Eisenhardt, 1989 and Rousseau 1995. 
 
The psychological contract is mostly based on singular perceptions between the interacting 
parties. Due to the perception variability among individual, authors (Rousseau, McLean Parks 
1993, Rousseau 1989) have identified two elements that will have to be present in order to 
argue the psychological contract existence. These elements are term (time) and performance.  
Rousseau (1995) defined four types of psychological contract: 
 Transactional: are those with a well-defined timeframe, in many cases short time and 
with specific performance requirements and expectations during the interaction.  
 Transitional: Rousseau (1995) (pag.98) said “essentially a breakdown in contracts, 
reflecting the absence of commitment regarding future employment.” The relationship 
tends to be short-term and there is a weak definition of performance for the parties. 
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 Relational: are those contracts that do not have defined time frame. Therefore, more 
long term, but also there are not precise performance expectations (not specific).  
 Balanced: Those are contracts without defined timeframe or open termination, but at 
the same time tend to have defined performance terms and expectations among the 
parties. This type requires well-specified performance.  
These different psychological contracts are indicated in the following figure by dimensions: 












Source: Rousseau 1995. 
 
4.6.1 Performance Dimension  
In relation to the duties, responsibilities, expectations and performance, Rousseau (1995) 
suggests that these are based on the levels of performance’s specificity during the relation. For 
instance, how well defined are mutual obligations between the parties in order to accomplish a 
particular goal that may benefits both. In other words, what should each party do in order to 
achieve common goals. This level of detail in the expected performance can be connected to 
the human assumptions (Risk) and organizational assumptions (Efficiency as Effectiveness of 
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the contract type) mentioned by Eisenhardt (1989) mainly in regard to the risk perceived by the 
candidates. 
As I have argued in the heading “Employment Status,” the candidates tend to be less averse to 
risk if they are unemployed. Therefore, they may be more inclined to engage in a transactional 
or balanced psychological contract (specify performance). Contrary to this, employed 
candidates are more averse to risk, and may be less engaged with the HH. Consequently, their 
psychological contract from with the latter are more likely to be transitional or relational (weak 
specify performance).   
Considering these previous arguments, I present my third hypothesis: 
H.3 Employment status is negatively related to Psychological contracts between the 
candidate and the headhunter, in regards to the performance dimension. 
4.6.2 Timeframe Dimension 
In the case of the contracts forms presented by Rousseau (1995) the timeframe of the 
relationship is limited in time (short term), and open (long term). This timeframe consideration 
is in accordance to the two moments mentioned by Luci (2012) in which the candidate may be 
engaged in a relationship with the HU for a particular job search well defined (short term), but 
it may also maintain the relationship the HU more open in order use him in a further search 
(Long term). I am inclined to see this situation in the actual efforts that a candidate may be 
doing in looking for a new or future employment. Consequently, obtaining a job in the short or 
long term. 
This link between terms and efforts are in accordance to previous research done by Kanfer, 
Wanberg, & Kantrowitz (2001), in which they showed that higher efforts are related to shorter 
term in unemployment.  For instance, the candidate depending on their efforts will expect short 
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term outcomes from this relationship. I suggest that a candidate who has a high JSB understands 
that his or her efforts are the only domain, and therefore the outcome should materialize in a 
shorter term compared to another candidate that may has a lower JSB. The rationale behind my 
suggestion is that the candidates assume that the headhunter may have other potential 
candidates for a search. However, the candidate with higher JSB may have a higher 
consideration in the actual searches, not on those in the future. Based on this argument I 
hypothesize the following:  
H. 4 JSB is negatively related to the psychological contract duration between candidate and 
headhunter perceived by the candidate. 
4.7 OUTCOMES 
The outcome is a significant issue for the Agency Theory (Eisenhardt 1989). In Eisenhardt’s 
(1989) perspective, when the relationship Principal-Agent is based on outcomes, it is more 
probable that their interest are aligned.  Outcomes in recruitment have been researched 
previously (Chapman, Uggerslev et al. 2005), and these outcomes are what the parties involved 
expect to result based on their decisions and behavior during the process. Consequently, the 
JSB are related to the outcomes expected.  
In the same research Chapman et al. (2005) mentioned as a possible outcome “Hiring 
Expectancies.” These are the likelihood of been hired. In this case I also consider the previous 
steps during the relationship HH-CA, which without them is almost improbable to reach an 
offer by the candidate. In the context described, when the headhunter and candidate understand 
that depending their interactions there may be different outcomes (some of those more 
valuables), both parties may start to align their interest to reach the best outcomes. For instance, 
been hired or received a job offer from the client is more beneficial for the candidates that just 
participate in the process itself. 
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The practitioner’s literature review shows a group of possible tangibles outcomes from the 
candidate’s perception related to this relationship. Among those I may mention: been 
interviewed by the client, receiving an offer from the client, obtaining a job from the 
headhunter’s client, been considered for another search with same headhunter, receiving an 
offer from the headhunter’s other clients, obtain a job from the headhunter’s other clients. 
These outcomes are highly aligned with the JSSE-O mentioned by Saks et al. (2015). Although 
the relation includes an intermediary (headhunter) the outcomes are similar. Therefore, I argued 
that they are realistic and also measurable in or research.  I now present my fifth hypothesis: 
H.5 JSB is positively related to the outcomes obtained by the candidate. 
Taking the construct of Information sharing, and linking this with the theoretical framework 
(Agency theory) I argue that higher level of disclosure on information are positive the the 
relationship between candidate and HH. However, consider this a relationship with outcomes 
based on a contingency (Clients decision) higher levels of information in regards to the 
candidates are valuables for the Client providing signals (Spence 1973). On the other hand, the 
information received by the Candidate in regards to the Client and the position definitely help 
in defining a realistic job preview and potentially to the job offer acceptance. Therefore, I 
hypothesize: 
H.6 Information sharing between the candidate and the headhunter is positively related to 
the outcomes obtained by the candidate. 
As I mentioned in the performance dimension of the psychological contract, those relationship 
between candidate and headhunter that have well defined responsibilities and expectation 
among them tend to have less information asymmetries. Therefore and considering my 
previous arguments, I present my final Hypothesis: 
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 H.7 Psychological contracts with defined responsibilities and expectation perceived by the 




4.8.1 Participant and procedures 
Using recruiter’s records has been previously a main source of statistics for research in the 
context for this industry (Hamori 2010). However, in most cases these databases were 
composed with primary data provided by candidates at engaging moment with the executive 
search firm (demographics and CV-Resume information), and a secondary data adding 
variables. In my case, the data was collected from a survey sent to a previous headhunters’s 
contacts database (1777 contacts). 
The database is hosted on a professional-social network. This source is used by many 
headhunters to locate candidates (Klehe, de Goede 2012). The selection of this sample is 
aligned to the characteristics of Targeted Sampling (Watters, Biernacki 1989). Using this type 
of sampling is possible to reach hidden populations. I consider my respondents hidden 
populations because this is, as I have mentioned on section 2.3.2, an industry with high levels 
of confidentially not only in regards their clients but also in regards their candidates.  
There were 357 respondents for the survey, and 265 indicated that have been contacted by 
headhunters. However, only 202 (n=202) of those complete the whole survey, which represents 
a response rate of 11% response rate). These contacts not necessarily have been considered in 
previous searches by the headhunter whom facilitate the database, more than 85% indicated 
they have been contacted by headhunters more than once. The participants voluntarily take part 
in the online survey submitted via email. The survey was presented in English and Spanish 
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(participants choose the language). All items included in the survey maintained consistency 
with their original version including translation and back translation procedures. The 
demographics characteristic are presented in the Appendix.  
4.8.2 Measurements 
 Employment status: based on the descriptions presented by Hamori (2010) and 
Sonnenfeld & Ward (2008), I define to type of employment status for candidate in this 
context, “Employed” or “Unemployed”. I add a third category for those individual 
doing activities like consulting, contractor, self-employed. My intension was to 
consider individuals in such activities or status with a level of safety-net in reference to 
a risk, similar than those employed. This variable for the analysis took values 1-3 (1: 
Employed, 2: Doing Consulting or self-employed, 3: Unemployed).   
 Information sharing CA-HH: Considering this construct changes depending on the task 
or context, it may be considered a multidimensional construct. And has not been 
previously used for this context.  I have adapted the items mentioned by Britton, Wright, 
& Ball (2000) as common objectives between candidates and headhunters. For instance 
Job Specification, Interviews, Career advice, Remuneration package, Information on 
company, Items M-N-O-P-Q (Information received by the candidate) & CV (Resume) 
and candidates report, and psychometric testing , Items Infshapro1 and Infshapro2 
(Information given by the candidate). These items are pieces of information shared 
during the executive search process between candidate and headhunter mentioned on 
the academic work by Britton, Wright, & Ball (2000),  they were validated based on 
the qualitative aspects, contrasted with the practitioners literature consulted (Byrne 
1986, Jones 1989, Garrison 2005), but also on interviews with practitioners (executive 
recruiters) . I only considered those that from the candidates perspective were valued 
as common objective between them and headhunters (% Candidates identifying 
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common objectives > 0). To measure the level of information shared I associated the 
level of importance on receiving (items M-N-O-P-Q) and receiving (items Infshapro1 
and Infshapro2) to maintain interest in the search process with the headhunter. I’m 
aware that these measurements are somehow broad (due the individual characteristics 
of the items, i.e. remuneration and company information). Therefore the internal 
consistency expected will be low. 
 Psychological contract: I selected the 4 items used by Wade-Benzoni, Rousseau, & Li 
(2006) to identify the type of psychological contract perceived by the candidate. These 
items were considered based on the timeframe definition (long-term and short-term) 
and performance specificity (strong and weak) mentioned on the theoretical review. 
The coding for each psychological contract is as follow: Relational = 1, Transactional 
= 2, Balanced = 3 and Transitional = 4. Then, to measure the performance specificity 
Transitional and Relational were recoded “0” for weak and “1” for strong. In the same 
line, to measure the timeframe dimension was recoded as Transitional and 
Transactional “0” for short-term and Relational and Balanced “1” for long-term. 
 Job Search Behavior (JSB): I have selected the scale developed by Saks, Zikic, & Koen 
(2015) (α = .88). However, I just picked the items (10) related to JSSE-B. An example 
of these items: using social networks to obtain job leads, preparing resumes that would 
get me job interviews, impressing interviewers during employment interview, making 
“cold calls” that would get me a job interview, conducting information interviews to 
find out about careers and jobs that I was interested in pursuing, preparing a sales 
pitch that would attract the interest of employers, planning and organizing a weekly 
job search schedule, finding out where job openings existed, using a variety of sources 
to find job opportunities, searching for and finding good job opportunities. 
 Outcomes: In the same line of the JSB I have selected the scale developed by Saks, 
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Zikic, & Koen (2015). However, I just pick the items (10) related to JSSE-O. I also 
adapt this scale to this context, including some other items (outcomes) perceived by the 
candidates mentioned on previous research and practitioners publications (Luci 2012b, 
Garrison 2005, Finlay, Coverdill 2002, Jones 1989). The outcomes were split on four 
outcome categories. A first category (dep1) with values 1-5 (ordinal variable). This 
first category relates to the outcomes achieved for the main search process on which 
the candidate was contacted by the headhunter. This class is ordinal, assuming that a 
candidate that receive a job offer from the headhunter’s client also achieved all the other 
milestones. These are the items: 1- had a phone interview with the headhunter, 2- had 
a face to face interview with the headhunter, 3- had a phone interview with the 
headhunter's client (hiring company), 4- had a face to face interview with the 
headhunter's client (hiring company), 5- received a job offer from the headhunter's 
client (hiring company). The three other outcomes categories (dep2, dep3 and dep4 
respectively) were binomial with values 0-1, and each of them responding if the 
candidate reach this outcomes as well: 6- was considered for other searches done by the 
headhunter (dep2), 7- received another job offer from another client of the headhunter 
(dep3), 8- hired the same headhunter to do a search for my employer (dep4).  
4.8.3 Methodology 
To obtain estimates for the conceptual model proposed, generalized structural equation 
modeling (GSEM) is employed. I selected this approach due to the multifaceted nature of the 
conceptual model, multiple hypotheses to be tested, and the non-continuous response variables. 
Structural equation modeling affords the ability to simultaneously estimate multiple 
interrelationships and regressions, as well as estimation of latent factors. And as the response 
variables are non-continuous, ordinal and binomial, GSEM is utilized over SEM as the latter is 
only appropriate for continuous data (Skrondal, Rabe-Hesketh 2004, Mehta, Neale 2005). 
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I employ two latent factors [ξ1 , ξ2] within the conceptual model presented, job search behavior 
and information sharing/receiving. The first latent factor [ξ1] job search behavior (JSB) is from 
Saks, Zikic and Koen (2014), they identified ten highly correlated indicators that capture the 
job candidate's JSB. Inspection of my data confirmed their findings. The second latent factor 
[ξ2], information sharing, makes use of information provided by the job candidate as well as 
the head hunter. As expected, these indicators do not correlate as well as JSB since they embody 
the perceived actions of job candidate vis-à-vis the headhunter. To minimize the degrees of 
freedom applied in estimation of the model, factor analysis with orthogonal rotation (Varimax) 
is used to reduce the number of indicator variables while retaining the variance of the original 
set. With respect to ξ1, the original ten indicators were reduced to five while maintaining more 
than 95% of the original variance - factor loadings [λ]of less than .6 were removed in this 
process. With respect to ξ2, all of the original indicators were maintained as a removal of a 
single loading would have resulted in a loss of more than 10 percent of the original variance - 
this is to be expected given the potential for divergence between the headhunter and candidate.  
Within the model employment status is exogenous and the latent factors as well as the 
psychological constructs performance and time are endogenous. The dependent variables (η) 
dep1, dep2, dep3 and dep4 as explained on the measurement subsection 4.8.2., been dep1 
ordinal (1-5) and dep2 through dep4 binomial. Figure 8 presents the modeled where the one-
way arrows from the endogenous to exogenous variables identify the direction of effect. The 
size of the effect is captured in the β coefficients.  Covariation and correlation between the 
latent factors is represented by the two-way arrow and captured in term φ. The model is 
recursive as there is a clear beginning with the endogenous variable and ends with the response 
variables. That is, the model does not exhibit a circular process, hence it is clearly defined 




Figure 8 Structural Equation Model Diagram 
 
Source: own elaboration.  
The data are assessed using Stata SE 13.1 (Rabe-Hesketh, Pickles et al. 2001). The conceptual 
model was estimated using maximum likelihood with robust standard errors (Huber/White 
sandwich estimator (Huber 1967, White 1982) and for convenience factor loading residuals are 
fixed to one (Satorra, Bentler 1994). To assess model fit of the values obtained using GSEM, I 
calculate the probability of the Yuan-Bentler T2 statistic relative to the chi-squared (Yuan, 
Bentler 1997). Obviously, this approach differs from the traditional SEM assessment with fit 
statistics such as RMSEA and GFI. McIntosh (2012) discusses the historical background of 
metrics used for assessing model fit and notes that both Jöreskog and Sorböm who are key 
pioneers of SEM state "chi-square is all you really need (to assess fit)." Jöreskog goes on to 
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note that GFI was invented to make users happy (McIntosh 2012). As well a number of other 
papers go on to point out the realized and potential shortfalls of the traditional fit indexes (Hu, 
Bentler 1999, Marsh, Hau et al. 2004, Antonakis, Bendahan et al. 2010) . Hence, my method 
of assessment is appropriate for the assessment of the conceptual model. 
4.9 RESULTS  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables used for this study. The results of 
this model test produced a goodness of fit Yuan-Bentler style chi2 test T2 = 213.56573 and p 
T2 = 0.06046131 (Yuan, Bentler 1997) df = 183. I decide to use this indicator due the size 





Table 2 Descriptive statistic 
 
Source: own elaboration.  
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Table 3 presents the results of the regressions showing output generated by method describe 
above in relation to the Employment Status.  The hypothesis developed around the construct 
(H1, H2 and H3) were not supported by the statistics on each variable. The agency theory 
assumption related to this construct was risk aversion. Therefore, my claim that the individuals 
may be: less collaborative in relation to the information shared with the headhunter, less 
inclined to exercise a high efforts in looking for jobs (JSB) and less interested in developing 
relationship with defined or specified performance with the headhunter,  are not supported. 
Table 3 Analyses for Employment Status 
    Robust           
    Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
JSB <-             
  EMPSta 0.134163 0.21962 0.61 0.541 -0.29628 0.564611 
Info <-             
  EMPSta 0.217553 0.199392 1.09 0.275 -0.17325 0.608354 
Perf <-             
  EMPSta -0.05111 0.047789 -1.07 0.285 -0.14477 0.042558 
  _cons 0.626816 0.07593 8.26 0 0.477995 0.775636 
Source: own elaboration.  
In the case of the Hypothesis 4 related to high JSB and psychological contracts with low 
temporality perception my suggestion was supported. Thus there are statistical signification (β 
= 0.18, p < .01) between these efforts and the temporal timeframe. In other words, individuals 
with high level of JSB develop short-term contracts. This is appreciated on the table 4. 
Table 4 Analyses for Job Search Behavior (JSB) and Psychological Contract 
(Timeframe Dimension) 
    Robust           
    Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Time <-             
  JSB 0.187094 0.045345 4.13 0* 0.098219 0.275969 
  _cons 0.30308 0.062208 4.87 0 0.181154 0.425006 
Notes: 202 respondents      
*p<.05        
**p<.01        
Source: own elaboration.  
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Table 5 indicates the connotation for the Information sharing candidate-headhunter (M-N-O-
P-Q-Infshapro1-Infshapro2) over my dependent variables, in the case on the hypothesis 6 the 
construct does not show statistical significance in relation to any of the possible outcomes of 
the relationship with the headhunter. Thus, the bounded rationality assumption that individuals 
will share more or less information and this may related to achieve more outcomes is not 
braced. 
Table 5 Analyses for information sharing between candidate and headhunter (info) and 
Outcomes 
    Robust           
    Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Dep1 <-             
  Info 0.314614 0.651731 0.48 0.629 
-
0.96276 1.591984 
Dep2 <-             
  Info -1.00775 1.114253 -0.9 0.366 
-
3.19165 1.176142 
  _cons -1.16794 0.70577 -1.65 0.098 
-
2.55123 0.21534 
Dep3 <-             
  Info -0.07322 2.870146 -0.03 0.98 -5.6986 5.552167 
  _cons -6.22607 2.797006 -2.23 0.026 
-
11.7081 -0.74404 
Dep4 <-             
  Info -0.55462 1.003746 -0.55 0.581 
-
2.52193 1.412681 
  _cons -3.42833 0.726705 -4.72 0 
-
4.85264 -2.00401 
Source: own elaboration.  
Regardless that some hypotheses have been rejected, my model presents interesting statistical 
findings in regards the hypotheses 5 and 7. The hypothesis 5 is accepted on all 4 outcomes. 
Thus, individuals with a high job search behavior tend to be more likely to: receive a job offer 
from a headhunter’s client or be shortlisted (β = 0.95, p < .01), been considered for another 
search with the same headhunter (β = 2.35, p < .05), received another job offer from another 
client of the headhunter (β = 4.8, p < .05), hired the same headhunter to do a search for their 
employer (β = 1.45, p < .05). Therefore, hypothesis 5 is fully supported. 
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For hypothesis 7, this is only accepted partially. However, the outcome that received 
significance is the one linked to receiving a job offer from a headhunter’s client or be shortlisted 
(β = 0.98, p < .01).  Having a perception of a relationship based on performance specificity 
between the candidate and the headhunter just relays to the main search process, not to some 
other outcomes. These previous arguments for hypotheses 5 and 7 can be seen on the table 6. 
Table 6 Analyses for Psychological Contract performance dimension and Job Search 
Behavior towards Outcomes 
    Robust           
    Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Dep1 <-             
  Perf 0.981542 0.337093 2.91 0.004** 0.320851 1.642233 
  JSB 0.952376 0.314844 3.02 0.002** 0.335294 1.569458 
Dep2 <-             
  Perf 0.277079 0.552083 0.5 0.616 -0.80498 1.359141 
  JSB 2.302249 0.743451 3.1 0.002* 0.845112 3.759386 
  _cons -1.16794 0.70577 -1.65 0.098 -2.55123 0.21534 
Dep3 <-             
  Perf 1.666421 1.347823 1.24 0.216 -0.97526 4.308105 
  JSB 4.836816 1.931832 2.5 0.012* 1.050495 8.623137 
  _cons -6.22607 2.797006 -2.23 0.026 -11.7081 -0.74404 
Dep4 <-             
  Perf 0.728139 0.607952 1.2 0.231 -0.46343 1.919703 
  JSB 1.459309 0.640624 2.28 0.023* 0.20371 2.714909 
  _cons -3.42833 0.726705 -4.72 0 -4.85264 -2.00401 
Notes: 202 respondents      
*p<.05        
**p<.01        
Source: own elaboration.  
 
4.10 DISCUSSION 
In the previous chapter (3) I suggested how headhunters are able to create a large group of 
candidates who match the clients’ requirements, but sometimes are unable to achieve the 
matchmaking, all this from the clients-headhunter dyad. However, closing the whole executive 
search process, until the candidate receives an offer from the client, is what I have pronounced 
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and analyzed for this chapter. In this part, I highlighted answers to concerns argued by 
Sengupta. I explained how through the relationship developed between headhunter and 
candidates, the outcomes that the latter may achieve can be affected. My approach is based on 
the agency theory’s problem domain (Eisenhardt 1989) of on which Principal and Agent had 
partly different goals and risk preferences. Nevertheless, through the creation of a non-written 
contract based on performance, efforts and short term, they aligned more their goals. 
My survey analysis explains that those candidates that have high Job Search Behavior are active 
candidates (looking for a job), and therefore, are sending the right signals to potential recruiters 
and employers. Consequently, those individuals are more likely to receive job offers from 
employers. This finding is aligned with those presented by Saks, Zikic and Koen (2014). These 
individuals, considered active tend to take higher levels of risk in their efforts to find new job 
opportunities, regardless their employment status (employed or not) as the literature reviewed. 
Therefore, it is more consistent and rational that headhunters look for individuals who are 
actively seeking employment. Unfortunately for the headhunters, the fact a candidate may be 
employed or not is more related to the client’s perception of the ideal candidate.  This is 
somehow what I argue on the previous chapter about the filters set by the Human-Resource 
Unit or the Hiring Authority. 
It seems that the contractual form presented between the candidate, and the headhunter is more 
aligned to the specificity of expectations, performance and short-term.  The candidates who 
perceive clarity on what was expected from each of them during the engagement processes, 
tend to achieve higher outcomes. This specificity on performance can be the way that both 
parties use to control and close the potential gaps between their partial goals and risk 
preferences. This finds is aligned to the attraction developed by applicants when they perceive 
a positive behavior by the recruiter (Uggerslev, Fassina et al. 2012) that are not accounted in 
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the construct but may also be important. Ultimately, this contract form based on defined 
expectations, performance and short timeframes, present fewer information asymmetries. 
Headhunters, may try to develop relationships with candidates characterized on the 
transactional psychological contract (Rousseau 1989) (Short term and with a defined 
performance expectations). On the other side, contrary to what the theory review indicated, the 
employment status in not significant in this perception. I may argue that there could be some 
other factors like perceived motives, contact frequency and similarities (Wade-Benzoni, 
Rousseau et al. 2006) that are not accounted in the construct but may also be important.  
The outcomes related to the relationship candidate-headhunter differ somehow by those 
pointed by Saks, Zikic and Koen (2014). The possibility of “piggy bag” or be hauling by the 
headhunter to another outcome is an interesting development in this research. This 
investigation considered those potential outcomes. Regardless that the statistical significance 
of those drops as we escalated on those other present outcomes, the reality is that candidates 
are in many cases considered for further searches with the same headhunter. In this point I see 
clear connection between Agency Theory and the context. Seems like the Job Search Behavior 
is connected to the self-interest assumption, thus is more valuated in the long-term for the 
headhunter, being this a lasting element in the future relationship.   
An interesting judgement derivable from this research is related to the information sharing. Not 
having statistical significance from the Employment Status and towards the outcomes is 
somehow confusing. However, I pose to see this as a situation related to the same 
confidentiality in the industry. For instance, candidates who engaged with headhunters may 
know more or less what information will be expected from them, and likewise, what they will 
receive from the headhunter.    
Considering the previous findings, I’m inclined to think this research produces evidence testing 
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how some of the Agency Theory human assumptions are present on the candidate-headhunter 
dyad. These results, along with all the preceding theoretical-contextual review, I posit that 
Agency Theory provides a better understanding to this relationship. Not only for those elements 
that I have tested here, but there are still many more agency parallelisms with the triad that may 
be tested. 
In summary, this chapter exams some agency theory assumptions that I documented. It 
additionally explains more in detail the business triad and process describe in the chapter 1. 
 
4.11 LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
Inherent limitations of the model developed in this chapter arise from the construct employment 
status, and Information shared. In the first one, all theory indicates that this construct was a 
good antecedent in relations to all the other variables considered. This is even more notorious 
in relation to the Risk Aversion human assumption on Agency Theory. This is most definitely 
a construct that requires refining and keeps developing. After, the analysis I’m inclined to see 
this variable as a composite that includes two dimensions, the original (Employed or not) and 
those related to Job Search Behavior. This at some point may lead to creating a unique construct 
that includes employment precondition and efforts looking for a job. That may point more 
towards the candidate’s typology used by practitioners (active or passive) mentioned in this 
chapter, section 4.3. 
The limitations in respects to the creation of the construct information sharing are somehow 
more complex. This is a paradigm that was built upon the only academic paper that express 
“common objects” in the relationship between candidates and headhunters (Britton, Wright et 
al. 2000). Those objects are the items that are included in the construct for this research. After 
the results obtained this is also a potential item to develop.  I pointed early on the chapter how 
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broad and disperse from each other the factors were. A possibility it will be performing 
qualitative research to set what pieces of information are, in reality, better indicators for this 
construct. 
Another limitation on this study is related to the sample size and type of sample. Even, that the 
model shown convergence, testing few hypotheses, and ultimately set some findings. I think a 
larger sample will definitely add value to the results. This is even more overbearing for those 
constructs non statistical significant. In relation to the sample, this has always been an issue 
when doing research about executive recruitment process. It seems like engaging with 
headhunters is not a good indicator of loyalty with employers (Khurana 2002b). As a result, 
the individuals who are contacted by headhunters are not sharing this situation with everyone. 
This condition is more present in their working environment. Therefore, considering the 
candidates a hidden population it was right. Nevertheless, that do not limit potential bias issues.   
The main suggestion resulting from this last chapter, is that a large qualitative research similar 
to what it was done by Finlay and Coverdill is highly recommended in order to create new 
construct and concepts.   
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
5.2 Summary of contributions and findings 




This dissertation set out to analyze the relationship Client-Headhunter-Candidates from the 
Agency Theory perspective, providing consistent and realistic approximation to the situations 
and context previously indicated by research and anecdotal recollections on practitioner’s 
literature. I have analyzed the triad by breaking it on two dyads, maintaining the headhunter as 
a hinge connecting both dyads. This study has also sought to know the executive recruitment 
process and the role for each of the parties involved.  
 
This final chapter offers an outline and conversation of the findings indicated in chapters 2, 3 
and 4, and what is implied in the research and practitioner’s community. In the section 5.2, I 
summarize the dissertation contributions and findings. To end the dissertation on section 5.3, I 
specify the thesis contribution. 
  
5.2 SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS AND FINDINGS 
The study sought to answer the following research question: 
What Agency Theory arguments and assumptions provide understanding for the client-
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headhunter-candidate relationship as a triad? 
Two theoretical and contextual reviews plus an empirical study were performed to answer this 
question. The first theoretical and contextual review concentrated the attention on studding the 
characteristics of this business triad and the executive search service industry. This initial 
review was structured in a way that I described the headhunting activity and the process while 
I pinpointed Agency situations and assumptions that created the foundations for my main 
hypothesis. The second review focused on embossing situations which the clients produce 
conscious or unconscious information asymmetries that compromise the relationship 
outcomes. In the review I proposed possible theoretical remedies for those situations. The 
empirical study presents a conceptual model tested using Generalized Structural Equation 
Modeling (GSEM). This model represents some constructs that, based on the literature review, 
characterize information asymmetry situations between headhunters and candidates. Those 
situations are, as I state in Chapter 4, non-common goals to achieve outcomes (for the candidate 
and, indirectly, to the headhunter). 
Chapter 2 titled “Executive Recruitment Triads and Agency Theory” presents a different 
perspective to analyzing and understanding the triad relationship. This perspective is nothing 
else than explaining a relationship that traditionally was associated with cooperative efforts, 
when, in reality, Agency Theory presents a better framework to explain the interaction between 
all parties. Using this framework I gave potential solution to the concerns pointed by Sengupta 
(2004) in the non-alignment between headhunters and clients’ outcomes. Previous theoretical 
frameworks have assumed balanced information when this is, by nature, an asymmetric 
condition. This unevenness is reflected in the headhunter assumption that producing candidates 
with a good “fit” for the client is enough.  
However, the review demonstrated that there are other elements to consider. These elements in 
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many cases are counted by the headhunter on each search process with the same clients.  
Therefore, long-term relationships produce better results for the clients. Another contribution 
that is important to point out is in relation to the Double Agency element on this triad. While 
it is true that initially the headhunter has a clear agency situation with the client, is not less true 
that when the process become narrower with a candidate, the latter transforms in another 
principal. I want to clarify that is not my position that the headhunter loses the fiduciary 
responsibility with the client, but at some point also defends the candidate’s interest.  
The contractual element is a part of the Agency Theory. The first review indicated potential 
different outcomes if the headhunter’s payment scheme is under retainer and contingent 
scheme. Basically because the retainers headhunters tend to have exclusivity with their clients, 
setting longer relationships with those and, consequently, knowing more of their clients. 
Another outcome from this relationship is related to the timeframe to produce results. As I have 
stated in the Chapter 2, in the executive search firm the timeframe to produce feasible 
candidates is questionable. This is an opposed perception between headhunters and clients. 
Each of them has different expectations. This is therefore, an asymmetric condition. The 
theoretical implications in this section aimed to consider the executive search process as 
another proof that the Double Agency indicated by others is also notable on this context. 
Based on the contributions presented in the chapter 2, clearly, theoretical, there are foundations 
which indicate that regardless of being a triad, this relationship can be explained better using 
agency theory. Conversely, the relationship client-headhunter matches perfectly with the 
customary Principal-Agent situation (Stiglitz 1987). Therefore, I considered more productive 
focus attention on the context of the executive search firms in the dyad client-headhunter. 
 Chapter 3 titled “Information Asymmetries between Clients and Headhunters” contributes in 
identifying, in this particular context, situations in which the clients generated information 
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imbalances.  This section explains that repetition of business helps to minimize asymmetries 
between the parties. Each time the same headhunter and client interact, this creates an 
increment of each other’s knowledge. In one hand, the headhunter learns more from the 
client and FIT, on the other hand, the client can reduce informational gaps that reduce risky 
situations during the process. Therefore, this section indicates that relationships that are based 
on long term assumptions between them tend to have positive outcomes.  This long term 
condition may allow the headhunter to assimilate positively the double principal (HR Unit and 
Hiring authority), and be able to cover as much as possible in both conditions. The “hiring 
authority” and “hidden profile” are also two concepts that I created and developed in this 
section. From the theory standpoint, hiring authority looks for making a distinction between 
the person who may overview the recruitment process from the client, and who is really the 
person that will make the final decision. In the case of hidden profile, the concept indicates the 
constructions of a set of characteristics that are not clear from the client up front, in many cases 
related to bias that the hiring authority may have. This may be connected to research associated 
to stigmas (Kulik 2000, Falk 2001). 
In respect to findings, Chapter 4 “The Headhunter-Candidate relationship a different form of 
Agency” presents evidence that the candidate’s employment status is not necessarily related 
to the outcome achieved by the candidate. I posit that this situation may be explained 
following this rationale: Headhunters tend to consider, in most cases, employed candidates 
because these produced positive signals to potential employers. However, when unemployed 
candidates are considered by the headhunter, this is because the latter can market that 
group of candidates (either because their background or particular characteristics). The 
employment status for the candidate is not related to the importance that they give to 
information shared between. Therefore, the rationale behind individuals with different risk 
aversion is not associated with the information shared during the process. Nevertheless, 
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those candidates who engage in higher efforts to obtain a job are related to positive outcomes. 
This supports the bounded rationality assumption from which individuals will base their 
decisions on information asymmetries. Thus, because candidates understand that obtaining a 
job offer is in part contingent to a third party decision, they maintain efforts at least until they 
decide to accept or reject the offer.  
The other important finding set on the Chapter 4 discusses about the characteristics of the 
contractual element that I argued. My main argument in this matter is that the psychological 
contract construct may explain the relationship between candidates and headhunters. This was 
tested by considering the two dimensions recognizable Performance, and Timeframe 
(Rousseau 1989). Both conditions (performance and timeframe) demonstrate significance. 
There are theoretical and empirical elements which may have some sort of contract among 
them, and it may rule this relationship. Therefore, my suggestion for a contract with similar 
characteristics to Psychological contracts is valuable.    
Based on the above arguments, I support my contributions in the Management and Human 
Resources Theory. Certainly, there are many other contexts which my research contribution 
may help. However, I’m inclined that there is an enormous gap in academic research that 
supports the practitioners like the executive recruiters or headhunters. 
 
5.3 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study focus on explaining the triad relationship client-headhunter-candidate using the 
human and organizational assumptions that Agency Theory presents. I have performed this 
task by developing three content blocks (Chapters 2, 3, and 4). The first two blocks are 
theoretical and context reviews, and the last one is an empirical study. Like any other academic 
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research in the continuous search for new ideas and evidence, this presents a group of 
limitations and future research lines.  
Chapter 2 established parallelism between the triad context and the Agency Theory 
assumptions, mainly focusing on information asymmetries and therefore, moral hazard. The 
first limitation is related to adverse selection (Akerlof 1970). Independently that I did provide 
a group of arguments backed up with authors’ positions on this matter, these positions are not 
supported with empirical evidence. I see that as a potential line to follow in future research. 
For instance, this dissertation may lead to research on what happened when the process went 
wrong.    
Although in Chapter 4 this situation is partially reviewed from the candidate’s perspective, it 
will be imperative to empirically support this position. The previous research done by Finlay 
and Coverdill (2002) indicates that clients minimize adverse selection with the guarantees 
offered by headhunters, but now the concern is how adverse selection works for the headhunter. 
This being a dependence relationship, the headhunter will assume all process failures regardless 
of whether or not this is coming from the client. Furthermore, what happened if the adverse 
selection is exercised by the candidate, in other words, it chose a wrong employer. This is 
undeniably an area of future research. 
Another limitation that this chapter has is related to the payment schemes. I presented 
theoretical argument indicating that retainer’s headhunters tend to provide better services than 
contingents. However, this is just supported with practitioner evidence, but is not empirically 
tested. This is a proposition that may lead to research on these particular items. 
For chapter 3, “Information Asymmetries between Clients and Headhunters” I developed 
theory and context that exemplified situations on which the client may produce information 
asymmetries for the process, an important related concept, which was previously mentioned, 
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is fit. I think this may be a limitation on that chapter. Fit is a broad concept (Rynes, Bretz Jr et 
al. 1990), this is why now, authors have come narrower. For instance, the chapter doesn’t 
develop the job fit and organization fit. In Chapter 2 these two concepts are mentioned but are 
not developed.  This is a clear potential area of research on the executive search process. It will 
be interesting for the academia and practitioners know if headhunters are able to produce 
candidates with both types of fit or one of them.  
This chapter also develops the “double principal” concept, which is somehow aligned to the 
previous research done by Finlay and Coverdill (2002). This concept has not been tested. 
Therefore, it will be important to come up with empirical evidence that measures if there is this 
duality with same client. I see a latent research on measuring the headhunter’s results when 
those are more aligned within the HR Unit or the Hiring Authority. 
A third limitation for Chapter 3 falls precisely on how natural the agency relationship is seen 
between client and headhunter. It is possible that due to a high level headhunter’s dependency 
on the client, at least on the initial stage, the headhunter is willing to accept more information 
asymmetries in order to get the business. Doing research on how the headhunter can reduce 
these asymmetries is most definitely a considerable element for investigation.  
On the last content stage for this dissertation (Chapter 4), because it involves an empirical part, 
the limitations are linked to those constructs that didn’t report significance in the model. The 
first construct in this condition is Employment Status. I see imperative to do more research in 
this matter. For instance, it will be valuable to know how headhunters are able to market those 
individuals who may be unemployed. Also, a comparative study between unemployed 
candidates and those which said they? were doing consulting would be significant. This is a 
limitation for the dissertation.  
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Chapter 4 also indicates the limitations related to the information shared construct. I 
overestimate the predictable capacity for this construct. I think the broadness of those factors 
used to measure this concept, indirectly limited the intentions behind its usage. Therefore, a 
more in-depth analysis and research about what information exchanges happen during the 
process are recommended. 
The limitation that I considered a short term task after this dissertation is increasing the number 
of respondents and retesting the model using another statistical software package to confirm 
findings. However, this may also be seen it as a positive contribution in the usage of Stata SE 
13.1 on models similar to mine. My literature review has indicated that this is not the more 
common approach.  
Overall, the biggest limitation on this dissertation is the triad itself. Any relationship that 
involves three or more parties may generate exponential differences on perception. This, along 
the enormous confidentiality on this industry may be seen as a dead-end road for many 
researchers. I personally saw this as a motivating challenge while developing this dissertation. 
I see prospective benefits of developing an extensive qualitative research on this triad that may 
help to solve potential gaps left for previous research, including this one.   
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A. Email sent to respondents 
B. Survey Copy 
C. Screenshot for the online survey 
D. Survey Demographics 
 
MATERIAL FOR SURVEY 
 
A. EMAIL SENT TO RESPONDENTS 
Hello, 
I am a doctoral student at Universidad Pablo de Olavide in Seville Spain. Currently I am 
conducting research for my dissertation. This study focuses on the Headhunter - Candidates 
relationships. The link below is for a short surrey about this topic, which will take no more than 
15 minutes to complete. At the end of the survey, you will have the chance to enter your email 
to receive the aggregated results if you are interested. 
Your responses will be kept confidential, and your name will not be reported in connection 
with your responses in anyway. Thank you for your time and input! Please click on this link to 
complete the survey: http://goo.gl/DFWwJl 
Please contact with any questions.  
Thank You, 
Carlos M. Baldo 
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B. SURVEY COPY 
 
Our Survey is in English and Spanish, what language would you prefer? Nuestra 
encuesta esta en Inglés y Español, ¿En qué lenguaje prefiere tomarla?  
  Response Percent Response Total 
1-) English (Inglés)     %  
2-) Español (Spanish)    %  
Total Respondents:  
 
1-) Have you ever engaged with an external recruiter or headhunter in a recruiting 
process? By engagement we mean responding emails, calls, interviews, etc. If you have 
never responded emails, calls or interviews, etc. from an external recruiter or 
headhunter please respond "No". 
  Response Percent Response Total 
1-) Yes, once.     %  
2-) Yes, more than 
once.  
   %  
3-) No.     %  
Total Respondents:  
 







1-) had a phone interview with the 
headhunter  
   %  
2-) had a face to face interview with 
the headhunter  
   %  
3-) had a phone interview with the 
headhunter's client (hiring company)  
   %  
4-) had a face to face interview with 
the headhunter's client (hiring 
company)  
   %  
5-) received a job offer from the 
headhunter's client (hiring company)  
   %  
6-) was considered for other searches 
done by the headhunter  
   %  
7-) received another job offer from 
another client of the headhunter  
   %  
8-) hired the same headhunter to do a 
search for my employer 
   %  




3-) At the last time you were contacted by a headhunter, how important was to receive 
the following information to maintain your interest in the process: 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Response 
Total 
Job specifications (details about the position for which you 
had been considered, title, staff, responsibility, actual 









Interview details (type of interviews, schedule and times, 









Career advice (headhunter’s information about the 
position's alignment with your career compared to other 
positions in the job market, quality of the position,growth 









Compensation package (salary expected, tangible and 
intangible benefits, retirement plan, medical insurance, 









Company information (industry, years in business, 
financial situation, locations, international exposure, 









Total Respondents: 0 
 
4-) At the last time you were contacted by a headhunter, how willing were you to: 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Response 
Total 
Provide resume and documents (CV or resume, contact or 
professional references, any other document that may help 









Take psychometric or similar tests (willing to participate in 









Total Respondents: 0 
 






1-)This relationship involved guidance. 
The time frame for the duration of the 
relationship was left open-ended. The 
requirements for a successful search 
process were implicit.  
   0 % 0 
2-)This relationship involved a search 
process with a specific time frame. The 
requirements for a successful search 
process were clear and explicit.  
   0% 0 
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3-)This relationship involved both a 
guiding relationship and at least one search 
process.The time frame for the duration of 
the relationship was understood to be 
open-ended(long) term.The requirements 
for a successful search process were well-
specif 
   0 % 0 
4-)This collaboration had no specified 
time frame or requirements for a 
successful search process. 
   0 % 0 
Total Respondents: 0 
 
6-) Before engaging last time with the headhunter, I was  
 1  2  3  4  5 
Response 
Total 
































conducting information interviews to find out about 



















































Total Respondents: 0 
 






1- Employed.     0 % 0 
2- Unemployed.     0 % 0 
3- Doing Consulting or Self 
Employed.  
   0 % 0 
4- Retired.    0.00 % 0 
142 
 
Total Respondents: 0 
 
8-) What is your gender? 
  Response Percent Response Total 
1- Male     0 % 0 
2- Female     0 % 0 
3- Prefer not to answer.    0 % 0 
Total Respondents: 0 
 
9-) Last time you were contacted by the headhunter, you were working on a company 
(or have previously work) in what industry or sector? 
  Response Percent Response Total 
1     0 % 0 
2     0 % 0 
3     0 % 0 
4     0 % 0 
5     0 % 0 
6     0 % 0 
7     0 % 0 
8     0 % 0 
9     0 % 0 
10     0 % 0 
11     0 % 0 
12     0 % 0 
13     0 % 0 
14    0 % 0 
Total Respondents: 0 
 







1- Technical/Specialist position (i.e. 
IT, Lawyer, etc)  
   0 % 0 
2- Staff     0 % 0 
3- Supervision     0 % 0 
4- Mid Management     0 % 0 
5- Top Management    0 % 0 
Total Respondents: 0 
 
11-) Last time you were contacted by the headhunter, you were working (or have 




 Response Percent Response Total 
1     0 % 0 
2     0 % 0 
3     0 % 0 
4     0 % 0 
5    0 % 0 
Total Respondents: 0 
 
12-) Last time you were contacted by the headhunter, you were working (or have 
previously work) on a company with subsidiaries on the following regions (leave it 
unanswered if previous question you answered "No Subsidiaries", mark all that 
applied) 
  Response Percent Response Total 
1     0 % 0 
2     0 % 0 
3     0 % 0 
4     0 % 0 
5     0 % 0 
6     0 % 0 
7     0 % 0 
8     0 % 0 
9     0 % 0 
10    0 % 0 
Total Respondents: 0 
 
13-) Last time you were contacted by the headhunter, what was your highest level of 
education completed? 
  Response Percent Response Total 
1     0 % 0 
2     0 % 0 
3     0 % 0 
4     0 % 0 
5    0 % 0 
Total Respondents: 0 
 
14-) Last time you were contacted by the headhunter, in which of the following 
languages were you fluent? 
  Response Percent Response Total 
1     0 % 0 
2     0 % 0 
3     0 % 0 
4    0 % 0 
5    0 % 0 View Detail   
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Total Respondents: 0 
 
15-) How many times have you participated as candidate in recruiting processes 
through Headhunters or Executive recruiters? 
  Response Percent Response Total 
1-) 1.     0 % 0 
2-) between 2-3     0 % 0 
3-) between 4-5     0 % 0 
4-) between 6-7     0 % 0 
5-) 8 or more    0 % 0 
Total Respondents: 0 
 
16-) Last time you were contacted by the headhunter, how old were you? 
  Response Percent Response Total 
1-) below 25     0 % 0 
2-) between 25-34     0 % 0 
3-) between 35-44     0 % 0 
4-) between 45-54     0 % 0 
5-) between 55-64     0 % 0 
6-) more than 64    0 % 0 
Total Respondents: 0 
 
17-) Last time you were contacted by the headhunter, how many years of employment 
did you have with that employer (or the previous if you were unemployed)? 
  Response Percent Response Total 
1-) between 0-1 years     0 % 0 
2-) between 2-3 years     0 % 0 
3-) between 4-5 years     0 % 0 
4-) between 6-7 years     0 % 0 
5-) 8 or more years     0 % 0 
    0 % 0 
Total Respondents: 0 
 
18-) Last time you were contacted by the headhunter, how many professional jobs had 
you held? 
  Response Percent Response Total 
1-) Just 1.     0 % 0 
2-) Between 2-3.     0 % 0 
3-) Between 4-5.     0 % 0 
4-) Between 6-7.     0 % 0 
5-) 8 or more.    0 % 0 




19-) The position for which you were contacted last time by the headhunter: 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Response 
Total 
had higher rank than your previous assignment. 






















































Total Respondents: 0 
 
19b-)Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Response 
Total 
The time frame on the relationship between you and the 









What was required from you to have success on the 










Total Respondents: 0 
 
20-) How long ago were you last contacted by the headhunter? 
  Response Percent Response Total 
1-) during the last year     0 % 0 
2-) between 1-2 years ago     0 % 0 
3-) between 3-4 years ago     0 % 0 
4-) between 4-5 years ago     0 % 0 
5-) 6 or more years ago     0 % 0 
    0 % 0 
Total Respondents: 0 
 






AD - Andorra     0.00 % 0 
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AE - United Arab Emirates     0.00 % 0 
AF - Afghanistan     0.00 % 0 
AG - Antigua and Barbuda     0.00 % 0 
AI - Anguilla     0.00 % 0 
AL - Albania     0.00 % 0 
AM - Armenia     0.00 % 0 
AO - Angola     0.00 % 0 
AQ - Antarctica     0.00 % 0 
AR - Argentina     0.00 % 0 
AS - American Samoa     0.00 % 0 
AT - Austria     0.00 % 0 
AU - Australia     0.00 % 0 
AW - Aruba     0.00 % 0 
AZ - Azerbaijan     0.00 % 0 
BA - Bosnia and Herzegovina     0.00 % 0 
BB - Barbados     0.00 % 0 
BD - Bangladesh     0.00 % 0 
BE - Belgium     0.00 % 0 
BF - Burkina Faso     0.00 % 0 
BG - Bulgaria     0.00 % 0 
BH - Bahrain     0.00 % 0 
BI - Burundi     0.00 % 0 
BJ - Benin     0.00 % 0 
BL - Saint Barthelemy     0.00 % 0 
BM - Bermuda     0.00 % 0 
BN - Brunei     0.00 % 0 
BO - Bolivia     0.00 % 0 
BR - Brazil     0.00 % 0 
BS - Bahamas, The     0.00 % 0 
BT - Bhutan     0.00 % 0 
BV - Bouvet Island     0.00 % 0 
BW - Botswana     0.00 % 0 
BY - Belarus     0.00 % 0 
BZ - Belize     0.00 % 0 
CA - Canada     0.00 % 0 
CC - Cocos (Keeling) Islands     0.00 % 0 
CD - Congo, Democratic Republic 
of the  
   0.00 % 0 
CF - Central African Republic     0.00 % 0 
CG - Congo, Republic of the     0.00 % 0 
CH - Switzerland     0.00 % 0 
CI - Cote d'Ivoire     0.00 % 0 
CK - Cook Islands     0.00 % 0 
CL - Chile     0.00 % 0 
CM - Cameroon     0.00 % 0 
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CN - China     0.00 % 0 
CO - Colombia     0.00 % 0 
CR - Costa Rica     0.00 % 0 
CU - Cuba     0.00 % 0 
CV - Cape Verde     0.00 % 0 
CW - Curacao     0.00 % 0 
CX - Christmas Island     0.00 % 0 
CY - Cyprus     0.00 % 0 
CZ - Czech Republic     0.00 % 0 
DE - Germany     0.00 % 0 
DJ - Djibouti     0.00 % 0 
DK - Denmark     0.00 % 0 
DM - Dominica     0.00 % 0 
DO - Dominican Republic     0.00 % 0 
DZ - Algeria     0.00 % 0 
EC - Ecuador     0.00 % 0 
EE - Estonia     0.00 % 0 
EG - Egypt     0.00 % 0 
EH - Western Sahara     0.00 % 0 
ER - Eritrea     0.00 % 0 
ES - Spain     0.00 % 0 
ET - Ethiopia     0.00 % 0 
FI - Finland     0.00 % 0 
FJ - Fiji     0.00 % 0 
FK - Falkland Islands (Islas 
Malvinas)  
   0.00 % 0 
FM - Micronesia, Federated States 
of  
   0.00 % 0 
FO - Faroe Islands     0.00 % 0 
FR - France     0.00 % 0 
FX - France, Metropolitan     0.00 % 0 
GA - Gabon     0.00 % 0 
GB - United Kingdom     0.00 % 0 
GD - Grenada     0.00 % 0 
GE - Georgia     0.00 % 0 
GF - French Guiana     0.00 % 0 
GG - Guernsey     0.00 % 0 
GH - Ghana     0.00 % 0 
GI - Gibraltar     0.00 % 0 
GL - Greenland     0.00 % 0 
GM - Gambia, The     0.00 % 0 
GN - Guinea     0.00 % 0 
GP - Guadeloupe     0.00 % 0 
GQ - Equatorial Guinea     0.00 % 0 
GR - Greece     0.00 % 0 
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GS - South Georgia and the Islands     0.00 % 0 
GT - Guatemala     0.00 % 0 
GU - Guam     0.00 % 0 
GW - Guinea-Bissau     0.00 % 0 
GY - Guyana     0.00 % 0 
HK - Hong Kong     0.00 % 0 
HM - Heard Island and McDonald 
Islands  
   0.00 % 0 
HN - Honduras     0.00 % 0 
HR - Croatia     0.00 % 0 
HT - Haiti     0.00 % 0 
HU - Hungary     0.00 % 0 
ID - Indonesia     0.00 % 0 
IE - Ireland     0.00 % 0 
IL - Israel     0.00 % 0 
IM - Isle of Man     0.00 % 0 
IN - India     0.00 % 0 
IO - British Indian Ocean Territory     0.00 % 0 
IQ - Iraq     0.00 % 0 
IR - Iran     0.00 % 0 
IS - Iceland     0.00 % 0 
IT - Italy     0.00 % 0 
JE - Jersey     0.00 % 0 
JM - Jamaica     0.00 % 0 
JO - Jordan     0.00 % 0 
JP - Japan     0.00 % 0 
KE - Kenya     0.00 % 0 
KG - Kyrgyzstan     0.00 % 0 
KH - Cambodia     0.00 % 0 
KI - Kiribati     0.00 % 0 
KM - Comoros     0.00 % 0 
KN - Saint Kitts and Nevis     0.00 % 0 
KP - Korea, North     0.00 % 0 
KR - Korea, South     0.00 % 0 
KW - Kuwait     0.00 % 0 
KY - Cayman Islands     0.00 % 0 
KZ - Kazakhstan     0.00 % 0 
LA - Laos     0.00 % 0 
LB - Lebanon     0.00 % 0 
LC - Saint Lucia     0.00 % 0 
LI - Liechtenstein     0.00 % 0 
LK - Sri Lanka     0.00 % 0 
LR - Liberia     0.00 % 0 
LS - Lesotho     0.00 % 0 
LT - Lithuania     0.00 % 0 
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LU - Luxembourg     0.00 % 0 
LV - Latvia     0.00 % 0 
LY - Libya     0.00 % 0 
MA - Morocco     0.00 % 0 
MC - Monaco     0.00 % 0 
MD - Moldova     0.00 % 0 
ME - Montenegro     0.00 % 0 
MF - Saint Martin     0.00 % 0 
MG - Madagascar     0.00 % 0 
MH - Marshall Islands     0.00 % 0 
MK - Macedonia     0.00 % 0 
ML - Mali     0.00 % 0 
MM - Burma     0.00 % 0 
MN - Mongolia     0.00 % 0 
MO - Macau     0.00 % 0 
MP - Northern Mariana Islands     0.00 % 0 
MQ - Martinique     0.00 % 0 
MR - Mauritania     0.00 % 0 
MS - Montserrat     0.00 % 0 
MT - Malta     0.00 % 0 
MU - Mauritius     0.00 % 0 
MV - Maldives     0.00 % 0 
MW - Malawi     0.00 % 0 
MX - Mexico     0.00 % 0 
MY - Malaysia     0.00 % 0 
MZ - Mozambique     0.00 % 0 
NA - Namibia     0.00 % 0 
NC - New Caledonia     0.00 % 0 
NE - Niger     0.00 % 0 
NF - Norfolk Island     0.00 % 0 
NG - Nigeria     0.00 % 0 
NI - Nicaragua     0.00 % 0 
NL - Netherlands     0.00 % 0 
NO - Norway     0.00 % 0 
NP - Nepal     0.00 % 0 
NR - Nauru     0.00 % 0 
NU - Niue     0.00 % 0 
NZ - New Zealand     0.00 % 0 
OM - Oman     0.00 % 0 
PA - Panama     0.00 % 0 
PE - Peru     0.00 % 0 
PF - French Polynesia     0.00 % 0 
PG - Papua New Guinea     0.00 % 0 
PH - Philippines     0.00 % 0 
PK - Pakistan     0.00 % 0 
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PL - Poland     0.00 % 0 
PM - Saint Pierre and Miquelon     0.00 % 0 
PN - Pitcairn Islands     0.00 % 0 
PR - Puerto Rico     0.00 % 0 
PS - Gaza Strip     0.00 % 0 
PS - West Bank     0.00 % 0 
PT - Portugal     0.00 % 0 
PW - Palau     0.00 % 0 
PY - Paraguay     0.00 % 0 
QA - Qatar     0.00 % 0 
RE - Reunion     0.00 % 0 
RO - Romania     0.00 % 0 
RS - Serbia     0.00 % 0 
RU - Russia     0.00 % 0 
RW - Rwanda     0.00 % 0 
SA - Saudi Arabia     0.00 % 0 
SB - Solomon Islands     0.00 % 0 
SC - Seychelles     0.00 % 0 
SD - Sudan     0.00 % 0 
SE - Sweden     0.00 % 0 
SG - Singapore     0.00 % 0 
SH - Saint Helena, Ascension, and 
Tristan da Cunha  
   0.00 % 0 
SI - Slovenia     0.00 % 0 
SJ - Svalbard     0.00 % 0 
SK - Slovakia     0.00 % 0 
SL - Sierra Leone     0.00 % 0 
SM - San Marino     0.00 % 0 
SN - Senegal     0.00 % 0 
SO - Somalia     0.00 % 0 
SR - Suriname     0.00 % 0 
SS - South Sudan     0.00 % 0 
ST - Sao Tome and Principe     0.00 % 0 
SV - El Salvador     0.00 % 0 
SX - Sint Maarten     0.00 % 0 
SY - Syria     0.00 % 0 
SZ - Swaziland     0.00 % 0 
TC - Turks and Caicos Islands     0.00 % 0 
TD - Chad     0.00 % 0 
TF - French Southern and Antarctic 
Lands  
   0.00 % 0 
TG - Togo     0.00 % 0 
TH - Thailand     0.00 % 0 
TJ - Tajikistan     0.00 % 0 
TK - Tokelau     0.00 % 0 
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TL - Timor-Leste     0.00 % 0 
TM - Turkmenistan     0.00 % 0 
TN - Tunisia     0.00 % 0 
TO - Tonga     0.00 % 0 
TR - Turkey     0.00 % 0 
TT - Trinidad and Tobago     0.00 % 0 
TV - Tuvalu     0.00 % 0 
TW - Taiwan     0.00 % 0 
TZ - Tanzania     0.00 % 0 
UA - Ukraine     0.00 % 0 
UG - Uganda     0.00 % 0 
UM - United States Minor Outlying 
Islands  
   0.00 % 0 
US - United States     0.00 % 0 
UY - Uruguay     0.00 % 0 
UZ - Uzbekistan     0.00 % 0 
VA - Holy See (Vatican City)     0.00 % 0 
VC - Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines  
   0.00 % 0 
VE - Venezuela     0.00 % 0 
VG - British Virgin Islands     0.00 % 0 
VI - Virgin Islands     0.00 % 0 
VN - Vietnam     0.00 % 0 
VU - Vanuatu     0.00 % 0 
WF - Wallis and Futuna     0.00 % 0 
WS - Samoa     0.00 % 0 
XK - Kosovo     0.00 % 0 
YE - Yemen     0.00 % 0 
YT - Mayotte     0.00 % 0 
ZA - South Africa     0.00 % 0 
ZM - Zambia     0.00 % 0 
ZW - Zimbabwe    0.00 % 0 
Total Respondents: 0 
 
22-) If you have any comments or suggestions about this survey, please write them in 
this box. 
Total Respondents: 0 View Detail   
 
23-) Would you like to receive the survey results? If so, please provide your email. 












D. SURVEY DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
Table 7 Demographic information for Employment Status 
Emp. Stat 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Employed 148 73.3 73.3 73.3 
Unemployed 24 11.9 11.9 85.1 
Doing Consulting or Self 
Employed 
30 14.9 14.9 100.0 
Total 202 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 8 Demographic information for Gender 
Gender 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Male 151 74.8 74.8 74.8 
Female 51 25.2 25.2 100.0 


















Table 9 Demographic information for Industry or Sector 
Industry or Sector 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Oil & Gas (Producer, 
Equipment, Alternative 
Energy) 
11 5.4 5.4 5.4 
Basic Materials (Chemicals, 
Forestry & Paper,Industrial 
Metal, Mining) 
2 1.0 1.0 6.4 
Industrial (Construction & 
Materials, Industrial Goods 
and Services 
24 11.9 11.9 18.3 
Consumer Goods 
(Automobiles & Parts, Food 
& Beverage, Personal & 
Household goods) 
45 22.3 22.3 40.6 




17 8.4 8.4 49.0 
Consumer Services (Retail, 
Wholesale, Media, Travel & 
Leisure 
17 8.4 8.4 57.4 
Telecommunications 13 6.4 6.4 63.9 
Financials (Bank, Insurance, 
Real Estate and Financial 
Services) 
24 11.9 11.9 75.7 
Technology 14 6.9 6.9 82.7 
Government 3 1.5 1.5 84.2 
NGO (Non-profit) 2 1.0 1.0 85.1 
Education 4 2.0 2.0 87.1 
Other 26 12.9 12.9 100.0 










Table 10 Demographic information for Position Level 
Position level 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Technical/Specialist position 
(i.e. IT, Lawyer, etc) 
19 9.4 9.4 9.4 
Staff 22 10.9 10.9 20.3 
Supervision 32 15.8 15.8 36.1 
Mid Management 82 40.6 40.6 76.7 
Top Management 47 23.3 23.3 100.0 
Total 202 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 11 Demographic information for level of education 
Level of Education 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid High School 2 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Associate 7 3.5 3.5 4.5 
Bachelor 79 39.1 39.1 43.6 
Master 108 53.5 53.5 97.0 
PhD or Doctoral 6 3.0 3.0 100.0 
Total 202 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 12 Demographic information for # times engaged with headhunter 
Times Participated 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Once 29 14.4 14.4 14.4 
between 2-3 94 46.5 46.5 60.9 
between 4-5 48 23.8 23.8 84.7 
between 6-7 10 5.0 5.0 89.6 
8 or more 21 10.4 10.4 100.0 







Table 13 Demographic information for Candidates Age 
 
Age 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid below 25 15 7.4 7.4 7.4 
between 25-34 63 31.2 31.2 38.6 
between 35-44 88 43.6 43.6 82.2 
between 45-54 25 12.4 12.4 94.6 
between 55-64 10 5.0 5.0 99.5 
more than 64 1 .5 .5 100.0 
Total 202 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 14 Demographic information for tenure before last engagement with the 
headhunter 
Tenure at position 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid between 0-1 years 39 19.3 19.3 19.3 
between 2-3 years 52 25.7 25.7 45.0 
between 4-5 years 56 27.7 27.7 72.8 
between 6-7 years 15 7.4 7.4 80.2 
8 or more years 40 19.8 19.8 100.0 
Total 202 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 15 Demographic information for Candidates Job mobility 
Job Mobility 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Just 1 23 11.4 11.4 11.4 
Between 2-3 81 40.1 40.1 51.5 
Between 4-5 75 37.1 37.1 88.6 
Between 6-7 13 6.4 6.4 95.0 
8 or more 10 5.0 5.0 100.0 
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Esta tesis versa teórica y empíricamente que los supuestos personales y organizacionales de la 
teoría de la agencia pueden explicar de manera más acorde la relación en una triada de negocios 
como lo son Cliente-Headhunter-Candidato. Por otra parte, esta desarrolla investigación en los 
procesos de búsqueda de talento ejecutivo usando terceros o intermediarios. Este estudio 
identifica algunas situaciones en esta relación que podrían comprometer todo el proceso.  Esta 
relación de triada es analizada en diadas, usando al headhunter como bisagra o elemento 
comunicante entre las otras dos partes. La hipótesis central es que la teoría de la agencia 
presenta argumentos y supuestos  más sólidos alineados con las situaciones del mundo real. 
Esto les permite a los investigadores entender las fallas en los procesos de búsqueda ejecutiva, 
creando la posibilidad de mejorar estos procesos.  
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La hipótesis central es revisada y comprobada en varias etapas. Primero, a través de revisiones 
teóricas y contextuales de la relación triangular en cuestión y de la diada cliente-headhunter. 
En segunda etapa, se comprobó parcialmente la hipótesis central en la díada Headhunter-
Candidato por medio del análisis de datos derivados de una encuesta entre los 202 candidatos 
los cuales han sido contactados por headhunters.  
Esta tesis ofrece contribuciones para el desarrollo de la teoría de gestión, en lo que respecta al 
uso de la teoría de la agencia en escenarios con tríadas. Esta investigación presenta la 
posibilidad de explicar una relación a tres partes tan particular como lo es cliente-headhunter-
candidato en el marco de una teoría (Agencia) más realista en el contexto descrito. Esta tesis 
también ofrece contribuciones en el campo de la Gestión de Recursos Humanos. Otra 
contribución importante que este estudio proporciona se refiere a los practicantes en la 
profesión de búsqueda de ejecutivos y las personas que los utilizan a estos como una salida 
para desarrollar sus carreras.  
a. Importancia de estudiar la triada Cliente-Headhunter-Candidato 
Uno de los más grandes desafíos para las organizaciones es el manejo del talento en el mercado 
laboral moderno (Cappelli, Keller 2014b). El mercado laboral actual incluye movilidad de 
individuos cualificados (Hamori 2010). Por consiguiente, el conocer como esa movilidad 
sucede es importante para las empresas. Esta movilidad en muchos casos está relacionada a la 
intervención de los headhunters (Clerkin, Lee 2010). Los headhunters son parte de esta relación 
tripartita o triada desarrollada entre clientes que buscan un talento con un perfil particular y 
potenciales candidatos con ese talento, que sin la intervención de los headhunters sería muy 
probable que estos no se conecten.  
La definición por parte de Simmel (1950) de una traída como una relación de tres ha sido 
importante como marco en el entendimiento de las relaciones de negocios. Estas relaciones 
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implican individuos comúnmente conocidos en el mundo de los negocios como bróker o 
intermediarios. El trabajo de Simmel es reconocido como el punto de partida en el desarrollo 
de las tipologías individuales  de los participantes en las triadas. Su investigación y 
conceptualización define el rol de los headhunters como “Tertius Gaudens”, en otras palabras 
un tercero que puede capitalizar de las diferencias entre otros dos. Sin embargo, otros 
desarrollos en este tópico han generado estrategias de como sobreponerse a estos 
intermediarios usando coaliciones (Caplow 1968) entre las otras dos partes. 
Desafortunadamente, siendo esta relación entre las tres partes consecuencia de la ignorancia o 
desconocimiento de la existencia del otro (en muchos de los casos), donde solo el headhunter 
conoce a los otros dos, una posible coalición es poco imposible por la no orientación de una 
meta común (Porter 1970). Quiero enfatizar que el desconocimiento de los otros no es la única 
casusa de esta relación, situación que desarrollo en los capítulos dos, tres y cuatro.  
En una investigación contemporánea realizada por Britton, Wright y Ball (2000), en la que la 
relación estudiada es igual en la presente investigacion, los autores utilizaron teoría de la 
coordinación como marco teórico. Consecuentemente, su investigación considera que todas las 
partes involucradas en la relación deben de tener objetivos alineados para lograr metas 
comunes. Esto les hace caer en la misma problemática presentada anteriormente por Porter 
(1970). En la misma línea de analizar relaciones de triadas, Khurana (2002) añade a la tipología 
de Simmel un más profundo entendimiento de los intermediarios. En su investigacion Khuruna 
claramente plantea como los intermediarios (en nuestro caso los headhunters) juegan un papel 
importante en la reducción de informaciones asimétricas entre las otras partes en cuestión.  
Tomando en cuenta los argumentos e investigaciones anteriores, se obserban brechas en el 
entendimiento de cómo funciona una triada, y sobre cuál es el verdadero rol del headhunter en 
la misma, no queda claro si su rol es como el mencionado en la descripción de Simmel como 
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Tertius Gaudens o de intermediario como lo denomina Khuruna. EL conocer cómo funciona 
una triada ayudaría a clarificar a todas las partes que intervienen en esta relación como pueden 
las mismas intervenir y aprovechar un mejor posicionamiento en esta. 
b. Importancia de estudiar la relación Cliente-Headhunter-Candidato 
usando teoría de la agencia 
Los profesionales como agentes han sido investigados usando agencia como esquema teórico 
(Sharma 1997). Sin embargo, la importancia considerada por Sharma (1997) para estudiar a 
estos se conecta a una precondición de “conocimiento” como elemento en una relación de 
intercambio, haciendo que estos tipos de situaciones de agencia difieran de otras tipologías más 
tradicionales. A este punto considero vital dar una explicación general de la teoría de la agencia. 
No obstante, en cada uno de los próximos capítulos, este marco teórico es bien desarrollada, 
adaptándolo al contexto de las partes que intervienen. 
La teoría de la agencia se defino como la situación donde un Individuo (Principal) contrata a 
otro (Agente) para actuar o decidir en nombre del primero para realizar una tarea o actividad 
(Ross 1973b). Sin embargo, un importante elemento que considera esta teoría es  la información 
asimétrica. Esta se define como un desbalance de información entre el principal y el agente (o 
las partes que intervienen en la relación) (Arrow 1963). Basado en esta limitación de 
información entre las partes tanto el Principal como el Agente pueden actuar a su propia 
discreción asumiendo riesgos en nombre del otro (Jensen, Meckling 1976), situación 
denominada Daño Moral (Arrow 1965). En algunos otros casos en función de la imitación de 
información el agente tomo una decisión equivoca en nombre del Principal; este tipo de 
información asimétrica se denomina Selección Adversa (Akerlof 1970). Para evitar estas 
situaciones previas, la teoría propone el uso de contratos que limiten las acciones y premiar o 
recompensar el adherirse a este intercambio siguiendo estos acuerdos.  
Con intención de reducir esta información asimétrica, existen alternativas definidas 
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“Señalización” o Signaling (en inglés) y “Proyección” o Screening (en inglés). Señalización es 
un tipo de información compartida en forma de señales (Spence 1973). Esta es enviada por una 
de las partes a las otras, modificando la conducta del o los receptores. Proyección  es una técnica 
usada por agentes económicos para obtener información de sus contrapartes con la intensión 
de minimizar asimetrías de información (Stiglitz, Weiss 1992). 
Un artículo fundamental que se ha considerado pilar fundamental en esta tesis, es el 
concerniente con la investigación realizada por Eisenhardt (1989). En este artículo, la autora 
plantea lo que es conocido como supuestos de la teoría de la agencia, siendo estos supuestos 
individuales y organizacionales. Los supuestos individuales son interés propio, racionalidad 
limitada y aversión al riesgo. El interés propio es la descripción dada al porque individuos 
tiendes a tomar decisiones basadas en sus propios intereses. Racionalidad limitada es la 
descripción que se le da al como los individuos nunca hacen decisiones perfectas porque existe 
información relacionada a esa decisión, no conocida por ellos. Aversión al riesgo es una 
conducta humana que sucede cuando los individuos están expuestos a resultados con 
incertidumbre. Por lo que los individuos tienden a escoger la decisión que con menor riesgo a 










Tabla 1 Esquema de la Teoría de la Agencia. 
Idea Principal Relaciones principal-agentes deben reflejar organización eficiente de la 
información y los costes de riesgo asociado. 
Unidad de Análisis  Contrato entre en Principal y el Agente 
Supuestos Humanos  Interés Propio, racionalidad limitada y aversión al riesgo 
Supuestos 
Organizacionales 
Conflicto parcial de objetivos entre los participantes. 
Eficiencia como el criterio de eficacia. 
Información asimétrica entre principal y agente. 
Supuesto sobre la 
información  
La información como un bien adquirible 
Problemas de 
contratación 
Agencia (daño moral y selección adversa) 
Riesgos compartidos 
Dominio del problema  Las relaciones en las que el principal y el agente que tienen diferentes 
metas y preferencias de riesgo (por ejemplo, la compensación, la 
regulación, el liderazgo, la gestión de la influencia o impresión, la 
denuncia de irregularidades, de integración vertical, los precios de 
transferencia) 
Fuente: Eisenhardt, 1989. 
Los supuestos organizacionales son: conflicto parcial de objetivos entre los participantes, 
eficiencia como el criterio de eficacia e información asimétrica entre principal y agente. El 
conflicto parcial es la situación en la cual algunos objetivos pueden ser compartidos por los 
participantes. Sin embargo, otros objetivos no por lo que son de agendas individuales de cada 
una de las partes. Por lo que, en algunos casos el principal y el agente pondrán sus objetivos 
personales sobre los acuerdos comunes. En lo que respecta a eficiencia como criterio de 
efectividad, es el cómo las partes establecen la mejor y más eficiente manera de crear elementos 
contractuales que sean beneficiosos para ambos.  
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Estos supuestos se explican con detalle a lo largo de los capítulos 2, 3 y 4. Por lo que los 
conceptos teóricos presentados son solo una introducción al marco teórico desarrollado 
posteriormente. El simple propósito a este punto es permitir la comprensión de la triada en 
cuestión.  
En consideración a los conceptos de agency expuestos con anterioridad, hay una relación de 
agencia entre los clientes y los headhunters. Esta relación tiene un elemento contractual como 
lo define la teoría. Aunque, en el caso del tercero en la presente triada (el candidato) no hay un 
contrato “de jure” con el headhunter. Aquí se plantea un contrato con similitudes a los contratos 
psicológicos planteados por Rousseau (1989). En otras palabras, una forma de contrato que no 
es escrita, en la que se valora más el elemento de temporalidad de la relación y la definición de 
responsabilidades en alcanzar los objetivos. 
Por otra parte, otro elemento en esta materia es el nivel de dependencia desarrollado por el 
principal y el agente con el candidato. Este último, podría modificar el resultado del proceso 
en cualquier momento. Los candidatos en un punto se transforman en principales de la triada, 
sometiendo al agente a un segundo grupo de controles, esto se denomina doble agencia (Child, 
Rodrigues 2003). 
Situaciones similares han sido analizadas usando teoría de la agencia y triadas. Por ejemplo, 
esto se ha documentado en el sector de servicios de marketing (Tate, Ellram et al. 2010), y en 
la industria de la construcción (van der Valk, van Iwaarden 2011). Sin embargo, el principal 
argumento que aquí se utiliza para soportar lo particular de este trabajo en comparación a los 
otros citados, es que los candidatos son los “vendedores” y “activo”, pero antes que eso son 
seres humanos. En consideración a las características de estos individuos su importancia en la 
triada es incalculable, sus decisiones tienen efectos en sus vidas profesionales futuras.  
Por lo anteriormente dicho, mantener investigación en las triadas de negocios usando teoría de 
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la agencia provee contribuciones más realísticas que otras teorías que consideran logros y metas 
comunes como supuestos de una triada.  
c. Importancia de estudiar los procesos de búsqueda ejecutiva usando 
terceros, para efectos del reclutamiento y selección y el desarrollo de 
carrera 
Hacia finales de la década de los ochentas, el reclutamiento y otras prácticas de contratación 
cambiaron (Bonet, Cappelli et al. 2013). Un cambio de las formas tradicionales en el 
reclutamiento hacia el uso de intermediarios, es uno de estos. Las firmas de búsqueda ejecutivas 
o headhunters (cazatalentos en español) están dentro de esos intermediarios. Estas son firmas 
o “agentes, los cuales reciben pagos de clientes, empresa u organizaciones para ayudarles a 
atraer, contratar y desarrollar líderes” (Piccolo 2012). 
Un reporte presentado en el 2014 por la empresa Bullhorn (Tecnología de la información y 
soluciones de software para sector de la contratación de personal) expreso que desde el 2010 
al 2014, 70% o más entre los encuestados (n=1337, compañías de búsqueda de personal), 
lograron o excedieron sus metas de ingresos (EEUU y Canadá). Otro reporte (American 
Staffing Association (ASA) 2014) relacionado al mismo sector refleja que más allá de los 
últimos años de recesión económica, ha existido un “crecimiento vigoroso” en el sector de la 
búsqueda de personal. Junto con estas importantes referencias, compañías como Korn Ferry, 
Boyden, Egon Zehnder, Heidrick & Struggles entre muchas otras con larga experiencia en este 
sector de servicios se han transformado en empresas globales (Garrison 2005), sugiere que los 
procesos de búsqueda ejecutiva son una práctica que impacta a las empresas alrededor del 
mundo.  Estas empresas se han llegado a involucrar en mercados no tradicionales como la 
educación superior y las empresas sin fines de lucro, ejecutando búsquedas en posiciones de 
liderazgo.  
El crecimiento de las firmas de búsqueda ejecutiva mencionado anteriormente y el alto nivel 
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de globalización de estas empresas (Hall, Beaverstock et al. 2009) obliga a la comunidad 
académica a mantener la investigación para este importante sector. 
La automatización de las funciones de recursos humanos o E-HRM es una gran tendencia en 
las organizaciones en contextos globales (Davila, Elvira et al. 2007, Panayotopoulou, Vakola 
et al. 2007). Sin embargo, en el caso del reclutamiento y selección depende de gente, 
principalmente en candidatos activos (gente buscando empleo). Como aquí se explican y se 
dan evidencia los headhunters en muchos casos consideran entre sus candidatos personas que 
no están buscando empleo. Por lo que, es importante mantener líneas de investigación en el 
sector que motiva en parte la movilidad de los candidatos.   
Otra manera de entender como trabajos los headhunters es verlos como intermediarios que son 
capaces de crear igualdad entre organizaciones que buscan individuos particulares, con 
características difíciles de conseguir, y estos mismos individuos (Hamori 2010). Usar a estos 
intermediarios para realizar este emparejamiento podría ser costoso. Sin embargo, por el nivel 
de especialización que algunas de esas posiciones requieren, una firma de búsqueda ejecutiva 
puede ser rentable (Adler 2003). 
Finalmente, en relación a las investigaciones previas de desarrollo de carrera (Dreher, Lee et 
al. 2011, Hamori, Kakarika 2009, Hamori 2010, Hamori, Cao et al. 2012), estas han demostrado 
lo beneficioso que puede ser para los candidatos el participar en búsquedas por medio de 
headhunters. Estos candidatos pueden desarrollar carrera y tener mayor movilidad que aquellos 
que no los usan. Por esto, el  entender a través de investigación como los candidatos interactúan 
durante los procesos de búsqueda ejecutiva podría ser importante. 
d. Importancia de estudiar los procesos de búsqueda ejecutiva usando 
intermediarios para la comunidad de profesionales 
Las firmas de búsqueda ejecutiva o headhunters son empresas de servicios que han sido 
incluidas en las que participan de “mercado de acceso irrestricto o contestable” (Britton, Clark 
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et al. 1992). Estos son mercados en los cuales hay bajas barreras de entrada y salida, costos 
hundidos e igualdad de condiciones en el acceso a la tecnología para nuevos o actuales 
participantes (Baumol 1982). Pareciera que por estas características además de la 
confidencialidad (Byrne 1986, Jones 1989) que históricamente ha rodeado a este grupo, podría 
ser una ocupación con bajo nivel de profesionalismo.  
Sin embargo, se puede apreciar como la Asociación de firmas de búsqueda ejecutiva y 
consultores en liderazgo (organización internacional de reclutadores ejecutivos) se han 
asociado con las más prestigiosas escuelas de negocios incorporando a sus exalumnos para 
ofrecerles posibilidades de estrategia en manejo de carrera (Association of Executive Search 
and Leadership Consultants (AESC) NAb).  Además, ellos han desarrollado un programa de 
certificación avanzada para formar profesionales en la búsqueda ejecutiva a través de la 
Universidad de Cornell y su escuela de Relaciones Laborales e Industriales (Association of 
Executive Search and Leadership Consultants (AESC) NAa). 
Estas señales de los profesionales en el área, como el desarrollo de competencias en búsquedas 
ejecutivas y la creación de sinergias con escuelas de negocios es prueba de que hay un 
incremento en los niveles de profesionalismo en esta actividad, haciéndose proveedores de 
servicios más respetables. 
Estos elementos discutidos previamente permiten considerar, cuán importante es y debería de 
ser para la academia en desarrollar más investigación que explique en detalle los procesos y 
características de este sector. A través del sustento de investigaciones en este sector, esto 
eventualmente se transformar en la creación de cursos académicos formales. 
Consecuentemente, entrenamiento de futuros profesionales, normalizando las operaciones y 




B. PREGUNTA DE INVESTIGACIÓN Y CONTRIBUCIONES 
a. Pregunta de Investigación 
La principal pregunta de investigación abordada en esta investigación es el siguiente: 
¿Qué argumentos y supuestos de la Teoría de Agencia proporcionan comprensión de la 
relación cliente-headhunter-candidato como una tríada? 
Para responder a esta pregunta Yo realice dos revisiones teórico contextual y una investigación 
empírica. En la primera revisión, yo examine a manera general a los headhunters como bisagra 
de esta relación, adaptando parcialmente la metodología usada por Armenakis & Bedejan 
(1999). Construyendo sobre varias características, y procesos documentados e identificados de 
la industria del headhunting (Byrne 1986, Dingman 1993, Garrison 2005) soy capaz de usar 
los argumentos y supuestos de la teoría de la agencia para explicar situaciones como los 
tiempos en los procesos de búsqueda, la confidencialidad, la información asimétrica creada por 
el cliente, y la perspectiva del candidato en esta relación.  
En el segundo análisis teórico contextual, yo reviso la relación cliente-headhunter. 
Considerando de que esta relación es escenario natural de Principal-Agente (Stiglitz 1987), 
tome un abordaje similar a la revisión anterior. En este segundo cuerpo de contenido, Yo 
considero situaciones donde el cliente produce (consciente o inconscientemente) información 
asimétrica. Además se exploró las maneras en que los clientes evalúan los servicios provistos 
por el headhunter y la problemática de Doble Principal. Para culminar esta sección yo 
argumentó el concepto de perfil oculto propuesto.  
Sistemáticamente, y considerando que ya he afrontado la relación cliente-headhunter, tenía 
sentido considerar la otra parte de la triada. En la investigación empírica, escogí revisar la 
relación headhunter-candidato desde la percepción de este último, usando como variables 
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dependientes los resultados obtenidos de esta relación con en reclutador. Estos resultados como 
explico están alineados con los recientemente considerados en la literatura de recursos 
humanos (Saks, Zikic et al. 2015) adaptándolos al contexto señalado. Yo contemplé esto como 
manera lógica para completar la investigación de esta triada.  
En la parte empírica mencionada incluye como punto de partida la condición de empleo de las 
candidatos (Hamori 2010, Sonnenfeld, Ward 2008) que se han relacionado con headhunters. 
Esa condición de empleo o estatus es usada como antecedente de la información compartida 
entre candidatos y headhunters, los esfuerzos hechos por el candidato durante la relación y la 
percepción del tipo de contrato que yo planteo existe entre ellos. Estas tres variables son 
comprobadas con los resultados logrados por el candidato. Los resultados de este capítulo 
proveen evidencia de que existen elementos del contrato psicológico en esta relación, pero 
además soporta la idea que los esfuerzos en búsqueda de empleo por el candidato durante sus 
interacciones con el cazatalentos están relacionado e los logros obtenidos.  
b. Contribuciones 
Esta disertación provee contribuciones para el desarrollo de la teoría gerencial vinculadas al 
uso de la teoría de la agencia en escenarios de triadas. En primer lugar la investigación 
presentada puede identificar algunas situaciones que existen en el contexto de las búsquedas 
ejecutivas usando headhunters, y explica estas bajo la teoría de la agencia, enfoque nunca se 
había realizado en el contexto de una triada. Segundo, porque mantiene una línea de 
investigación relacionada al concepto de “Doble Agency” en el sector servicio, con la 
particularidad que en la triada que yo menciono en la disertación el activo principal de 
intercambio es un ser humano, el cual tiene relevancia y decisión en el proceso. Considero que 
esta disertación está alineada con otras investigaciones previas que combinan teoría de agencia 
y resultados conductuales (Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia 1998). Sin embargo, en mi caso el contexto 
es un proceso en el cual hay tres participantes y se relaciona con el sector servicios.  
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Ultimadamente, la contribución teórica más grande de esta investigación es la posibilidad de 
explicar una triada de negocios tan particular como lo es cliente-headhunter-candidato bajo una 
teoría (agencia) más realista en el contexto descrito. 
Esta tesis además provee contribuciones en el campo de la gestión de recursos humanos. 
Primero, porque ofrece una revisión académica del proceso de búsqueda ejecutiva usando 
intermediarios. Segundo, esta explora más en profundidad el uso de proveedores en procesos 
como lo son reclutamiento y selección. Tercero, porque sugiere conceptos como el de 
“Autoridad de Contratación” y el del “Perfil Oculto” las cuales se relacionan con problemáticas 
de los recursos humanos. Cuarto, porque explica el rol de las unidades de recursos humanos 
las cuales pueden juegan un papel positivo o no en los procesos de búsqueda ejecutiva. 
Finalmente, identifica un grupo de situaciones que afectan negativamente la interacción con 
headhunters. 
Otro aporte importante que este estudio provee se relaciona a los practicantes o profesionales 
de las búsquedas ejecutivas, y los  de los individuos que usan a estos para desarrollar sus 
carreras profesionales. La mayoría de la investigación disponible a los profesionales de esta 
área tiende a ser hecha por las mismas firmas de búsqueda ejecutiva, agrupaciones gremiales y 
proveedores de este sector. Por lo que, in muchos casos, yo planteo que pueden tener algún 
nivel de subjetividad. Esta es una de las pocas investigaciones que ha considerado a los 
candidatos como principal fuente de información.  
Entender algunas de las percepciones que tienen los candidatos en el proceso, y sus posiciones 
en función a la relación que desarrollan con los cazatalentos, se puede proveer soluciones a 
problemas en la misma y seguir reduciendo las brechas de información entre los participantes. 
Finalmente, pero no menos importante esta disertación ha servido para plantear una agenda de 
investigación personal en este tópico, y construir una fuerte red de investigadores y 
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colaboradores con los cuales actualmente estoy desarrollando otras investigaciones.  
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